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ABSTRACT
This thesis is devoted to analyzing the political transition 
that Mexico experienced from 1968 to 1988, through three sources of 
information: historical documents, economic and demographic statis­
tics and public opinion. The first part of the work examines four 
particularly relevant historical processes concerning the relation­
ship between State and society that can be identified by very pre­
cise symbolic events defined here as crisis: 1) the October 2, 1968 
massacre that culminated the student uprising; 2) the August 31,
197 6, peso devaluation that marked the climax of the confrontation 
between the Echeverrista government and the domestic business class 
3) the September 1, 1982, bank nationalization that symbolized the 
excesses of the oil boom and foreign indebtedness; 4) the October, 
1987, stock market crash that ended unrealistic market euphoria of 
political origin.
The second part of the thesis seeks to quantitatively 
outline these historical processes and establish a basis for 
comparing them one with another. To this end, several statistical 
series from 1940 to 1987 are used to measure the social, economic 
and political behavior of the period with the purpose of clarifying 
the relationship between the qualitative historical facts and the 
quantitative statistical figures.
The third part is dedicated to examining the opinions of 
individuals or, more precisely, the different perceptions that for 
different reasons Mexicans held about the same events and 
circumstances, as well as the effect that such a heterogeneous mix 
of opinion can have on a nation's ability to persevere in the face 
of the four crises of the last 20 years.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The central proposition of this thesis is that in 1968 a period 
of transition opened in Mexico as the product of a series of 
accumulated causes that created crisis and exploded in the student 
movement of that same year. The transition continued without 
resolution into 1987 and was expressed in successive explosions —  
the crises of 1976, 1982 and finally the stock market crash of 1987- 
- that were linked principally through the centralist presidency and 
the old Mexican state. The links in the chain were forged by the 
government response to each one of the crises it faced. And so, the 
central scheme of this project is the historical review of these po­
litical responses and, for this reason, the work is primarily po­
litical science rather than sociology or statistics — although sup­
port is sought from these other disciplines.
The analysis begins with four central hypotheses. First, the 
response to each of the four crises of the last 20 years has gener­
ated the following crisis, because the response — particularly 
through a strong, centralist presidency—  has primarily attacked im­
mediate, superficial effects and not profound causes. This has pro­
duced a pernicious historical chain of events, exacerbating Mexico's 
problems. Second, the first hypothesis notwithstanding, the country 
has improved since the 1940s, though in an accidental manner, owing 
to the relatively autonomous behavior of the political, economic and 
social spheres and the ability of each to neutralize and resist the 
negative effects of the others. Third, the last four crises have re­
vealed the existence of a great structural heterogeneity that gives 
the society an important capacity to resist adverse circumstances 
through the diversity of perception about the same reality. And, 
fourth, the superstructural element — values, perceptions, mass me­
dia, culture—  creates, spreads and propagates the characteristics 
that drive the behaviors described in the first three hypotheses 
and, therefore, perception is as important as reality.
3The response of President Luis Echeverria to the loss of legit­
imacy from the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre was to win support from the 
nation's youth through public appointments, public spending and 
rhetoric; tactics which also inspired opposition from domestic busi­
ness and led to the crisis of 197 6. The response of President Jose 
L6pez Portillo was to regain the support of business with big pro­
jects financed through foreign loans that were secured thanks to the 
oil bonanza. But, L6pez Portillo carried this strategy to unsustain­
able levels, inviting the crisis of 1982 that ended in the bank na­
tionalization and the alienation of international capital. The re­
sponse of President Miguel de la Madrid was to regain the confidence 
of international lenders through scrupulous payment of the foreign 
debt (even though the tactic would halt economic growth and produce 
unemployment for at least six years) and a show of economic opti­
mism, albeit based on stock market euphoria that became unsustain­
able and ended in the crisis of October, 1987, with the market 
crash.
The qualitative historical analysis of the first four chapters 
requires an empirical test to see: whether or not there was such a 
transition; whether or not the four stipulated crises indicate a 
transition; whether or not the four crises were linked and, if so, 
provoked by political rather than economic or other forms of social 
behavior. At the beginning of this work I assume that public opinion 
regarding the government --and, further, the statistical indicators 
of its performance—  would show drops or be turbulent during each of 
the four key periods, as evidence of the existence of the crises and 
the deteriorating conditions of the country, which, as a global re­
sult of hard economic times, would show a profile of general decline 
for the last 20 years. And so, the chapters dealing with statistical 
series are only indicative. That is to say, I saw them as a way of 
testing the central hypotheses, but not as constituting the theses 
and propositions to be tested. The statistics are only an attempt to 
get an empirical, less speculative measure of the four assumed 
crises along with their profundity and severity. I collected data 
from a 20-year period before and after the transition to accumulate
4enough statistical information to compare with a certain degree of 
validity the pre- and post-1968 behavior, which is taken as the 
inflexion point of the transition.
The initial assumptions were not previously checked, and test­
ing them proved highly rewarding. Public opinion did not turn 
against the government in 1982 or 1987, at least not in the general 
indiscriminate manner that had been hoped. The statistical indica­
tors did not collapse around the four dates of the crises, at least 
not in the pronounced way that I believed they would. The quantita­
tive outline of the 20-year period did not show the general economic 
and social decline that conventional wisdom would have guessed. 
Public opinion revealed much more complex, rich and sophisticated 
patterns concerning all of the hypotheses, above all unanticipated 
contrasts between regions and social groups. The statistical series 
revealed a system capable of attenuating, neutralizing or destroying 
the global effects that could have arisen from disturbances in dif­
ferent sectors of the economy and society. The quantitative outline 
of the period, despite its ups and downs, showed general improvement 
rather than decline up to the beginning of the 1980s.
These results led me to reformulate the original argument. Why 
were the initial conjectures refuted? Nonetheless, the refutations 
strengthened another explanation based on the great heterogeneity of 
Mexican society: the weakly connected behavior between polity, econ­
omy and society during the period; the increasing maturity of civil 
society; the important formation and participation of a new organic 
intellectuality; the notion that the country had advanced despite 
its governments; and, perhaps most important, signs that the transi­
tion was about to end.
The analysis contradicts the argument that the four crises have 
produced a profound, national decline. Each period has been charac­
terized, to greater and lesser degrees, by a problem of perception - 
-a phenomenon of public opinion. Such problems notwithstanding, as 
well as the conceptual difficulties and theoretical limitations of
studying crisis, the analysis is useful because it reveals elements 
and characteristics of the State — above all of the relationship be 
tween State and society—  that under normal conditions are very dif 
ficult to identify.
6PART ONE: THE FACTS
The point of departure is the historic search for the Mexican 
transition of 1968 to 1988 through the four crises of the period 
and, for this reason, it is important to delimit them. The first 
crisis under analysis — the repression of October, 1968, in 
Tlatelolco—  seems to have been caused by the protests of an ascen­
dant middle class wanting to participate. The traditional, authori­
tarian aspects of the political system and the inequalities of the 
economic system were openly denounced, inspired in part by the 
worldwide spirit of popular protest of the times. The second crisis 
— the peso devaluation of August, 1976, that climaxed the business- 
government confrontation of the second half of Echeverria's sexenio- 
- seems to have been produced by business leaders and their lack of 
confidence in the president's political opening to and rapprochement 
with the middle class; a strategy Echeverria put into practice in 
response to the lessons of 1968. The third crisis — the bank nation­
alization of September, 1982, as the culmination of a process of 
distrust and capital flight—  seems to have been provoked by the po­
litical leadership to check its defeat from the attempted reconcili­
ation with the business class; a strategy adopted by L6pez Portillo 
because of the events of the Echeverria sexenio. The fourth crisis - 
-the stock market crash that began on October 6, 1987, with the nom­
ination of the PRI's candidate for president—  seems to have been 
provoked by the public and private leadership through a chain of mu­
tual errors and blunders, not all of which were inevitable. The four 
crises reveal distinct responses of the national leadership: the 
government reconciliation with the middle classes beginning in 1968; 
the government-business reconciliation beginning in 197 6; the recon­
ciliation between government and international capital beginning in 
1982. The responses to the crisis of 1987 are too fresh to be delin­
eated.
The analysis about the nature and magnitude of the crisis, as 
well as about the process of government decision making, was carried 
out from the end of the 1970s by all social groups and sectors who
7expressed public and private opinions, forming a prevailing aware­
ness about the problems that caused the crisis. A sample of the de­
bate appears in Nexos in March of 1983, where several contradictory 
opinions are expressed about Mexico's conditions. Some commentators 
interpreted the moment as dangerous for the nation, while others saw 
it as an opportunity.
The first group saw a transitional stage in the world balance 
of powers that hurt Mexico, Latin America and the third-world coun­
tries. They argued that the new correlation of political forces was 
based strategically in military superiority that permitted a redefi­
nition of the west's hegemonic space and was accompanied by a direct 
attack on the exportation of the socialist revolution, open criti­
cism of Marxist ideology and a heightened disparagement of the real­
ity of the socialist world. For them, the politics of the military 
buildup was being entrenched and rationalized in the west through 
technology exchange, the strategic alliance, and the general notions 
of shared danger and defense of human rights, peace and liberty in 
the context of a new cold war.
On the other hand, the second group saw in the worldwide 
realignment a new international division of labor, seeking a 
strategic specialization to create economic growth with high levels 
of productivity and efficiency in a competitive, international 
capitalist system, which would promote re-equilibration of the 
international market and "healthy" industrialization. From this neo­
liberal perspective, the cultural dimension of the crisis was being 
diagnosed as a degeneration of traditional institutions and values, 
such as the family, the church, honesty, hard work, and in general 
all of the traditional mores of western civilization. The effects of 
the worldwide political realignment in Mexico and Latin America 
could be recognized in their cycles of economic crisis; their 
fragile political stability; growing international pressures; decay 
in national identity, pejoratively called nativism; the proven 
incapacity of their administrative forms and techniques; and in
general the atmosphere of uncertainty, mistrust, recession and 
poverty in acutely polarized social systems.
Although in other more ideological terms, the Mexican public 
sector recognized some problems with diagnosing the international 
political context as unstable, conflictive, unequal and 
ungovernable. And so foreign policy would be conducted according to 
its traditional principles, although not without important internal 
disagreements. Nonetheless, the government disagreed with 
interpretations that insisted that North American neo-liberalism was 
gaining too much influence domestically. The government accepted 
even less that this current would exert influence through the 
International Monetary Fund, the International Development Bank and 
the international banking community. Still less the government 
believed that such an advance could generate in Mexico a new 
national right closely tied to the North American right, as well as 
adverse conditions for the abatement of the crisis and structural 
change.
For Carlos Tello1 it was paradoxical and dramatic that with the 
rise of favorable conditions for development, the country created a 
more unequal society; that "among the success we have in terms of 
growth and material gains, we are worse off and our crisis is more 
acute, profound and generalized." For him, the crisis of the pattern 
of growth and accumulation was accompanied by a crisis of ideas now 
that Mexico insisted on the use of orthodox economic policy 
instruments that already had proven insufficient. This argument that 
re-emphasized the development-distribution problem was expressed 
principally by worker and campesino organizations as well as by 
leftist political parties who defined as causes of the crisis the 
public and private sectors. In what is referred to as the recycling 
of the crisis through improper political-economic management, we can 
observe the persistence of the ideological struggle between 
monetarists and structuralists.
1 Oceano-Nexos 1983: pag.8
9Rolando Cordera2 argued that the situation in 1983 had begun in 
the 1970s with the exhaustion of the old model of growth; that we 
experienced at the time a more acute phase of a long crisis or 
economic exhaustion that spun off several short-term crises. For him 
what failed was the attempt to change to a new economic policy. He 
described the problem as a "crisis of the management of the crisis 
in the errors and stalemates of the bureaucracy". In this sense, he 
argued that the crisis within the governing group was associated 
with a crisis in the development of ideas brought on by a fondness 
for the obsolete theories of the past. Rene Villarreal argued that 
the "strategy of development centered in accelerated growth and 
based on oil and foreign debt, far from resolving the structural 
problems, would make them more acute and also create a more profound 
crisis than the previous one." He pointed out that the traditional 
structural problems had been exacerbated in practically all of the 
economic sectors and that the crisis had reached private business.
From these fundamentally economic analyses, we can perceive a 
relative consensus about the obsolescence of the development model 
that Mexico had historically applied, as well as the changing 
international context and its effect on our economy. Also emphasized 
is the lack of creative new ideas and the incapacity of orthodox 
economic paradigms to deal with the crisis.
# 4  i tPablo Gonzalez Casanova upon asking what were the specific 
characteristics of the Mexican crisis, argued that it was 
accompanied by bankruptcy, equating the crisis with a 
decapitalization that, in order to solve the problem, employed 
policies that did not work — at least not in the way the government 
said they would work. To him the government's real objective was to 
bankrupt the working class and middle class, veiled in an optimistic 
belief that the problems would be solved through monetarist
2 Ibid, pag. 24
3 Ibid, pag. 63
4 Ibid, pag. 21
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prescriptions. Soledad Loaeza5 expressed her worry about the absence 
of a political project that supported the economic program of the 
recent governments, now that the announced economic prescriptions 
seemed not to take into consideration the perverse political 
consequences that could arise. She questioned the intent of reducing 
the presence of the state and foresaw possible intolerance in vital 
matters, given the politics of economic stabilization through 
demobilization and control of social demands.
Jose Carreno6 spoke of "a crisis of direction, of leadership, 
of the governing class" that extended to the leadership of labor, 
business, political parties, intellectuals as well as government. He 
argued that the social changes had not been assimilated politically, 
that "vertical, paternalistic, concentrated and exclusionary 
structures remained" and were in crisis. His analysis was related to 
the phenomenon of a new generation of politicians and to the 
weakening of civil society. This last point was interpreted 
completely differently by other analysts and politicians, since they 
saw that in the context of crisis civil society was becoming more 
plural through great pressure and was in the process of political 
reorganization and ideological redefinition.
Roger Bartra7 argued that two opposite alternatives were 
creating the crisis --one from the right and the other from the 
government. The option of generating alternatives from the 
government had difficulties, because, for Bartra, the system was 
unable to reproduce itself now that it only recognized the interests 
of the dominant class without creating alternatives that were 
politically viable and could be imposed. Manuel Buendia said that 
he saw the crisis as a revolution conquered or as a triumphant 
counter-revolution and that the dilemma posed by Tello and Cordera 
in La Disputa por la Nacion already had been resolved against the
5 Ibid, pag. 47
6 Ibid, pag. 10
7 Ibid, pag. 44
8 Ibid, pag. 92
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revolutionary project. Carlos Monsivais9 argued that the crisis 
brought, along with a national psychological crisis, a daily life 
that in time would create a cultural, social and political 
backwardness. He argued that the space of civil society already had 
been eclipsed --in dialogue, democratic participation, confidence 
and hope—  and that the social consensus was being articulated 
through fear and resignation.
On the side of the government Francisco Su&rez Davila10 argued 
that the crisis of the mythology of false and static diagnoses 
rested on responses that experience had shown to be inadequate and 
unrealistic. Manuel Camacho11 questioned the critics about the 
absence of a political project in the Miguel de la Madrid government 
and argued that the political project was strengthening our 
nationalism with economic and social efficiency, based on a non-
i 12authoritarian political rationality. Francisco Ruiz Massieu argued 
that the intellectual debate lacked the consideration of the 
politics of social governance, which, for him, made the analysis at 
best superficial for establishing a position or attempting to 
impinge on public opinion.
The existence of the crisis has been taken as fact in the last 
few years, but only to that point has there been consensus. Whenever 
attempts have been made to conceptualize the crises or propose 
options to resolve them, great theoretical, methodological and 
normative differences have arisen. Analyses of particular aspects 
have been made, such as the collections coordinated by Pablo 
Gonzalez Casanova and Enrique Florescano, Mexico Hoy, in 1979;
Oceano and Nexos, A Mitad del Tunel, in 1983; and Gonzalez Casanova 
and Hector Aguilar Camin, Mexico ante la Crisis, in 1985. They have 
not been integrated in a global analysis of the situation. But such 
a work is not easy since there is no basic consensus — even in such
9 Ibid, pag. 16
10 Ibid, pag. 80
11 Ibid, pag. 84
12 Ibid, pag. 87
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apparently fundamental aspects as whether the problem is more 
political than economic or vice versa, or whether it includes a more 
ideological connotation. The confusion is included in the term.
The concept of crisis
It is not the purpose of this section to exhaustively review 
the evolution of the theoretical studies about the term crisis. 
Rather it seeks to clarify the difficulties and advantages of using 
the concept and to make some bibliographic references. The term 
comes from the greek name, which means to judge, decide. And, in 
effect, crisis defines above all a moment of decision. Adopted first 
by medical science, the concept referred to the moment when the 
symptoms of an illness reached their decisive point. From there the 
options for the sick body remained well-defined: improve and recover 
health or worsen to the point of no return. From medicine the 
concept flowed to other areas of thought. Psychology adopted it, 
conferring a meaning similar to that of medicine: the moment when 
the altered individual loses complete control of himself and stops 
being responsible for his own acts. From psychology the term crisis 
jumped to the vast universe of the social sciences, where it has 
become one of the central and, at the same time, most polemical 
concepts.
In the field of human relations the first meaning we find for 
the term is armed confrontation among nations. War is, from the 
beginning, the typical crisis situation, which is prolonged 
throughout the hostilities and comes to an end in armistice. A long 
time before the social sciences were recognized as such, students of 
international relations spoke of crises. With the ideologues of the 
proletariat, especially the Marxists, the term crisis takes on a new 
meaning: the moment of rupture in the established social order which 
can lead to a radical transformation of property relations — social 
revolution. The Soviet revolution of October would be the best 
example of triumphant revolutionary crisis: the end of the old 
feudal organization of politics and industry and the beginning of
13
the construction of socialism. Of course, revolutionary crisis does 
not always lead to proletariat success but could also bring its 
defeat.
With capitalism and the increasingly clear revelation of its 
contradictions, the term was popularized as a reference to economic 
crises as the moment in which a stage of propsperity and growth 
comes to an end — at times suddenly. As such, the crisis of 1929—  
evidenced in the stock market crash of October, massive closings, 
general unemployment and pronounced drops in production, trade and 
consumption—  becomes the prototype of crisis.
In addition to its inroads into political economy and Marxism, 
the concept has transcended virtually all disciplines within social 
science. It is possible to find references to political, social, 
ideological or cultural crises as moments that have little or 
nothing to do with the economic cycle or proletarian revolutions.
The meanings are multiple and, at times, contradictory, but in all 
of them is the single common connection of the original idea of the 
decisive moment in the history of an individual or social group.
A review of the different concepts of crisis that prevail in
13 ithe field of social science reveals a panorama of great confusion, 
as much for its time and special references as for its character, 
dimension and effects. And so, by crisis are understood things so 
dissimilar as a moment of rupture or a process of several years; an 
event that improves or one that destroys a system; the total 
dimension of reality or a singular specific event; a product of
13 Of 76 titles about crisis, emphasized are En torno a Galileo: Esquema de las 
Crisis by Ortega and Gasset published in 1933; La Crisis de Nuestra Era and 
Las Filosoflas Sociales de Nuestra Epoca de Crisis: El Hombre Frente a las 
Crisis by Sorokin, published in 1941 and 1950 and Las Crisis en Mexico by 
Cosio Villegas written in 1947; more recently the Marxist works of Jurgen 
Habermas (1973) Problemas de Legitimacion en el Capitalismo Tardio, Alan 
Wolfe (1977) Los Limites de la Legitimidadf Claus Offe (1978) 
Ingobernabilidad: El Renacimiento de las Teorias Conservadoras, Goran 
Therborn (1979) iComo domina la clase dominatnte?. In the functionalist 
perpective Meadows (1973), Glazer (1975), Bell (1976), Inglehart (1977), 
Hildebrandt (1978), Kagles (1978), Janowitz (1978) and Von Alemann (1979).
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material conditions or psychological ones; the end or the beginning. 
These hardly represent a review of the work of those who have seen 
in the study of crisis an opportunity to advance social thought.
And so, several definitions of crisis can be found: from those 
that describe it as contradiction, chaos, transition, rupture, 
revolution; through others that characterize it as confusion, 
disorder, danger, suspense, tension, discontinuity, counter­
tendency, disarticulation, perturbation, dysfunction; to those that 
see it as renovation, adaptation, reinstitutionalization, 
realignment, adjustment, purification and regulation. In all of 
these definitions we can find emphasized the idea of movement, of 
change, of transformation, although evidently with different senses 
that correspond to different theoretical-epistemological and
14 imethodological perspectives. For Gramsci crisis consists precisely 
in that "the old dies and nothing new can be born", while for Robert
K. Merton15 it is a dysfunction "that weakens the adaptation or
16adjustment of the system" and for Max Weber crises are 
"irrationalities of every type (effects, errors), as a deviation 
from the anticipated development of rational action".
Regarding the characteristics of crisis, some people argue that
17they are spontaneous and frequently unpredictable; others that
they stem from the development of contradictions like historic phase
18transitions in-a mechanical, evolutionary and economic process; 
others see them more as the failure of existing rules and the search
19for new ones; and, also, some characterize crises as the
20 » unresolved problems of self government. Regarding the spatial-
21temporal, some consider crises as limited while others that they
14 Gramsci: 1971, P. 313.
15 Merton: 1980, P. 126.
16 Weber: 1947, P. 7.
17 Bobbio 1981, P. 454.
18 Poulantzas: 1977, P. 36 and 37.
19 Kuhn: 1971, P. 292.
20 Habermas: 1973, P. 19.
21 Bobbio: 1981, P. 454.
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22cover the whole terrain; some see them as cyclic processes of 
strength and weakness which may include the perception of unlimited
• 23time and space. Regarding the dimension of crises we find that 
they can be international, regional, national, local, affecting 
sectors, groups, families and individuals; as well as endogenous or 
exogenous; narrow or broad.
Regarding origins and causes, some emphasize internal or 
external roots, dependent or autonomous, structural or functional, 
historic or conjunctural, general or particular, abstract or 
concrete, material or ideological, determined or accidental, 
peaceful or violent, physiological or pathological, latent or 
manifest, of input or output, organic or causal. Others include as 
as causes and effects of crisis tension and anxiety, uncertainty and 
the need of participants to act, the loss of control over events and 
their implications, impatience and tension in the sectors of the 
system, changes in the relations among participants, future 
repercussions to the participants, the dangers included in the goals 
and objectives of the participants, as well as the formulation of
24alternative solutions.
As we see crises can arise in any social activity or 
organization: systems, structures, institutions, mechanisms, actors, 
strata, sectors, groups, elements, organs, forces, functions, 
processes, activities, strategies, projects, values, beliefs, 
theories, methods and ideals. As well as in any setting: from 
demographic composition to ecological reproduction, from the family 
to the international community, from investment to consumption, from 
demand to supply, from participation to retribution, from direction 
to dominance, from right to might, from folklore to technology; in 
synthesis, from the society and economy to politics and culture.
From this we can identify different problems in the scholarly 
analysis of crisis, since for some what is significant is its
22 Poulantzas: 1977, P. 36.
23 Gunder Frank: 1983, P. 120.
24 Garcia Cantu 1983, Excelsior, March 23, pag. 1.
character and for others the identification of its phases; others 
emphasize the understanding of its origins and causes or its levels 
relations and dimensions; also, some focus on impacts, effects and 
prediction and others in the decisions, responses and resolutions.
This probably is the product of the confluence of new 
phenomena, of sudden events, unanticipated realities, unknown 
problems, flaws in traditional methods, and also inadequate 
theories, mistrust of paradigms and the lack of practical technique 
in the social sciences. Given the new problems and the lack of 
explanatory power of current theories, social scientists have to re 
evaluate and explore existing alternatives to participate in the 
description of new realities and in the elaboration of alternative 
bases for action. Throughout this work the common use of the term, 
which normally identifies crisis as the ex-ante and ex-post stages 
around the critical moment in a process, will not be used. Crisis 
will refer to the critical moment itself that marks the culmination 
of a process of decline.
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1. THE CRISIS OF 1968
The first crisis of the last 20 years, the student movement of 
1968 that ended in the October 2 massacre, seems to have taken the 
country by surprise. In the 1960s Mexico enjoyed great prestige in 
business and financial circles in and outside of the country. 
Economic growth, open credit and solid money were some of the bases 
for this prestige. In fact, the celebration of the Olympic Games in 
Mexico City symbolized that successful image. The political system, 
regardless of how peculiar or heterodox it could appear, had been 
able to give the country more than 50 years of political stability. 
It had not shown any need to use general repression, despite the 
chronic economic inequality in large sectors of the population. The 
stability was explained until the 1970s in terms of the formal ex­
pressions of democracy: political parties, elections, civilian 
presidents and free press being among the most important.
But the crisis should not have been such a surprise. In real­
ity the 1968 movement represented a break caused by the structural 
contradictions deeply embedded in the process of state building in 
Mexico since 1917; a break that had been expressed through previous 
decades although with less intensity. To see the profound signifi­
cance of the 1968 crisis it is necessary to understand the process 
of the formation of the contradictory state in Mexico and its ef­
fects on the orientation of the productive apparatus. But an under­
standing of the event would be incomplete without paying attention 
to the more far-reaching and profound reactions that came as a re­
sponse to the 1968 crisis: the government's attempted reconcilia­
tion with the middle class and the project of reorienting economic 
policy from stable to shared development; both constitute the lead­
ing threads of the centralist presidency.
Carefully and thoroughly mapping out the analysis of the first 
crisis can help clarify its causal relation with the second crisis 
in 1976 and of the second with the third in 1982 and of the third 
with the fourth in 1987. That is to say, I can attempt to recon-
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struct the pernicious chain of successive crises in the last 20 
years that point to a far-reaching transition.
The formation of the contradictory State
The State and politics in Mexico are defined by two structural 
peculiarities: first, the revolutionary and, therefore, popular 
origin of the state; second, its commitment to a policy of capi­
talist development, more than with a capitalist class.25 In these 
terms, the contradiction explains the simultaneous presence of two 
structural aspects in conflict: a mass-based political system and a 
capitalist economy. The evolution of the state and politics in 
Mexico since the Revolution appears then as the response to two 
leading threads: support for the masses and the requirements of 
capitalist development. The empirical result of these two aspects 
has been social mobility (respecting the popular masses) and eco­
nomic growth (respecting capitalism).
The insoluble binomial "populism-capitalism" since 1917 ex­
plains the alternating evolutionary pattern in Mexican politics. 
Thus the relations between state and the masses has been, at the 
same time, as much of alliance and support as of manipulation and 
control. The first requires social mobility and benefits; the sec­
ond corporatism and authoritarianism. If the commitment to capital­
ism had not been constrained by the popular origin of the state, 
the need for popular alliances could have appeared much later. In a 
similar way, if Mexican populism had not been limited by the 
commitment to capitalism, the need for control and manipulation 
could have taken a very different form. This is not, however, an 
exercise in conjectures about- possible alternatives to the Mexican 
Revolution. It is only an attempt to emphasize the fact that the 
alliance with and control of the masses was an inevitable 
characteristic of the "populist-capitalist” state.
25 For a deeper account of the development of this structure, Cfr: Basafiez 
(1981a): 169-183.
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The essential aspects were those that permitted the state to 
maintain the support and loyalty of the masses, to wit, the hege­
mony of the Mexican state. State hegemony— ideological leadership 
of the society— was based in the fact that the new order was re­
sponding to the aspirations of the masses (land, jobs, education) 
at least as they were perceived. Consequently, Mexico seems to have 
evolved as a praxi-cracy more than as a democracy (government of 
the people). All of the structures and practices, which responded 
to mass aspirations, became a powerful foundation for state hege­
mony. Particularly relevant were those matters crystallized in four 
constitutional articles: education (3rd.), land reform (27), work 
(123) and no re-election (83).
The stability of the Mexican political system is explained in 
terms of its capacity to provide the masses with social mobility 
and benefits, through skillful administration of education, land, 
labor and electoral matters. Nonetheless, it should be recognized 
that from the beginning the system began to develop its contradic­
tory nature. While producing benefits for a given group, it was 
also establishing a mechanism to control it.
The populist nature of the Mexican state required pursuing, 
first, the goal of ideological leadership of the masses (hegemony), 
while its capitalist nature required maintaining at the same time 
control and manipulation. However, hegemony was the rule as much as 
control was the exception. These were, then, two faces of the same 
coin— hegemony and corporatism— the first being essential and the 
second instrumental.
i
Mexican hegemony (ideological leadership of the society by 
part of the political-military bureaucracy that took control of the 
state apparatus) was built upon the following four ideological 
standards that, although not in operation with equal effectiveness 
at the end of the 1980s, were very powerful for almost 50 years: 
redistribution of land, labor unions, mass education and no re- 
election. These four standards grew out of three important legacies
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from the 19th century: sentiments of nationalism and independence 
formed from the war of independence (1810-1821) and later rein­
forced in the United States military invasions and French interven­
tion (1863-1867); the long-debated matter of federalism vs. cen­
tralism that consumed the period of 1824-1854; and the separation 
of church and state that covered the period of 1857-187 6. Thus the 
constitution of 1917 would retain provisions as much liberal as 
they were revolutionary.
It is certainly not true that the four ideological pillars 
essential to the revolutionary program were contributed by the dom­
inant political-military group (the constitutionalists) headed by 
Carranza. On the contrary, Carranza was forced to accept them. But, 
having accepted them, the constitutionalists found alliances that 
brought support from different fronts. Carranza, as well as Madero, 
was inclined more toward small conservative changes than toward so­
cial innovations that he would have considered exotic. However, 
Obregon’s pragmatism proved to be more adequate.
The 1917 Constitution evolved as the center piece of the new 
political order. It was the crystallization of the specific corre­
lation of forces that emerged from the Revolution. In the same way 
that the political forces of 1917 formed a heterogeneous mosaic, 
its ideological orientation was likewise heterogeneous. The caudil- 
list period that followed 1917 came quickly to understand that in 
as much as the four ideological standards were kept alive the loy­
alty of the workers, campesinos, middle classes and political-mili­
tary bureaucracy would remain with the revolutionary family. 
Consequently, a mechanism began to grow and mature for alternately 
and successively reaffirming the four revolutionary pillars.
The foundation for hegemony in Mexico was, therefore, laid by 
the Revolution. The caudillist period of the 1920s initiated the 
development of the principle characteristics of Mexican hegemony in 
order to permit in the 1930s the opening of a period of consolida­
tion. The creation of the PNR (Party of the National Revolution) in
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192 9, the Cardenas-Calles split in 1936 and the oil expropriation 
in 1938, and the constitutional reform by Cardenas provide basi­
cally the same structure that prevails until today. A powerful 
presidency (more than the president himself) rules the country 
through five institutional groups: official political party, 
congress, executive bureaucracy, the courts and public enterprise.
Within this mechanism, the official party is essential to po­
litical stability. The PNR (later the PRM and then PRI) structure 
basically reflected revolutionary ideology: one sector for labor, 
another for campesinos and two for the middle classes— the military 
sector and bureaucracy. Four years later, the military sector was 
dropped and only the popular sector remained.
The 1940s would have to bring an important change to the
Mexican political system as the populist-capitalist government be­
gan to experience a disequilibrium because it was increasingly em-
2 6phasizing capitalist development. Several economic aspects can be 
brought to bear as an explanation for the change: the economic boom 
of the war period; the expectations generated by the import substi­
tution process; the new international agencies that emerged at the 
end of the war and, extremely important, the cold war in itself. As 
a result, the change made the hegemonic aspects of the state less
dynamic. Inversely, the other side of the coin, corporatism and au­
thoritarianism* began to gain importance.
As this tendency progressed, groups began to appear that could 
not find a place within the new order. In a certain sense, the pre­
eminence of economic development required the submission of the 
populist aspects of the system. Thus the cooptive nature of the 
system was restricted. The division of the CTM in 1947, the rail- 
workers and teachers movements of 1958, the intellectual movement 
(National Liberation Movement) of 1961, the formation of the 
Independent Federation of Campesinos (CCI) in 1963, the doctors
26 Labastida: 1974, P. 638.
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movement of 1964 and, finally, the student movement of 1968 point 
unmistakably to the gradual closing of political space throughout 
all of these years. In this sense, 1968 is nothing but the growing 
of a tendency that began in the 1940s. It could seem then that in 
the second half of the 1940s the faith put in private enterprise 
increased while the alliances with the masses weakened.
The orientation of the productive apparatus27
It is practically outside of the reach of a government (not to 
mention a whole society) to give lasting definition to its economic 
orientation. Mexico was enmeshed in a colonial system that it did 
not choose much less create— that of imperial Spain. As a result, 
the country served for three centuries as a provider of primary 
products (mainly gold and silver) to Spain. This situation formed 
the biggest part of the country's economic structure.
The independence of 1810 did not drastically change Mexico's 
economic activity as an exporter of primary products, which pro­
duced most of the country's economic growth that peaked between 
1880 and 1910. Very important changes followed in the transition 
from the model of exportation of primary products to that of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1930s. In Mexico, World 
War I did not promote the industrialization taking place in the ma­
jority of Latin American countries because of the 1910-1920 
Revolution, which was followed by a period of marked political 
uncertainty (1921-1928).28 Nonetheless there was a significant in­
dustrialization during the 1920s, but it was not until the Great 
Depression (1929-1933) when Mexico began to break with the model of 
primary exports; a break that lasted until 1939.
Explicit formulations toward a change to the import substitu­
tion model existed from the first sexenial plan of 1934-1940, pre-
27 For a broader development of this section, Cfr: Basafiez (1981a): 147-156.
28 Villarreal: 1976, P. 24.
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2 9pared by the PNR in 1933. However, it was necessary to wait until 
1940 (during World War II) to promote the ISI model more deci-
• 30sively. Further, it was not until 194 6 when the objectives of the 
ISI model became better defined within the more general context of 
political^ economy.31
In a more general perspective, the economic history of Mexico 
after 1910 is divided into two parts: one of slow growth until 1935 
and another of rapid sustained growth from then on. After the 
Depression of 1929-1933, Mexico entered a stage of accelerated 
growth driven mainly through agricultural expansion. This expansion 
began with public investment in transportation and irrigation, as 
well as with land reform.32 The stage of sustained growth is itself 
subdivided into two parts: one of growth driven by agriculture 
(1936-1956) and another driven by industry after 1956.
The first stage (1936-1956) was predominantly oriented toward 
external markets, while the second (after 1956) changed the empha­
sis to the internal market. Equally, the financing of imports dur­
ing the first stage was through agriculture exports while imports 
were financed in the second stage through tourism and foreign in­
vestment, as much direct as through public credit. Finally, regard­
ing inflation and the politics of stabilization, the first stage is 
characterized by growth with inflation and three currency devalua­
tions— 1938, 1948 and 195433— while the second is subdivided into:
1) growth without inflation (1956-1970) known as stable development 
and 2) the attempt to reduce social inequality and restructure the 
economy (1970-1976), known as shared development. Although deci­
sions about economic orientation are not easy to manipulate, given 
the existence of restrictions (domestic as well as international), 
this fact should not lead to minimizing the role of the State. The 
economic importance of the public sector in capital accumulation
29 Solis: 1975, P. 22.
30 Izquierdo: 1983, P. 247.
31 Trejo Reyes: 1973, P. 152.
32 Solis: 1979, P. 111.
33 Ibid, PP. 109-115 and 218.
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has been made clear and it is necessary to distinguish four differ­
ent stages to provide the context for the changing role of the 
State in the economy. There is a logical sequence in the growth of 
dependent capitalism: 1) exporter of primary products (EMP); 2) im­
port substitution industrialization, phase one (ISI-1); 3) import 
substitution industrialization, phase two (ISI-2), and; 4) internal 
contradictions.34
The stage of exportation of primary products is characterized 
by the dominance exercised by the primary export sector 
(agriculture or extractive) over the economy, which generates 
global demand. In this phase, the public sector only provides 
specific infrastructure and depends on exports taxes. Second, the 
first stage of import substitution industrialization emerges 
through the growth of national industry against the pattern of 
demand generated by exports from the primary sector, under the 
favorable conditions that arise during periods of war in the inter­
national arena. In this context the role of the public sector basi­
cally involves providing general infrastructure and financing de­
velopment . The resources of the state come principally from export 
taxes and high taxes on imports.
The second stage of import substitution is characterized by 
renewed foreign penetration through transnational business. The 
public sector is limited to the role of protecting capital, receiv­
ing support from international agencies. Finally, the stage of con­
tradictions is characterized by low rates of productive investment, 
slow growth and chronic difficulties in the balance of payments.
The solution to the contradiction, in terms of sustained growth 
(apart from the return to the exportation of primary products), re­
quires greater expansion of demand or state control over the struc­
ture of production and consumption.
34 Fitzgerald: 1974, P. 2.
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This model of four stages essentially applies to the Mexican 
case, despite the fact that the country (although solely in terms 
of chronology) remained outside of the Latin American path. The 
conversion to the first stage of ISI in several Latin American 
countries^ in the period 1910-1920 was delayed in Mexico until the 
1930s, when the second push toward import substitution took place. 
The stage of foreign penetration (ISI-stage 2) in the period 1950- 
1965 is basically out of step with the rest of Latin America as 
well. Fitzgerald’s observations in 1973 brought him to conclude
35that "Mexico had found a particular solution to growth." However, 
he later modified his position saying that the stage of internal 
contradictions would be taking place beginning in the 1980s. In 
sum, the economic history of Mexico can be divided into five peri­
ods regarding economic orientation: 1) exporter of primary products 
(before 1929); 2) transition (1929-1939); 3) import substitution 
phase one (1939-1956); 4) import substitution phase two (1956- 
1970); 5) transition (after 1970).
This brief summary underlines the compromise of the Mexican 
State with capitalist growth since its foundation in 1917. In this 
respect, although it was not in the hands of the forgers of the 
State to choose the productive structure or the strategy of growth, 
the State was certainly able to conform itself to the logic of cap­
italist growth. What must not have been very clear was the implicit 
long-run contradiction with another basic commitment of the Mexican 
State: its popular origin. This contradiction broke politically in 
1968 and was made evident in economic terms in 197 6.
The first crisis: the student movement of 1968 36
The events of 1968 were considered by some as a storm in a tea 
cup. Those involved in the student movement were not masses of poor 
people, organized workers or campesinos demanding land. The partic-
35 ibid, P. 7.
36 For a deeper treatment of the theme developed in this section, Cfr: Basanez 
(1981a): 169-184.
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ipants were mainly from the pampered sectors of the middle class 
confronting the traditional establishment. But, was this really the 
case? Did Mexico really only have a storm in a tea cup?
The simplistic points of view that tried to explain the polit­
ical problems of 1968 only in terms of the authoritarianism of Diaz 
Ordaz or the outside influence of the Soviet Union or United States 
gave way to broader more elaborate perspectives, which essentially 
pointed toward an eroding political order that received a great 
challenge in 1968.
It would be deceptive to set aside the analysis of the student 
movement of 1968 at this point. Its importance does not stem from 
the fact that it was a serious challenge to the system, whether in 
economic, political or ideological terms. Rather its relevance 
derives from the fact that it revealed the contradictory nature of 
the Mexican State, which made possible the propagation of the move­
ment. Besides, and more important still, the disclosure effect of 
the events of 1968 unleashed a series of changes in the operative 
agreements between the public and private sectors, which seem to
37have become irreversible.
In 1970 the leader of the Senate of Lopez Mateos said that 
1968 culminated and continued the essential aspects of the process 
of crisis:
For this reason we insist on characterizing this 
year as very important in national life. Throughout 
the year many problems emerged that had been hidden 
in the past: reactions against deceit and corruption 
were made well-known; the anti-democratic methods 
that abound in national life and the form in which 
authorities violate fundamental norms to advance 
their self interest were denounced. 1968 clearly re­
vealed the official limitations placed on all popular 
and class movements, on all serious disagreements 
with the general orientation of economic development 
and its deviations, on all criticism of goverment 
action. The use of certain tactics to reprimand or
37 Tello: 1979, P. 34.
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punish in illegal, barbarous or uncivilized manners 
is another sign of the crisis that pierces the 
country...in the future no small number of events
38will be considered tied to 1968 and its antecedents.
The main contribution of the analysis of this theme can be 
found in Zermeno's examination of causes and the environment of the 
student movement of 1968. He identifies four profound motivations: 
1) the inadequacy of the political system to absorb and represent 
the demands of the new social sectors; 2) deterioration of the re­
lationship between the state and the universities; 3) weakening of 
the cultural model; and, 4) reorientation of the state toward a 
function directly favorable to a sector of the upper classes— a 
perception held by certain middle-class sectors highly sensitive in
• 39this respect.
Regarding the first, the inadequacy of the political system 
refers primarily to its restricted possibilities for promoting and 
mobilizing the new professional groups. Zermeho calls attention to 
the growing importance in numbers and quality of the professional 
sector, to the institutional obstacles facing the professionals and 
their aspirations and to the lack of channels of mobility. The sec­
ond cause, the split between the State,and the universities, arose 
for historic reasons and for lack of interest by government to 
change these conditions. This abandonment can be seen in the amount 
of resources the government spent on the universities: after moder­
ate increases in the proposals of 1963 and 1964, toward 1967 re-
. 40sources declined progressively until reaching 1959 levels.
The third cause is the weakening of the cultural model or the 
dominant ideology of Mexico. The historic process of forming a pow­
erful ideological trilogy— nationalism-populism-development— ex­
plains the high grade of social cohesion in Mexico, which came to 
its climax during the 1930s, especially under the Cardenas regime.
38 Moreno Sanchez, Manuel: 1970, P. 13.
39 Zermefio: 1978, P. 55.
40 Ibid, P. 60.
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These three elements, although revealed at first as congruent al­
ternatives, proved in time to be profoundly contradictory. Two of 
the three elements began to be especially contradictory as indus­
trialization proceeded: nationalism and development. Through the 
1950s it became evident that, under our conditions of late capital­
ism, the logic of profit-making brought the local bourgeoisie to 
quickly disassociate with its national identity. This entrepreneurs 
not only appears increasingly driven to take advantage of interna­
tional technology to increase profits, above from the average rate, 
but also tends to merge its capital with that of international
41business which reappeared on the scene in our countries.
The integrating force of nationalism, as much in politics as 
ideology, began to decrease to the extent that foreign economies 
and ideology penetrated slowly and cautiously. As a result, several 
signs of ideological disintegration were present toward the end of 
the 1960s. The last profound cause of the 1968 student movement in 
Zermeno's analysis is the reorientation of the state toward a func­
tion that clearly favors the upper classes. In other words, the 
metamorphosis of the populist state in a state of classes. Mexico’s 
historic consistency was based in the formula of strong state-weak 
civil society, which was clearly expressed during the sexenio of 
Diaz Ordaz.42
Assuming the success or the failure of the student movement 
regarding its initial demands is really a question of timing. 
Although during the Diaz Ordaz regime no concessions were made to 
the students, Echeverrfa, on the other hand, put several in place. 
The most important impact of 1968 was to raise the level of alarm 
for the public and private sectors. Several segments of the public 
sector had already lost in the 1960s their initial faith in the 
role of private business to improve the country. Equally, different 
segments of the private sector had by then lost their inevitable 
initial dependence on government support to survive. From there the
41 ibid, P. 84.
42 Ibid, P. 89.
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basic material conditions of harmonious dependence had been ex­
ceeded. The public sector wanted to continue in control, although 
it was less able to give its total services to the private sector. 
For its part, the private sector was not prepared to be deprived of 
any support that it had traditionally enjoyed. Further still, it 
could be prepared to try a realignment of prevailing forces if it 
considered any of its past conquests to be threatened.
Under this weak arrangement, the student movement made evident 
that the original alliance between the public and private sectors 
was being undermined. Additionally, the faith in private enterprise 
as well as in late capitalism received an open, public challenge, 
coming from the ideological leaders of the movement: Heberto
4 3Castillo, Demetrio Vallejo, Valentin Campa, Jose Revueltas. The 
first half of the Echeverria sexenio is, therefore, an attempt to 
revitalize the alliance; the second half, on the other hand, is an 
effort to resist the private sector's attempt to gain the manage­
rial role of the country. As a result, if the student movement 
brought to light the implicit contradictions of the Mexican model 
up to 1968, the Echeverria sexenio made them explicit.
In 1968 the challenge to state hegemony came from the educated 
middle classes--university students and professors— and not from 
the classes least favored by the development model in place since 
the regime of Aleman: workers and campesinos. Against the ebb and 
flow of the labor movement and the dispersion of the campesino 
movement, only the middle classes could carry the struggle for the 
recovery of the popular classes during the 1960s, and against the 
existence of objective conditions to raise such a struggle, the 
middle classes could not refuse the challenge. The student movement 
of 1968 was the last and most extensive of the middle class recov­
ery movements.
43 Ramirez: 1969, Vols. I and II and Poniatowska: 1971.
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The government reconciliation with the middle classes
From his presidential campaign Luis Echeverria proposed to 
open communication channels with the social sectors that were hurt 
in the student movement of 1968, especially with the universities 
and dissident groups of the left. With this objective he undertook 
the politics of democratic opening, which was seen as a new alter­
native for suspending the criticism from society of the repressive 
acts of the Diaz Ordaz government. In this sense, the new govern­
ment was presented as openly self-critical, which increased its le­
gitimacy and raised the credibility of the system. And so, the re­
covery of hegemony rested in a flexible and tolerant attitude by 
the government with the most active and contrary civil groups and 
organizations.
In this context, beginning in 1970 the voting age was lowered 
as well as the minimum age to run for public office, broadening the 
activity of young people in public matters. Leftist organizations 
emerged, such as the National Committee of Auscultation and 
Consultation (CNAC), which reunited leaders of middle sectors, la­
bor groups and intellectual political organizations that promoted 
independent syndicalism.
The constitutional reforms and the renovation of the electoral 
law in 1973 allowed the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) to surface 
from underground and the Mexican Workers Party (PMT) and Socialist 
Workers Party (PST) to form, at a time when the other existing po­
litical parties were strengthening themselves as well. In this 
form, the violent political participation of 1968 had other insti­
tutional outlets in political parties as well as in political orga­
nizations subjected to law.
The political opening worked as a rapprochement between the 
State and civil society in a framework of contention and prevention
44 For a deeper treatment of the theme developed in this section, Cfr: Basanez 
(1981a): 185-201.
of violence through tolerance and political dialogue, with the 
prospect of recovering social credibility and political control 
over dissident groups.
In reality the effects of 1968 began to be felt after 
Echeverria was designated as the PRI's presidential candidate in 
November of 1969. The style, concepts and rhetoric that Echeverria 
chose for carrying out his campaign seem to have alienated some in 
fluential people. From the beginning he tried to distance himself 
from the labels of left and right, with his slogan "neither left 
nor right, arise and go forward". The idea also surfaced that the 
most important change the country required was not only in social, 
political and economic conditions but a change of attitudinal 
structure.
Equally, he began to speak of self criticism, political open­
ing and the value of praxis. However, what should have worried the 
influential people was not Echeverria's discourse itself, but the 
fact that it was being reinforced through the incorporation of peo 
pie generally considered as opposition into his campaign. Alfonso 
Martinez Dominguez, ex-president of the PRI, had suggested that 
Diaz Ordaz think about retiring the candidacy of Echeverria. Such 
events indicate an internal split that could have involved the pri 
vate sector. Therefore, the degree of deterioration in the rela­
tionship between Echeverria and the private sector explains the 
purpose of the first half of his sexenio in revitalizing this al­
liance .45
The pillar of hegemony that mass education constituted as a 
form of social mobility was particularly reinforced during 
Echeverria's presidency. Public spending had been reduced through-
4 6out the education system during the sexenio of Diaz Ordaz, and 
government-university relations had deteriorated. After Echeverria 
came to power, the situation began to change. He proposed to bring
45 Whitehead: 1979, P. 14.
46 Zermefto: 1978, P. 60.
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the government and universities to terms, as well as open channels 
of participation to previous movements of opposition parties and 
dissident groups. Especially beginning in 1971 there was a substan­
tial increase of jobs in education; many new schools were created 
and the universities received important subsidy increases.
Respecting channels of participation, it is noteworthy that 
many government-dependent organizations (particularly related with 
rural areas, such as Conasupo, Inmecafe, SRA, SAG, etc.) estab­
lished programs that employed, under very good conditions, teach­
ers, university professors, researchers and students. Pablo 
Gonzalez Casanova, considered a leftist academic, became Rector of 
the National Autonomous University (UNAM) under Echeverria, and 
Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero, Director of the School of Social and 
Political Sciences at UNAM, became second in charge of the PRI. The 
incorporation of dissident groups provoked several conflicts within 
the public sector.47
Echeverria not only continued this conciliatory path but also 
dedicated considerable time to developing relationships and con­
tacts with intellectuals, professors and students. He also promoted 
the granting of awards and scholarships, scholarly publishing and
. 4 8the naming of distinguished intellectuals to the diplomatic corps.
His interest in closing the breach between government and uni­
versity led him to attend the inauguration of courses at UNAM in 
March of 1975. A dark and violent incident occurred on this occa­
sion, in which Echeverria and the entire audience were attacked re­
sulting in a head injury to the president from a rock. Echeverria 
blamed the incident on the CIA.
Despite the good relations, intellectual freedom and the rein­
forcement of social mobility through the education system, a de­
cline in the demand for higher education was perceived by the be-
47 Ibid, P. 66.
48 Shapira: 1977, p. 573.
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ginning of the 1980s, which could mean the premature end of the 
ideological aid of mass education. At the time it could deprive the 
political system of one of its four pillars.
Nonetheless, despite the efforts of the Echeverria administra­
tion to build bridges to the dissident sector and reconstruct the 
state’s lost legitimacy, no one could have prevented the sectors 
most radicalized through the injuries of 1968 from resorting to vi­
olent means in the political struggle. Rural and urban guerrilla 
warfare emerged and reached important dimensions: first in the 
southern states of Mexico and second in Mexico City. The state had 
to deploy a vast repressive apparatus to defeat the League of 
September 23 and other guerrilla groups operating in the cities and 
the peasant guerrillas commanded by Genaro Vazquez and later by his 
successor Lucio Cabanas.
In these years an ambitious government project took place to 
renovate the essential components of the State's ideology. It 
started appealing to themes such as development with social 
justice, the eradication or reduction of social inequalities and 
the broadening of channels of the expression of democratic ideas. 
Given the outdated political discourse and the clear advance of 
mass media in creating a new rhetoric far from the official 
ideology of the Mexican Revolution, the state suddenly undertook an 
aggressive political campaign to promote national values, exalt the 
Latin American and third-world identity of the country and recover 
our indigenous and popular roots.
Such politics had appreciable success above all among the rad­
ical and young university sectors. The cultural and artistic ex­
pressions swelled to the new pulsating of Latin American identity 
and the exaltation of the cultural values of the people. Mexico 
City was inundated with centers for diffusing Latin American music; 
groups of canto-nuevo proliferated and figures from Latin American 
folklore filled the stages of the capital's theatres. But the sub­
ordinate classes were not alone in promoting their values and po­
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litical organization. The private sector did the same thing and,
motivated by the discontent that was provoked by the politics of 
the Echeverria regime, pushed a process of internal organization 
that would end in the Foundation of the Business Coordinating 
Council.
Shared Development 49
progress. The following facts are noteworthy in this regard: The 
country had changed from a rural-agricultural economy to an urban- 
industrial one; the percentage of the population living in locali­
ties of more than 2,500 inhabitants had grown from 34 to 60; the 
percentage of the workforce occupied in agriculture dropped from 21 
to 11, while that in industry rose from 24 to 34. In addition, the 
highway network had increased from 5,000 to more than 70,000 kilo­
meters; electricity output from 0.5 to 7.5 million watts; oil pro­
duction grew more than four times over the level of the 1930s; ir­
rigated land was expanded from 0.1 to 3.0 millions of hectares; 
public education, social security and health services had been ex­
tended significantly.50 Although some problems were foreseen for the 
country, the main prognosis was triumph.
From the Echeverria campaign a different vision of the bene­
fits and results of Mexican development began to develop. This new 
vision found room for expression in the political opening promoted 
by Echeverria, as well as in the legacy of critical thought left 
behind by the student movement of 1968. Reinforcing this new vi­
sion, some negative aspects of economic development arose. Under 
these conditions, a current critical of Ortiz Mena's (Secretary of 
Hacienda 1958-1970) policy of stable development began to propa­
gate. The challenge to several of its bases, added to the unfavor­
able economic conditions of 1970, led to the formulation and subse-
At the end of the 1960s,
49 For a deeper treatment of the theme of this'section, Cfr: Basafiez (1981a) 
140-163.
50 Tello: 1979, P. 13.
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quent implementation of a new economic strategy: shared develop­
ment .
The new strategy emerged amid the changing economic circum­
stances of. the 1970s, but was originally formulated more as a crit­
icism of stable development than as a well-elaborated and developed 
alternative. As a result, the characteristics and objectives of
51shared development were initially uncertain. As time passed, the 
new strategy gained definition and in 1973 an attempt was made to 
systematize it in a plan of development. In no way did the attempt 
to systematize the plan receive presidential support, to such an 
extent that it could go no further than a document titled Outlines 
for the Formulation of a Plan of Development 1973-1980. In one sim­
plification, Gerardo Bueno described the objective of stable devel­
opment as growth in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), while 
that of shared development would be redistribution of wealth and 
employment.52
And so, a period of transition seems to have opened in 1970 in 
the Mexican economy, going from the second stage of import substi­
tution to an alternative strategy. Several events point to this 
change: first, the end of the Diaz Ordaz regime in 1970; second, 
the critical challenges from the Echeverria campaign to the policy 
of stable development; third, the legitimacy crisis stemming from 
the student movement of 1968; fourth, the decline in the interna­
tional economy and, fifth and most important, the exhaustion of the 
ISI-2 model once the market established in Mexico had been satu­
rated.
The first year of the Echeverria regime (1971) is character­
ized over all by an internal austerity that resulted in economic 
stagnation. It already has been noted that beginning with the cam­
paign of 1970 the characteristics of stable development were under 
attack. The criticisms emerged as much from structuralist
51 Bueno: 1977, P. 30.
52 Ibid, P. 31.
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economists as from monetarists, although from different sets of as­
sumptions and for different reasons. As the alternative of shared 
development remained immature, the perspective that prevailed was 
one of caution suggested by the largest economic institutions 
(Hacienda and the Bank of Mexico) in such a way that atonia, 
decline, was the economic opening of the sexenio.
Atonia was not only the product of infighting among 
economists, but rather a response to international economic condi­
tions as well as national ones. Echeverria had promised to reduce 
the balance of payments deficit and keep inflation below what it
53was in the United States. He was responding to the economic prob­
lems that were observed at the beginning of the 1970s, according to 
Hacienda and the Bank of Mexico. In the international scene, 1970 
was for the United States a year of economic restriction and prob­
lems in strengthening the dollar, as well as a year of disorder in 
the international monetary system. The worst effect for Mexico was 
the 10 percent charge on imports imposed by Nixon in 1971, which 
aggravated the economic stagnation here. And so, although inflation 
and the external deficit were reduced, per-capita income fell and 
unemployment rose.
Although GDP per capita fell in 1971, the private savings rate
54 iincreased, to the level that the bank system had reserve funds in 
excess of legal requirements. This fact destroyed the objections to 
increasing government spending and diminished as well the credibil­
ity of the monetary authorities. Equally, the negative effects of 
the economic stagnation on the social and political agenda of 
Echeverria ended in the discrediting of Hacienda and the Bank of 
Mexico in the eyes of the president. And so, the recommendations of 
the structuralists (headed by Flores de la Pena of Patrimonio 
Nacional) rose to the highest level at a time when the interna­
tional economy allowed such a change because of easy available 
credit in the international market. Despite its peculiarities, the
53 Whitehead: 1979, P. 29.
54 Fitzgerald: 1979, P. 40.
decline of 1971 was occurring not only in Mexico but practically 
all of the capitalist world.
2. THE CRISIS OF 1976
The principle- responses to the demands of 1968 were the govern­
ment reconciliation with the middle classes and the economic strat­
egy of shared development, which created new tensions and worries. A 
war of words broke out between government and business and reached 
the breaking point in the peso devaluation of 197 6 — a true social 
disturbance after 22 years of fixed parity. Once again this event 
would summon the leading thread of the centralist presidency that 
would take the country in tow toward a new reconciliation; not with 
the middle classes this time but with business. Intimately tied to 
the strategy was a form of financing the reconciliation, because 
there is no lasting alliance with business or any other group if it 
is not sustained through easy and abundant resources. It is here 
where oil in the period of Lopez Portillo gained significance and 
took center stage.
The confrontation between the public and private sectors
Until the decade of the 1970s the relations between government 
and business seem to have been dominated by a fundamental agreement: 
the project of capitalist development in which private enterprise 
was essential. This is a labor of reciprocal dependence. Contrary to 
expectations, the 1960s were generating certain doubts about the 
ability of the-economic project to solve the country's problems as 
well as about the need for private enterprise as the Salvation Army 
of the future. When the student movement of 1968 arose, the basic 
premises of the operative relation became suspect. Consequently, 
when the 1970s witnessed confrontations between the public and pri­
vate sectors, the fundamental agreement became the subject of exami­
nation.1 Within this context emerged the fruitless attempt of 
Echeverria to build an alliance with the private sector through the 
head of the Monterrey Group— Eugenio Garza Sada.
1 Labastida: 1974, P. 638.
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In the second half of the 1970s the leading sectors of the eco­
nomic factions were sufficiently strong to pursue their own path 
with or without the— in other times vital— support of the State. On 
the other hand, the relation seemed rather inverted to the extent of 
making the public sector severely dependent (economically speaking) 
on the private sector. But once more a perturbing element appeared: 
the oil discovery, which would make it difficult to subordinate the 
public sector to the private. Because of this, the reinforcement of 
the political apparatus of the private sector was not abandoned. The 
concentration and polarization tendencies of economic power contin­
ued their course in a similar way as did those of the control over 
the private sector's political organization.
To give a general context to the infighting of the business 
sector, the first characteristics of the period should be recalled.
A good understanding with the Diaz Ordaz regime (1964-1970) could 
explain the apparent lack of interest in the precandidates for pres­
ident, who in 1968 included the secretary of Governance (Luis 
Echeverria), the regent of the Federal District (Alfonso Corona del 
Rosal) and the secretary of the Presidency (Emilio Martinez 
Manatou). When the army reproved the student movement in October of 
1968, the private sector backed Diaz Ordaz's decision and did the 
same when he announced the presidential candidacy of Echeverria in 
November of 1969.
This good disposition seemed to begin to change very rapidly 
and fundamentally with a reaction to Echeverria's rhetoric, which 
business perceived as too radical and populist. There were serious 
internal disagreements and pressures within the public sector that 
could have led to a change in candidates. One journalist during 
Echeverria's regime explored this question, although in a novel. In 
any event, the situation produced a moderation in Echeverria's posi­
tion toward the private sector. It is not clear, however, if the 
pressure in this case came from business, the military or both.
2 Spota: 1976.
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More specific challenges came from the man who had been presi­
dent of Coparmex since 1960, Roberto Guajardo Suarez, who heaped 
criticism on Echeverria in December of 1970 and March of 1971.3 
Sufficiently unanticipated, nonetheless, was the fact that after the 
ferocious initial attack, Guajardo Suarez quickly adopted an atti­
tude of collaboration and one year later was promoting and support­
ing Community Action A.C. (Acomac) which served as the tie between 
the PRI and Coparmex. Acomac was directed by Luis Sanchez Aguilar, 
who was second in command to Guajardo Suarez at Coparmex.
Guajardo Suarez's change in attitude cannot be explained in 
terms of a moderation by Echeverria. On the contrary, the new agrar­
ian reform law had been approved, the education reform was in 
progress, the State was nationalizing the sugar industry, a fiscal 
reform was announced, among other similar actions. The explanation
i
rather seems to rest in the bone-of-contention role played by
. . 4Eugenio Garza Sada in 1973 against the general business unrest.
Mexican businessmen were worried about four important aspects: 
fiscal, labor, state intervention and political opening. However, it 
seems that before 1973 no important, open confrontation occurred be­
tween the public and private sectors. The important variable seems 
to have been introduced by the United States Ambassador to Mexico 
Robert McBride? when in December of 1972 he questioned Echeverria's 
plans to regulate foreign investment. Such a criticism had not been 
seen up to that point. In April of 1973, CAMCO began to openly pro­
mote itself as a defender of free enterprise and led a boycott 
against the newspaper Excelsior because it was at odds with 
Televisa.5 In May, Guajardo Suarez was forced to resign from 
Coparmex. In August, Frank Loretta, president of Dupont and ex-pres­
ident of the American Chamber of Commerce, delivered the Powell 
Paper to businessmen in Monterrey.
3 Tirado: 1979, P. 85.
4 Arriola 1978, P. 42.
5 Rodriguez Toro: 1980, P. 2.
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The actions to unify the line of the political organization of 
the private sector progressed relatively rapidly. In September, 
Allende fell in Chile, which seems to have inspired Mexican business 
to oppose. Echeverria's politics. A week later (September 17) Eugenio 
Garza Sada was assassinated, the same day that a general increase in 
salaries was signed and the period of open confrontation between po­
litical and economic elites peaked and the salary accord was forgot­
ten. After Ricardo Margain Zozaya's aggressive speech at Garza 
Sada's burial, business action intensified. In response Echeverria 
ordered two of his secretaries to call a conference with the mili­
tary and labor to prepare for major action. A popular national al­
liance was put in place. Vast demonstrations to support Echeverria 
were held throughout the country on October 4, and a few weeks later 
the family of Eugenio Garza Sada reproved Margain's speech, announc­
ing their total confidence in the president and their commitment
g
that investment would be more abundant.
In January of 1974 business leaders declared that their confi­
dence had been restored. Nonetheless, the conflict persisted, 
although on a smaller scale. The main reasons cited by business as 
the causes of discontent were, among the most relevant, government 
tolerance of independent syndicalism, worker demands for salary in­
creases, the price control program and the consumer protection law. 
Especially acute were the attacks by Coparmex on the Authentic Labor 
Front (FAT), accusing the organization of being tied to the Soviet 
Union, Cuba and the marxist Bishop Sergio Mendez Arcero (FAT was 
promoting independent movements).
A national strike protesting the salary increases was announced 
September 20, 1974, by business organizations. Echeverria, upon an­
nouncing the possibility of extending price controls, forced busi­
ness to the negotiating table with labor. The issue of price con­
trols, however, caused such a commotion that John Langley (president
6 Arriola: 1976, P. 50.
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of CAMCO) declared in December of 1974 that Brasil was a more at­
tractive investment option for the United States.7
Regarding the internal actions of the private sector's politi­
cal apparatus, 1974 was dedicated by Coparmex to increasing the ties 
and strengthening the unity among several sectors of the business 
world. It is reported that Coparmex increased its membership from
g
13,000 to 18,000. Most active among the leaders of the private or­
ganizations in 1974 was Andres Marcelo Sada (vice president of 
Coparmex and member of the prominent Monterrey group), who earned 
the title businessman of the year by expanding a Mexican version of
9
the North American magazine Fortune.
Rupture at the top
Notwithstanding the cordial public sector-private sector rela­
tionship expressed publicly in 1974, the truth is that three courses 
of action took off which do not seem to have been stopped at least 
until 1976. One was the contraction of investment and capital 
flight. Another involved the specific steps taken to improve the im­
age of business and recover public confidence.10 The third was the 
unification of the private sector's political actions.
The year 1975 was especially relevant in the period, because a 
presidential candidate would have to be selected. The creation of 
the National Business Coordinating Council (CCE) in April of this 
year was an attempt by business to influence the selection as well 
as a need by grand capital to centralize political control over the 
business sector. The need of such a centralization stemmed from the 
problems of controlling the different leaders of business organiza­
tions .
7 Ibid, P. 56.
8 Tirado: 1979, P. 83.
9 Arriola: 1976, P. 58.
10 Ibid, P. 56.
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From there, for example: 1) Orvananos was disciplined in 
Coparmex, although not as much as big business had wanted; 2)
Amilcar Ranero, recently named in Canacintra, had returned to the 
nationalist position of Terrones Langone to such an extent that he 
opposed the creation of the CCE and, as a result, Cancintra was not 
unified. Naturally, Ranero was not allowed to take the traditional 
vice presidency'of Concamin or be re-elected in Canacintra; 3) 
Alvarez Guerrero in Concamin ventured to back Canacintra and pub­
licly recognize Guajardo Suarez for his 13 years as president of 
Coparmex, which disappointed powerful business groups; 4) Concanaco 
also faced different pressures which became evident when Juan 
Rodriguez proposed, while Lopez Portillo was presidential candidate, 
the abrogation of the Concanaco law to permit small business (the 
great majority) to separate and form a chamber of small businessmen, 
which became a member of the PRI.
The structure of the CCE itself reveals much about its intent 
to control. The directive body of CCE was made up of six members, 
one for each of the six constituent organizations: Concamin, 
Concanaco, Coparmex, Association of Bankers; the Mexican Association 
of Insurers and the Mexican Council of Businessmen. All CCE direc­
tors had equal representation, without regard to the fact that 
Concanaco had more than 300,000 members and the Mexican Council of 
Businessmen had only 30.11
After the formation of the CCE, only a few isolated declara­
tions of uncertainty were made by business organizations. Business 
abstained from suggesting a candidate, thinking that doing so would 
disqualify their pick. But business was tenacious in specifying the 
qualities they desired in a candidate. The electoral interest of 
business is reflected in the debate that arose within its ranks 
about the question of uniting with the PRI. While Concamin sent a
letter to all of its members prohibiting political participation in
12the PRI, Coparmex on the other hand considered it discriminatory
11 Tirado: 1979, P. 56.
12 Arriola: 1976, P. 67
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to prohibit businessmen from affiliating with the party. Regardless, 
the debate seems to have concluded when the candidacy of Lopez 
Portillo was announced in 1975.
Despite the complacency shown toward the candidate selection, 
political activity in the business sector did not decrease. On the 
contrary, in November of 1975 the CCE began its most important pub­
lic confrontation with the government: the agriculture strike in 
Sinaloa. The strike was intended to halt action by agricultural au­
thorities in Sinaloa and Sonora that were interpreted by businessmen 
and growers as "an attack on free enterprise and a deviation toward
13communism". The political business organization called a national 
strike in support of the growers of Sinaloa and Sonora. The call for 
a strike exposed the real political forces of businessmen, now that 
they were unable to reach their goal by a wide margin.
This experience taught both business and government that the
economic faction's capacity to politically mobilize had been eroded 
to the low levels experienced during the Lopez Mateos regime over 
issues of text book content and the Cuban Revolution.14 
Notwithstanding the low level national strike, business was success­
ful in facing the agrarian actions of 1975. Correspondingly, the 
government gave way in order to proceed with its agrarian program a 
year later. A few weeks before the end of the Echeverria administra­
tion, ejidarios invaded several private farms in Sonora. The con­
flict polarized toward two extremes: Echeverria and Monterrey. In 
October of 1976, Echeverria declared that
...The rich and powerful of Monterrey claim to be 
Catholic and beat their chests in contrition, but 
they refuse to help their fellow man and, although 
they create industry, lack a social conscious, which 
translates into a profoundly reactionary group who
are enemies of the people.15
13 Ibid, P. 65.
14 Arriola: 1976, P. 35.
15 Loaeza: 1977, P. 140.
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In sum, the rapprochement of Echeverria with the popular 
classes as an indispensable action to regain hegemony had as a logi­
cal counterpart the alienation of the private sector leadership. The 
nation's businessmen, satisfied with the balance of the Diaz Ordaz 
regime and perhaps as well with the night of Tlatelolco, supported 
Echeverria's nomination as PRI presidential candidate. Despite the 
populist rhetoric of the new president, they had sufficient reasons 
to suppose that Echeverria would not, at least in the first halj °f 
his term, try to alienate business. The good relations that he 
established with the head of the Monterrey Group, Eugenio Garza 
Sada, and with the leadership of Coparmex, at whose head was a man 
of liberal tendencies— Roberto Guajardo Suarez— as well as the deci­
sion to keep business taxes low and finance growing public spending 
through massive indebtedness, show that for Echeverria the goals 
were not incompatible of reaching out to the dissident sector and 
popular classes and at the same time maintaining good relations with 
the private sector.
However, much of what Echeverria wanted to do was not appreci­
ated by business; for them, he brought a certain nucleus of nation­
alistic and progressive ideas to the presidency— stemming from his 
strategy of incorporating the university dissidents— and stamped his 
government with an unambiguous seal of social democracy. But possi­
bly what contributed most decisively to the alienation and real 
threat at the top was the promulgation of the law of regulation of 
new foreign investment and technology transfer. The external faction 
of the private sector, predominantly North American capital, consid­
ered their interests damaged by the new legislation and responded 
aggressively.
The political confrontation between Echeverria and the private 
sector had been unprecedented since the Cardenas era and constituted 
the first threat in post-war history to the basic agreement of the 
ruling class. The loss of confidence was mutual and the fight by 
businessmen against the new politics drew government criticisms over 
the behaviour and social role of entrepreneurs. The sexenio ended,
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in fact, in the middle of a severe crisis of confidence, aggravated 
by Echeverria's final decision to expropriate large tracts of land 
in Sonora to form ejidos.
Among the new legacies left by the Echeverria sexenio, one 
stands out because it transcends contemporary politics and makes 
identifies the true place of hegemony in Mexico. The private sector 
was not able to create a real possibility of commandeering the so­
cial hegemony, despite its repeated attempts to do so and despite 
the hidden but palpable support of transnational capital, which was 
disappointed as well with the president of Mexico. The private sec­
tor's most notable defeat in its attempt to put the regime in doubt 
was the national strike staged, and headed by the recently founded 
Business Coordinating Council (CCE), in support of the growers of 
Sinaloa and Sonora. The strike, a true test of the private sector's 
mobilization capacity, failed and only had certain isolated and lo­
cal repercussions. On the other hand, the State showed that it more 
or less maintained its capacity to mobilize support from the great 
contingents of workers and campesinos for its boldest and most far- 
reaching decisions. Not even the new onslaught of rumors of catas­
trophe could seriously jeopardize State hegemony and political sta­
bility. Regardless of what the businessmen said or did, Echeverria's 
sexenio came without major setbacks to its end.
The second crisis: the devaluation of 197616
Despite the fact that: 1) private investment remained stable at 
11-12 percent of GNP; 2) manufacturing had reacted favorably to the 
State's expansion program and; 3) private savings had increased 
throughout the period, the government-private sector relationship 
surprisingly began to deteriorate toward the end of 1972 and the 
private sector's opposition to the State's strategy of economic ex­
pansion grew progressively. The internal economic conditions 
(despite the populist overtones of the government) did not seem to
16 For a more detailed examination of the theme of this section, Cfr: Basanez 
1981a: 147-168.
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give sufficient evidence to explain such a clear and drastic change. 
The explanation for this sudden turn by the private sector seems to 
be dominated by an emphatic absence of real internal causes before 
1973 and by a peculiar presence of external influences after 1972.
When the fiscal reform at the end of 1972 was blocked, 
Echeverria had to be content with making tax collection more effi­
cient and introducing minor sales taxes. Public sector prices were 
revised in 1973 and those of oil and electricity rose 50 and 30 per­
cent respectively. The public sector price increase (that was called 
the end of the fictitious economy) certainly contributed to infla­
tion after 1973, but was not the principal reason. In every way, 
these limited measures were quite insufficient to finance the in­
creased state spending that the economy required. As a result, the 
borrowing requirements of the public sector to finance its rapid ex­
pansion of investment in state enterprises rose from 2 percent of 
GNP in 1971 to 6 percent in 1973 and to 10 percent in 1975.17
After 1973, State expansion and inflation became the private 
sector's pet circular explanations for the country's economic prob­
lems. However, lagging production in agriculture and manufacturing 
in 1973 was more important, having reduced their share of GNP. 
However, the main difference (from the political perspective) among 
these two types of explanations rests in the fact that the first 
(state expansion and inflation) allowed the private sector to pour 
the blame for the economic problems on Echeverria's program of 
shared development; the second (decline in manufacturing and agri­
culture) could place the blame with the private sector. As a result, 
state expansion and inflation confirmed the dangers of abandoning 
the old model of stable development, in the eyes of the private sec­
tor .
The economic problems in 1973 might have been enough to devalue 
the peso. In every way, in addition to technical reasons, political
17 Fitzgerald: 1979, P. 42.
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considerations prevailed in Echeverria's decision to maintain parity 
and free convertibility: first, the 1954 devaluation had weakened 
labor support for the PRI, and, second, the capital flight of 1973 
was responding more to a political reality (the change in secre­
taries of public finance) than an economic one. And so, government 
borrowing continued to prop up the peso. The international lending 
euphoria allowed the Echeverria regime in 1974 and 1975 to enjoy al­
most unlimited external credit, as much to finance the deficit as to 
support the peso. The immediate objective of the loans was to permit 
the public sector to finance imports, but the indirect result was 
the financing of private capital flight toward the dollar.
During 1974-1975 inflation seemed to have important implica­
tions for the overvalued peso. But the internal inflationary pro­
cess, explained by the private sector in terms of state expansion, 
was not the main cause of the peso decline. Rather, the principo-l 
cause was an exogenous problem that penetrated the Mexican economy 
through the prices of commercial goods. Meanwhile, salaries did not 
contribute fundamentally to inflation though real salaries rose 12 
percent— they did not precede the price increases in systematic 
form. Analysis of wholesale and consumer price indices in Mexico and 
the United States reveals that although wholesale prices in both 
countries had fluctuated in more or less similar terms, consumer 
prices rose much faster in Mexico. One effect of this was that 
demand did not-generate internal production (that is, goods away 
from the international market) at a time when import prices were
18rising. As a result, the balance of payments rapidly deteriorated.
In 197 6 it became clear that the balance of payments was in se­
vere disequilibrium. And so, it was necessary to take drastic ac­
tion. In every way, public spending continued to grow to complete 
government programs before the end of the sexenio, but the rates of 
agricultural and manufacturing growth had declined seriously. 
Continuing the line of open confrontation from 1972, the private
18 Ibid, PP. 43-44.
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sector was spreading rumors of rural and urban land reform, the na­
tionalization of transnationals and the freezing of bank deposits. 
Such campaigns came to be effective destabilization strategies, as 
capital flight assumed disastrous proportions. To make matters worse 
Mexico was the object, from the beginning of 197 6, of a tourism boy­
cott by North American Jews because of Mexico's vote on Zionism in 
the United Nations. Within this context, the Bank of Mexico finally 
withdrew its support of the peso on August 31, 197 6, allowing the 
currency to float to its own level. This decision brought the 
International Monetary Fund once again to the Mexican scene as the 
Echeverria period was ending.
It is certain that from a strictly technical point of view the 
1970-1976 period can be considered an unfortunate time in the eco­
nomic history of Mexico. However, when the relevant events are 
placed within internal and international socio-political contexts, 
the panorama can seem quite different. First, Echeverria was con­
vinced that continuing with the stable development policy, despite 
the success it had had, would lead to a very dangerous political si­
tuation, such as the 1968 student movement. And so, the primary ob­
jective of Echeverria was "to decapitate the perceived danger to po-
19litical stability even at a cost of economic decline".
Second, the Echeverria period strengthened the public sector's 
position vis a^vis the private sector. Borrowing policies made enor­
mous gains in resources for the public sector without contributing
disproportionally to inflation.20 State enterprises grew from 84 in
211970 to 845 in 1976. Agriculture investment avoided a bad situa­
tion and the fruits of investment from oil exploration and produc­
tion were already on the horizon.
Finally, the disciplinary measures taken by the U.S. government 
and the IMF did not produce the drastic experiences that they had in
19 Whitehead: 1979, P. 64.
20 Fitzgerald: 1979, P. 45.
21 Fitzgerald: 1978c, P. 278.
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other Latin American countries. It is certain that internal economic 
conditions as well as external ones can provide part of the explana­
tion for the disequilibrium of 1970-197 6. But it is also certain 
that U.S. as well as domestic politics played a very important role 
in producing the destabilizing factors in this period.
Public finance and oil
The open presence of the IMF in Mexico a few months before the 
end of the Echeverria administration was seen as the only way out of 
the public finance and balance of payments crisis. In the first 
place, the magnitude of the peso devaluation required it. According 
to the IMF agreement, any currency devaluation more than 10 percent 
required the fund's supervision. Second, because the financial sup­
port of this institution was needed— the fund offered the Mexican 
government up to 1.2 billion dollars to deal with its economic dif­
ficulties— even when such support implied adoption of a stabiliza­
tion agreement. Third, because the government's outside creditors 
demanded the endorsement of the IMF to keep doing business with 
Mexico.
22The pact signed with the IMF, set a maximum limit on overall 
monetary expansion, considered highly inflationary; demanded the 
strengthening of international reserves; limited the net external 
debt— short and long term— coming from any source to no more than 3 
billion dollars for the first year of the agreement; agreed to re­
duce the public sector deficit and to this end established direc­
tives concerning salaries and prices as well as other aspects re­
lated to fiscal structure and para-state business.
It announced as well the intent to establish an economic pro­
gram to restore real rates of growth, raise employment and GDP in 
real terms and to stimulate domestic saving and capital formation.
As part of the program a decision was made to let the Mexican peso
22 Nexos, No. 13, January 1979, P. 41.
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float and, in the meantime, Mexican gold would be valued at 197 6 
levels. Other adopted measures included the creation of an export 
tax, suspension of the certification system for tax returns (CEDIS) 
and the progressive dismantling of unnecessary import controls, as 
well as reducing the level of imports of industrial inputs and 
refusing to adjust prices that were not based in cost increases.
The main objectives were to adjust the public sector deficit, 
external finance and local bank credit. The concession of new credit 
by the IMF was subject to ratification by the incoming administra­
tion. The following goals were established for the 1977-1979 period: 
1) increase production from 4 percent in 1976 to 5 percent in 1977 
to reach 7 percent in 1979; 2) raise the rate of capital formation 
from the 23 percent of GDP obtained in 1976 to 26 percent in 1979 
and base the increase in domestic saving; 3) restabilize the balance 
of payments equilibrium in such a way that the current accounts 
deficit would fall to 2.6 percent of GDP in 1979; decelerate the in­
flationary process to insure price stability in 1979.
In a parallel form but far from the presence of the IMF in 
Mexico it can be said that the years of the oil boom (1978-1981) 
brought the country a period of growing optimism across a wide spec­
trum of Mexican society, especially among the middle class and popu­
lar sector, before what seemed the beginning of a long period of na­
tional prosperity guaranteed by the rising price of oil that would 
translate into growing opportunities for upward social mobility. 
There were objective reasons to justify this optimism. The acquisi­
tive power of the society was constantly increasing, thanks to the 
progressive overvaluation of the peso. This facilitated patterns of 
consumption that previously were exclusively reserved for the accom­
modated classes. The number of Mexicans that traveled abroad, taking 
advantage of the favorable exchange rate, rose to unprecedented 
levels and Mexican tourists exhibited a great capacity to spend.
Real estate investment in the United States spread among the 
country's upper classes. Facilitated once again through the overval­
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ued peso, the acquisition of houses and land in the United States 
reached such levels that it was said Mexicans finally had recovered 
the territory lost in the last century. The economic boom of 197 9- 
1981 created an extraordinary number of jobs. During these years 
young people entered the labor market at rates above the growth of 
the economically active population and among other phenomena associ­
ated with the accelerated growth in employment, women took more and 
more jobs in industry and expansion services. The construction in­
dustry in particular grew at such high rates in these years that the 
armies of bricklayers and peons were not enough to cover the demand 
for labor and should have been complemented by massive hirings of 
campesino immigrants to the cities, whose low skill level for non- 
agricultural work alone prevented it.
For a period of time— that later would be seen as incredibly 
ephemeral— the majority of Mexicans were under the illusion that the 
country would soon be counted among the industrial powers of the 
West. When oil peaked and the peso began to fall— and with it the 
population’s high level of consumption--at a time when public fi­
nance was near collapse in August of 1982, it was not possible to 
avoid the discouragement and pessimism that gripped a people who for 
a fleeting moment believed that poverty and underdevelopment would 
soon be a thing of the past.
The high rate of economic growth after 1978 was made possible 
by an unprecedented increase in the capacity to import, stemming not 
only from oil wealth but also from an active concentration of exter­
nal credit from overabundant resources in the international money 
market. The oil potential of the country and the announced energy 
policies facilitated the access of the public and private sectors to 
the international markets. This capacity of the nation was reflected 
not only in the number and amount of repaired operations but also in 
the financial conditions offered to Mexico.
The additional resources foreseen by the public sector as a re­
sult of the oil activity had a double effect. First was the increas­
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ing relative size of the public sector in the economy and second 
was, while loans based on income from oil exports increased, the 
losses to the public sector— especially those coming from decentral­
ized parastate businesses through the sale of public goods and ser­
vices that lagged considerably. This situation resulted in subsidy 
increases granted to specific sectors of the economy. This was fea­
sible in virtue of the intense use of external debt and the broaden­
ing monetary base as sources of finance.
The loss of competitiveness of Mexican products abroad and the 
intense internal activity were reflected in the virtual stagnation 
of non-oil exports. The gradual overvaluation of the oil trade was a 
decisive factor in the great acquisitions of foreign assets of every 
type. The oil wealth created, in some businesses, the idea that a 
permanent overvaluation was feasible that would permit them to fi­
nance investments in and acquisitions of new businesses with foreign 
credit at a cost in pesos equal to the foreign interest rates.
Income from Pemex exports grew at a much more dynamic rate than 
the exports themselves because of the strong increase in energy 
prices in the world market between 1979 and 1980. The adjustment of 
the economy to this notable rise in the flow of wealth from abroad 
came immediately; when prices rose Mexico invested the oil resources 
and used additional external finance at a large scale. The current 
account deficit of the balance of payments grew 2.7 times between 
1978 and 1980, projecting a strong tendency toward disequilibrium 
with the external sector.
With the growth of the public sector and the decline, in real 
terms, of the income from its businesses, the requirements for fi­
nancing multiplied. The growth in current spending made the budget 
structure less flexible, exacerbating the internal disequilibrium of 
public finance. Despite the improvement in terms of trade, the econ­
omy became more vulnerable to outside perturbations and less effi­
cient in generating foreign exchange in every sector except oil.
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The fall in international oil prices, observed since the first 
quarter of 1981, was not a chance event. The evolution of crude oil 
prices had been always determined by the volumes of extraction, ex­
portation, storage and consumption, which define the levels of sup­
ply and demand in industrial as well as in producer countries.
Beginning in 1973 crude oil prices rose constantly and peaked 
in 1980. Countries such as Lyb^a and Nigeria began to quote prices 
as high as 40 dollars a barrel of high quality crude oil, while 
Mexico charged 38.50 dollars per barrel for isthmus oil. However, 
1980 marks as well the year of transition toward the stage of sus­
tained decline in the international price of oil. The United States 
was the principal promoter of reversing the adverse effects of 
OPEC's market controls on developed countries. The most important 
changes came on the demand side.
In reponse to the oil crisis and constant rise in crude oil
quotes, the industrial countries implemented programs to save energy 
and increase strategic reserves. In 1981 these countries consumed 8 
percent less energy and 24 percent less oil to obtain practically
the same level of economic production of 1979. On the supply side,
it is possible to identify among structural factors the discovery 
and development of new oil fields and alternative sources of energy 
along with common factors such as the accelerated growth of oil in­
ventories and the record production of Saudi Arabia throughout 1981. 
All of these factors combined in such a way that the spring of 1981 
saw the first international price decline since 1973.
The reconciliation with business
Before the express recognition of the exhaustion of the strat­
egy of Mexican development, Lopez Portillo made, during his presi­
dential campaign, a joint diagnosis that expressed the need to re­
build the national economic base through the expansion of production 
and employment. Beginning with this objective and in order to con­
front the problems of the crisis, he proposed two central actions
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for the first years of his government: political reform to transform 
the regime’s democratic institutions; and the popular, national, 
democratic alliance for production to recover from and superceed the 
crisis.
These two lines of strategy were meant to reconcile the govern­
ment program with social demands, fundamentally with the private 
sector to recover its confidence and reactivate it economically and 
with the dissident sector which continued demanding greater politi­
cal participation. A third line of strategy, the so-called adminis­
trative reform, was intended to support the alliance for production 
and the political reform. Its slogan of "organize the government to 
organize the country" meant that internal public power would be re­
organized politically and economically.
In the sexenial perspective, the alliance for production was 
intended to cultivate the bases and qualitative changes that would 
allow consolidation of the economy in the medium run and accelerated 
growth in the last two years of the regime. With the alliance the 
private sector was given incentives, subsidized and supported fis­
cally and financially, which regained its confidence since, to the 
extent that the nation grew, the resources were designated for the 
private sector in addition to the fact that they generated greater 
profits. In contrast, the social sector was in for grave problems 
stemming from inflation, unemployment, salary disputes and unequal 
distribution of wealth.
Jose Lopez Portillo won an important political victory the day 
he took office. The most disgruntled group with Echeverria's perfor­
mance, the private sector, reactived favorably to his speech on 
December 1, 1976, and the most respected voices of business said 
that his regime had regained their confidence.
When the period began all of the attacks on the president 
stopped, although some attacks on Echeverria continued. The action 
of business took three main paths from there: 1) maintenance of con-
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trol over the private sector's political organization; 2) personifi­
cation of the economic leadership of business in the Alfa group of 
Monterrey (particularly in its boss, Bernardo Garza Sada); and 3) 
increased private sector penetration of the government. Nothing spe­
cial happened in the political organization of business after Lopez 
Portillo took office, except that Alfa predominated. This was con­
sistent with the personality of Garza Sada. The preoccupation with 
publicity came to be relevant because the majority of past business 
leaders were notorious for avoiding publicity.
More important, however, seemed to be the business penetration 
of government dependencies. Scant attention has been paid to this 
subject, even when it could be considered important; different situ­
ations point toward this fact. Santiago Roel (secretary of foreign 
affairs from 1976-1979) was closely tied to Monterrey. One high gov­
ernment official interviewed illustrated the bond when he said that 
Roel occasionally invited persons from Monterrey to join official 
commissions concerning foreign matters. Such commissions were able, 
naturally, to make use of the private airplanes of the Monterrey 
group.
Another official close to a member of CMHN revealed that in 
Novembers of 197 6 (that is, a few weeks before Lopez Portillo took 
office) he did an analysis of the possible secretaries for the next 
cabinet. On this occasion business leaders expressed the opinion 
that the candidate for secretary of Commerce was good, although in a 
couple of years they would like to see in the post someone with the 
qualities of Jorge de la Vega. From another point of view, it is in­
teresting to note as well the different coincidences between a pro-
23posal by Banamex and the Global plan of development 1980-1982.
The possible influence of Monterrey and Televisa in the resig­
nations of Porfirio Munoz Ledo (1978) and Jesus Reyes Heroles 
(1979), as well as the Santiago Roel period (1976-1979), should have
23 Hodara: 1978.
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brought these groups to consider the prospects very promising for 
their aspirations. These aspirations seemed to have reached their 
climax in the Pope's visit in 197 9.
The modernity of the Alfa group, its expansion, its power, had 
by 1980 turned it into prototypical economic and political leader of 
business. Beginning with 1974 Alfa constituted the array of busi­
nesses of the Garza Laguera and Garza Sada families in Monterrey, 
which initiated a peculiar stage in the history of business in 
Mexico. Its influence over the public sector could be observed in 
such cases as the law of the promotion of farming in 1980, which was 
hotly debated as inoperable, but which the group saw as essential 
for expanding its investment in the rural sector. Its influence over 
the private sector can be seen in the stock market euphoria of 1981 
fueled in part by the group's activity in the market. In May of that 
year Alfa continued enjoying its glory. The credit of 178 million 
dollars granted by Eximbank seems to corroborate this. What is miss­
ing now is an examination of the not insignificant part played by 
Alfa in the formation and precipitation of the third crisis in 1982.
In sum, during the Lopez Portillo sexenio, the leading thread 
of policy was the economy, which is understandable given the legacy 
of political stability and legitimacy left by Echeverria at a time 
when economic disequilibrium was requiring urgent attention. The 
conciliatory attitude of the new regime and the conditions imposed 
by the IMF brought Monterrey to consider that, despite not having 
gained political leadership, they probably should have a fundamental 
say in important decisions. And in truth, the first half of the 
Lopez Portillo sexenio (1976-1979) seems to have been dominated by a 
pro-business discourse.
3. THE CRISIS OF 1982
The third crisis under analysis, the bank nationalization that 
mobilized national public opinion on both sides of the issue, has 
been perhaps the most debated event of the last 20 years. It encour­
aged and discouraged at the same time certain segments of the popu­
lation and conditioned in an important way subsequent political and 
economic actions. In the first three months, it provoked a broad mo­
bilization in support of the measure that a little later turned into 
disapproval.
In the formation and evolution of this crisis, the influence of 
several actions grounded in U.S.-Mexican relations should not be un­
derestimated. After the ominous negative reaction of the U.S. to the 
purchase of Mexican gas, when was almost ready the construction of 
the Cactus-Reynosa gas line in December of 1977, the relations 
between presidents Lopez Portillo and Carter were not good, as was 
obvious during Carter visit to Mexico City in February of 197 9. The 
decision not to enter GATT in March of 1980 and the visit to Cuba in 
September of the same year, along with Lopez Portillo's assessment 
of international politics and his study about the value of private 
property for the IV Reunion of the Republic in Hermosillo in 
February of 1981 and the joint announcement with France about El 
Salvador in August of this year, must have heightened attitudes of 
fear and caution toward Mexico in strategic U.S. agencies. The 
North-South reunion in Cancun in December of 1981 and support for 
Nicaragua were fleshing out a Mexican activism in international 
affairs that surely created growing discomfort for the United 
States.
In 1982 Mexico had difficult economic times. The factors that 
precipitated the crises were, on one hand, the contradictions stem­
ming from the country's development model and the inflexibility of 
economic policy to respond favorably to adverse circumstances and, 
on the other hand, changes in international economic conditions —  
falling oil prices, rising interest rates, tight financing. In addi­
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tion, an excessive public deficit, growing alarm within the external 
sector — including widespread capital flight—  inflation and drops 
in GNP, among other factors pointed to a grave economic 
disequilibrium.
To understand the crisis of 1982 it is essential to note, in 
addition to the bilateral relationship with the U.S., the oil crash 
that dragged down government and business as well as the presiden­
tial succession process that has become increasingly unsettling. As 
in the analysis of the previous two crises, complete comprehension 
of the third requires examination of the strong reactions that it 
provoked: without a doubt, international concern as well as the slow 
but growing emergence of internal pressures to risk levels.
The oil crash
The multiplication of oil income beginning with the second vic­
torious OPEC offensive in 1979 and the increase in the production of 
crude by Pemex upset the tranquil, natural order of things and 
established the state as the grand sector of national political and 
economic life, making remote the objective possibilities for the 
private sector to take over national hegemony. The Lopez Portillo 
government seems not to have found an adequate formula for assimi­
lating the new, abundant oil income, a good part of which was lost 
in financing an artificially high rate of consumption, as much by 
the government as the rest of society.
To finance development of the energy sector and the massive im­
ports of capital goods — which seeked to maintain an abnormally high 
rate of growth as well—  the country accelerated the process of 
external indebtedness that eventually would become unsustainable and 
end in the suspension of outside credit after the deterioration of 
confidence from the business sector, the crisis of public finance 
and the bank nationalization.
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The structural imbalances of the Mexican economy could be over­
come and postponed thanks to the oil bonanza. However, the grave and 
growing decline intensified the contradictions and made evident the 
great fragility of the scheme of finance based on debt, especially 
foreign debt and oil resources.
A broad debate about the course of the global economy broke out 
in 1980 in response to the decision that Mexico might enter the GATT 
and expand its program of oil exploitation. It is certain that the 
debate arose in this year, but it was really only one phase in a 
more profound process of inquiry that had begun 10 years earlier.
One important advance toward the economic redefinition of the period 
of readjustment (1968-1980) came on the anniversary of the oil ex­
propriation, March 18, 1980. First, Mexico did not give in to pres­
sure from the U.S. to increase oil production beyond the 2.5 to 2.7 
million barrels a day level — only a 10 percent variation was ac­
cepted. Second, entrance into the GATT was rejected. Third, the sys­
tem of Mexican foodstuffs (SAM) was proposed and implied a more di­
rect participation by the state in the production of food.
Although these amounted to partial redefinitions, they were 
enough to produce several changes in internal arrangements in 1980. 
First, in April a global plan of development was presented that in­
cluded some of the fundamental ideas proposed by the private sector, 
especially by Banamex. Second, in the president's May trip to 
Europe, Televisa expressed its disappointment by pulling all of its 
coverage of the trip. Third, in agreement with the Federal Reserve 
Bank of the United States, more than 4 billion dollars was left in 
the private banks for the end of May.1 A separate but relevant char­
acteristic in this panorama was the offer in February from a Chicago
banker to the Chamber of Commerce to provide "North American mili-
, 2
tary help to Mexico in exchange for oil".
1 Informatica: 53, P. 18.
2 Informatica: 50, P. 19.
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The disturbances in the international price of oil beginning in 
June of 1981 seem to have had an impact of finance that affected 
Alfa. In July the consortium could not obtain a loan in New York for 
200 million dollars and a month later Bernardo Garza Sada declared 
that the rumors of layoffs and bankruptcy in Alfa were unfounded; 
however, a decline in the value of the group’s assets and suspension 
of its plans to diversify were observed by October. Finally,
Banobras announced an extension of 17 billion pesos in credit to 
Alfa on November 1, the day after the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
denounced the technical bankruptcy of the consortium and demanded 
the nationalization of Alfa. Garza Sada declared that there was nei­
ther crisis nor bankruptcy, but presented a petition to the stock 
exchange agents to freeze the group’s assets. With this, the 
viability of a business project, as an option for the nation's 
development, was frozen as well — at least for a while. The 
demoralization of business became apparent.
As in the case of Diaz Serrano, the obvious causes of the rapid 
and strident decline of Alfa — expansion, high costs and debt—  are 
hidden in unknowns that shadowed the event. The first unknown can be 
called the strong internal rivalry between Alfa and Visa; the sec­
ond, a possible profound tie between Visa and the Social Democratic 
Party (PSD). In either case much is missing to illuminate and, above 
all, establish the links between the bankruptcy of Alfa and the pre­
cipitation of the crisis of 1982.
The presidential succession
If the economy was upset, political life was that much more un­
stable. The most turbulent period in Mexican politics is definitely 
the presidential transition, although preoccupation over the succes­
sor exists practically throughout the entire sexenio. This preoccu­
pation traditionally intensifies after the fourth presidential ad­
dress to the nation and heightens as the fifth approaches. This pro­
vokes reshuffling of government posts and pressures that affect po­
litical behavior.
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However, two events are noteworthy in the succession of the 
Lopez Portillo administration: the discourse of Roberto Casillas, 
particular secretary of the president, in August of 1980 and a 
series of interviews granted by Luis Echeverria in April of 1981 to 
El Universal. The effect of Casillas' discourse was a televised in­
terview by the president, who denied his role as the great elector 
and qualified it as fiel de la balanza, the scale pointer. The 
effect of the Echeverria interviews was the switching of posts 
between the president of the PRI and the secretary of agrarian 
reform, eight days after the supersonic breaking of silence. In both 
cases, the president showed a need to strengthen his grip over the 
nation's political situation in a progressively unsettled 
environment.
In contrast with events before July of 1981, later events made 
control over the succession process difficult. On one hand, the oil- 
price problem that arose was analyzed and had an important impact on 
the president's plans. On the other hand, was the dismissal of Diaz 
Serrano which seemed to be due to more than the disagreement over 
price reductions per barrel of exported oil. In addition, the pres­
sures coming from the industrial bloc headed by Alfa and from the 
financial sector foreshadowed the arrival of erratic and disarticu­
lated business actions that came to be the basis of rumor, lack of 
confidence and-capital flight. Finally, the three interviews with 
President Reagan all on U.S. soil, with no reciprocity. The times 
and activities surrounding the presidential nomination during the 
last half of September are suggestive. On the 14th, Diaz Serrano 
said he was ready to return to political life. On the 17th, Lopez 
Portillo went up for the third consecutive time to meet with Reagan, 
this time in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The day after his return, Lopez 
Portillo announced at a meeting in Monterrey that the PRI would re­
veal its candidate in a few days and it was leaked that Diaz Serrano 
would leave to be ambassador to the Soviet Union, and on the 25th 
the PRI disclosed its candidate, almost a month earlier to the Cancun 
meeting --the expected date of destape. Without resorting to
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conspiracy theory, it will be important in the future to investigate 
the possible relationship between the contributing elements: Bush, 
Alfa, Diaz Serrano, Grand Rapids and the anticipation of the 
unveiling of the PRI presidential candidate.
Five weeks after the resignation of Diaz Serrano, the president 
gave a press conference on board the airplane Quetzalcoa tl upon his 
return from Guadalajara July 10. On this occasion he denied that a 
climate of no confidence was being created: "a dirty, unfounded, 
emotional charge based on rumor and gossip...",* he declared himself 
against the devaluation and press terrorism. He promised "to return 
to the Cancun meeting with all of the force of the presidency of the 
republic". A week later, on July 17, Lopez Portillo referred again 
to press terrorism against the peso. He used a press conference with
, 4
foreign correspondents as his forum.
It seemed that the two press conferences helped to temporarily 
calm the general anxiety, which heated up again as the celebration 
of the V Reunion of the Republic approached on Feb. 5, 1982. On that 
day the president once again requested tranquility, confidence and 
solidarity: "We defend our peso in order to not make it the toy of 
the most despicable element of the society: those who enrich them­
selves through speculation and the defeat of others".5 The effect 
was the opposite of what he intended and on February 17 the with­
drawal of the Bank of Mexico from from the exchange market was an­
nounced. The peso against the dollar went from 27.06 on February 17 
to 47.25 on the 26th.6 The ability of the financial sector to un­
leash an efficient pressure mechanism had been proven once again, 
but the inability to regain control was revealed as well.
The financial conditions sharped the economic debate. The 
irreconcilable propositions of the monetarists and structuralists
3 El Dia, July 11, 1981, P. 2.
4 Uno mas Uno, July 18, 1981, P. 1.
5 Excelsior, February 6, 1982, P. 1.
6 Uno mas Uno, February 28, 1982, P. 9.
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came to a head: free exchange rates and tight bonds with the inter­
national monetary system vs. controlled exchange rates and financial 
self-determination. Under this scenario the heads of Public Finance 
and the Bank of Mexico were switched respectively on March 16 and 
17, 1982,# , which was interpreted as a step forward in the transi­
tion toward the new government as the new appointees were close to 
the candidate. To that point, the monetarists seemed to predominate. 
At least that was the general impression when the director of the 
Bank of Mexico published "a pragmatic — not dogmatic—  analysis 
about the suitability" of exchange controls, in which he came to the 
firm conviction that they could not be adopted in Mexico.
Rumor and disparagement continued hurting the president's image 
during a political period — the transition—  that already was diffi­
cult for him. On May 11, 1982, Lopez Portillo formulated an exten­
sive explanation televised in the program Twenty Women and a Man, 
where he argued that the country had problems with financial liquid­
ity but denied the existence of an economic crisis. He made a call 
for confidence, but admitted "that I enjoy less credibility than a 
bank teller".7 Capital flight continued in greater and greater de­
grees. During June and the beginning of July, public attention was 
monopolized by the closing days of the political campaigns and by 
predictions of high voter turnout for the elections. But after the 
electoral euphoria, the rumors returned.
The severity of the financial situation became apparent August 
1 with price hikes for gasoline, bread and tortillas, especially 
given the considerable amount of government subsidies they absorbed. 
The difficulties became apparent once again on August 5 when double 
exchange parity was established. This decision was the first step 
toward general exchange controls announced on September 1, which 
showed that the balance of political forces in the dispute over the 
country's economic policy was changing rapidly.
7 El Nacional, May 12, 1982, P. 1.
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The third crisis: the bank nationalization
The announcement of the bank nationalization and general ex­
change rate controls during the president's VI address to the nation 
took the country by surprise. Except for the cabinet secretaries who 
ate breakfast that morning with the president in Los Pinos, the 
president elect — who was informed the previous afternoon—  and a 
small group who had worked on related projects, no one knew anything 
about the measure.
Since March there had been general considerations about certain 
aspects of the policy change by people close to the president, but 
it was not until the adoption of double parity on August 5 that the 
process reached the point of no return. In the last week of July the 
economy's vital signs were revised in order to conclude that strong 
remedies were needed for serious illnesses. It became clear as well 
that in the magic of the Mexican political system there seemed to be 
only 18 weeks every six years during which difficult decisions could 
be made: from July 15 to November 30 of the last year of the govern­
ment, 15 days after the election of the new president and one day 
before leaving office.
Because of the taboo against controlling free exchange rates, 
the events of August 5 seemed to indicate that the president had 
decided to break definitively with the past. The celebrated marriage 
between private bankers and the government in 1925 blew up and was 
undoubtedly dissolved by September 1. The affairs of the peculiar 
pair had gone along acceptably for nearly 40 years. A flexible and 
moderate fiscal policy in exchange for internal financing of a small 
public deficit was a happy formula for many years.
One important danger that threatened the bank nationalization 
was the popular lack of confidence that could have exploded upon re­
opening the banks on September 6. The danger seemed to arise with 
the first change in regulations announced by Carlos Tello on televi­
sion on Saturday, September 4: fixing parity at 50 and 70 pesos per
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dollar; reducing interest rates; eliminating commissions on checking 
accounts; increasing interest on savings accounts from 4.5 to 20 
percent; reducing the 23 percent in credits for low cost housing to 
establish it at 11 percent, among many other things.
The fundamental chronology of the arrangements that began on 
September 13 in which were given the general rules for exchange rate 
controls went as follows; on September 21* the president sent to the 
Chamber of Deputies the constitutional reforms to reserve bank and 
credit services to the state, to control labor relations through 
part B of article 123 and to convert the Bank of Mexico into a de­
centralized public agency; on the 22nd, 21 banking institutions 
sought protection and, finally, on the 27th the constitution of a 
trusteeship was announced to repatriate real estate at a time when 
Carlos Tello declared that an agreement would be signed with the 
IMF.
The principal observation that can be made about the reactions 
that the bank nationalization and exchange controls produced is that 
they were truly moderate compared with the aggression and opposition 
that other events had received in recent Mexican history, particu­
larly during the Echeverria sexenio.8 There was a manifest absence 
of opposition that was anticipated from a faction of the church. 
Notable as well was the disarticulation of the business sector and 
the heterogeneity of its reactions. Among lawyers a debate arose 
about the constitutionality of the measures, but they remained far 
from reaching a consensus. The workers movement and political par­
ties, with the exception of the PAN and PDM, came out in favor. 
Televisa contained itself and the editorial pages were divided. 
Private investors and a good part of public investors were opposed.
8 Basaftez: 1982c, P. 57.
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Figure No. 1
N a tio n a l iz a t io n  of th e  B a n k in g  S y s te m  
(B y  P a rty  P r e fe r e n c e )
V G G F B V B D K N A T O T
P A N 1 1 2 6 2 2 1 6 8 1 2 5 1 0 0
P R I 2 2 3 8 1 8 5 2 1 0 5 1 0 0
P S U M 3 1 3 8 1 6 6 1 5 3 1 0 0
P P S 1 5 3 0 2 2 5 4 1 5 9 1 0 0
P R T 2 6 2 9 2 4 5 3 1 3 - 1 0 0
P D M 1 3 3 3 2 8 1 3 - 1 3 - 1 0 0
P S T 2 1 3 2 1 7 2 - 2 1 7 1 0 0
P M T 3 1 2 6 1 7 3 - 1 4 9 1 0 0
P A R M 8 5 0 1 7 8 - 1 7 - 1 0 0
A B S 1 1 2 8 2 1 1 2 6 1 8 4 1 0 0
N C 1 2 2 4 1 8 1 0 3 1 2 2 1 1 0 0
N S 2 0 - 4 0 - - 2 0 2 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 7 1 8 1 1 1 0 4 2 4 3 2 1 7 8 6 4 6 3 0 1 5 4 1 7
S U M A 1 9 3 3 1 9 8 3 1 2 6 1 0 0
Q u e s t io n :  <j,Do y o u  th ink  th e  b a n k s '  n a t io n a l iz a t io n  w a s . . .?  
V G - V e r y  G o o d  /  G = G o o d  /  F = F a ir  /  B = B a d  /  V B = V e r y  B a d  /  
D K = D o n ' t  K n o w  /  N A * N o  A n s w e a r
The real state of Mexican public opinion was not being re­
flected in the measures, as is seen in the poll taken by the author 
in November of 1982.9 Actual support for the government run at 71 
percent of those interviewed, in a range that varied from 64 percent 
of businessmen at the low end to 87 percent of politicians at the 
top end, as was indicated in the poll results.
One expression of the maturity process in civil society can be 
observed in the heterogeneous influence of political parties in the 
process of the formation of public opinion, which arose in the na­
tionalization issue. It can be noted that while sympathizers of PAN,
9 The poll included 5,417 annonymous interviews with uniform quotas across 13 
occupational groups and proportional numbers across 31 states and the 
Federal District according to population. The questionnaire contained 41 
closed and five open questions. The percentage of men and women was 62-38, 
with 24 percent of the interviewees making less than one minimum salary, 46 
percent making between one and four minimum'salaries, 22 percent making more 
than four minimum salaries and 8 percent refusing to answer questions about 
income.
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PDM and PARM as well as abstainers and those without an opinion, 
registered the lowest percent of very good responses at levels from 
8 to 13 percent, members of PSUM and PMT, on the other hand, regis­
tered the highest percentages at the 31 percent level. Sympathizers 
of PRI, ppT and PST came in between 21 and 2 6 percent. At the other 
end of the scale, the highest expression of bad opinion came from 
sympathizers of PAN, PDM, PARM, abstainers and those who did not an­
swer questions about party preference.
Figure No. 2
N a tio n a l iz a t io n  of th e  B a n k in g  S y s te m  
(B y  In c o m e  L e v e l)
V G G F B V B D K N A T O T
L o w 1 1 3 2 1 6 5 1 2 6 9 1 0 0
M id d le  L o w 1 4 31 2 2 4 1 21 7 1 0 0
M id d le 1 9 3 6 2 0 6 1 1 3 5 1 0 0
M id d le  H igh 2 3 3 7 1 9 7 3 7 4 1 0 0
H ig h 21 3 2 1 9 1 4 7 4 3 1 0 0
N A 1 6 2 7 1 6 9 4 1 5 1 3 1 0 0
T O T A L  1 0 0 7 1 8 1  1 1 0 4 2 4 3 2 1 7 8 6 4 6 3 0 1 5 4 1  7
1 9 3 3 1 9 8 3 1 2 6 1 0 0
Q u e s t io n :  <j,Do yo u  th ink th e  b a n k s ' n a t io n a liza t io n  w a s . . .?  
V G = V e r y  G o o d  /  G = G o o d  /  F = F a ir  /  B = B a d  /  V B = V e r y  B a d  /  
D K = D o n 't  K n o w  /  N A = N o  A n s w e a r
The influence of income level on opinion about the bank nation­
alization was clearly apparent as well. It can be seen in the pre­
ceding figure that the most negative opinions (21 percent of bad and 
very bad) came from the highest income groups at the eight minimum 
salary level, while the most positive responses (60 percent of good 
and very good) came from the upper middle group (between four and 
eight minimum salaries).
Despite the generally accepted impression that government func­
tionaries overreported their opinions to square with the official 
party line, the bank poll showed that when granted anonymity they
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were inclined to agree with parties of the center-left. A minority 
exists in the public sector that can demand a more radical role for 
the state, a more nationalistic position that emphasizes social 
policies to benefit the masses. This could be reflected in the sup­
port for opposition parties that supported similar demands, but it 
also could be a sign of the government's latent capacity to move a 
little bit toward the left in order to coopt dissidents. On the 
other hand, whatever measure of government support for the left 
would probably strengthen the right sustained by the groups that 
support the government less.
The crisis of 1982 contains one peculiarity. It was not the 
dissidents, nor the private sector, nor the middle classes but pre­
cisely the public sector that exploded the crisis. Nonetheless, the 
bank nationalization was a determining factor in the reconstruction 
of state legitimacy and consensus among the popular masses. The 
demonstrations that followed in September — and that inhibited the 
business reaction—  would seem to support this. However, the Lopez 
Portillo era was almost over and the attempt to make enormous struc­
tural changes in the nation's financial relations soon came to an 
end.
International concern of the new Administration
The cente-rpiece of the government response to the 1982 crisis 
was defined from the beginning. The attempt would be made to comply 
scrupulously with the country's outside agreements — specifically to 
cover external debt service o.{ the order of 10 billion dollars a 
year—  and the adverse internal effects of such a decision would be 
countered with a broad respect for the free expression of ideas and 
a strong political reform.
Under these circumstances, Mexico saw as indispensable the re- 
evaluation of the importance of the international context in its 
economic orientation and the adoption of the premise of complying 
with the outside as a condition for domestic development. This re­
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quired a strong internal adjustment and broad promotion of the ac­
quisition of foreign exchange —  in a perspective of frugality in 
the public use of foreign exchange, reduction of imports and 
augmentation of exports, specifically non-oil exports, along the 
path of industrial reconvertion and liberation of commerce.
We can identify two periods in the Mexican government’s atti­
tude concerning its agreements abroad: the first goes from December 
of 1982 to February of 1986, in which the principle of compliance at 
any cost is imperative; the second begins in February of 1986 and is 
characterized by an attitude of modified compliance. The maxim of 
compliance at any cost undertaken by the Mexican government is un­
derstandable as much for the socio-political composition of the 
group that came to power in 1982 as for its vision of adverse exter­
nal and internal circumstances throughout the country.
The strategic North American agencies were very sensitive to 
Mexican foreign policy especially regarding Central America. 
Constantine Menges, head of the Latin American section of the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the beginning of the new 
Mexican administration 1982-1988, was one of the officials most con­
cerned about an alleged alliance between the Mexican government, the 
Soviet Union and Cuba,10 in which Mexico would support Nicaragua and 
El Salvador, according to Menges, and the Soviet Union and Cuba 
would keep the-Mexican left under control. To show tangentially that 
Mexico was not on the road to communism, nor in alliance with any­
one, the new Mexican government chose the path of scrupulous compli­
ance with external agreements regarding the debt. However, such ef­
forts and financial discipline were irrelevant for the North 
American security agencies, which continued pressure campaigns on 
the pretext of fighting drug trafficking, threats to tourists or 
government corruption in Mexico.
10 Lorenzo Meyer, "Imperios del Mai y Bien", Excelsior, P. 7, May 25, 1988.
It is interesting to contrast the dominant government opinion 
with that of the rest of the society on the debt issue.11 As can be 
seen in the following figure, government officials held the least 
unfavorable opinion (7 percent good and 77 percent bad) followed by 
the campejsinos (6 percent good and 56 percent bad) . But, in either 
case, the national contrast between those for and those against (4 
percent vs. 78 percent) shows society’s open rejection of the debt.
Figure No 3
External Debt  
(By Ocupation)
G ood Fair Bad D K
G o v e rn m e n t 7 1 1 7 7 5
B usiness 4 7 7 9 1 0
Professional 3 8 8 4 5
W hite  Collar 3 1 0 7 9 8
Civil Servant 3 8 8 2 7
Blue Collar 3 9 7 6 1 2
Farm er 6 1 2 5 6 2 6
U n e m p lo y e d 2 9 7 5 1 4
National 4 8 7 8 1 0
Question: ^W hat is your opinion of the current external debt of Mexico?
In August of 1983 Mexico was rated by higher ups in interna­
tional financial circles as a country with an exemplary recovery 
program that was being imitated by other countries in financial 
trouble. This perception was argued and spread by specialized news­
papers and magazines with great international circulation that indi 
cated that no country in modern times had applied an adjustment pro 
gram so radical, rapid, firm and successful as Mexico. In June of 
1984, the IMF's executive director sent out a memorandum that de­
scribed Mexico as an example of how to adjust and negotiate for
debtor and creditor nations; the memorandum was backed by the presi
12dent of the U.S. Federal Reserve. To that point, international
11 Poll in April of 1983, See Appendix.
12 Cronica Presidencial: 1985, P. 276.
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opinion about Mexico had gone from skeptical and adverse to favor­
able in response to the national economic recovery. This meant that 
the new governing group was recovering credibility and confidence in 
international financial centers. But not so in the centers of 
strategic^ security.
Against the growing concerns that Latin America would confront 
the international financial community with a unified position, ex­
pressed in the meetings of Quito and Cartagena in 1984, the Mexican 
posture of compliance at any cost remained firm. The possibility of 
participating in the formation of a so-called debtors club was re­
jected and Mexico questioned the viability of any initiative of 
force, rupture or confrontation against the international financial 
centers.
Compliance with the agreements stems from a series of effects 
of different social and economic variables. The public deficit was 
financed with internal credit, which implied a vicious circle that 
exacerbated the problem each time, because a large part of the 
credit went to pay interest on the internal debt. As the internal 
financing of the public deficit increased, resources were absorbed 
that otherwise would have been directed toward productive activi­
ties, creating a financial constriction that among other things was 
characterized by a practically null availability of finance for the 
private sector^
The 1985 fall in international oil prices, the growth of infla­
tion, the reduction in industrial production and the effects of the 
September earthquakes, despite the use of emergency fiscal measures 
in exchange rates and commerce, did not ease the growing difficul­
ties in complying with external agreements. It was in this context 
that the presidential discourse of February 21, 1986, marked a shift 
in the policy of compliance at any cost. A change in the govern­
ment's attitude about this policy was first observed in mid-1985. As 
much for the government as for the society, it seemed evident that 
the economic containment policy initiated with the Immediate Program
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for Economic Recovery (PIRE) and reinforced with tight credit that 
year could not continue in effect much longer, without risking 
structural damage to the industrial plant. External creditors had 
been agreed to cover Mexican debt service, granting minor conces­
sions through restructuring, but since 1984 the country had not re­
ceived additional credit. Under these conditions, the progressive
13decapitalization of the country was not a very tempting option.
On February 21, 1986, Miguel de la Madrid sent a message to the 
nation and the external creditors through the media that his admin­
istration was no longer willing to continue sacrificing the stan­
dards of living of the majority of Mexicans in order to export, 
through debt payments, resources generated internally, while exter­
nal financial flows continued virtually cancelled and oil income had 
been cut to less than half. Two months later, upon inaugurating the 
21st session of CEPAL, de la Madrid declared that the present situa­
tion could not continue:
We have reached the limit of being able to sustain 
the transfer of capital to the rest of the world and 
our people demand and end to the crisis that becomes 
less tolerable every day... (As a result) Mexico ur­
gently demands restructuring of international eco­
nomic relations that embrace, along with the debt, 
the problems of finance and money, commercial flows 
and terms of trade, technological support and inter­
national cooperation.14
The undersecretary of Public Finance Suarez Davila observed at 
the end of April that Mexico could take unilateral action regarding 
the external debt, as it would be a reduction of interest beyond the 
approval of the creditors, in order to put the paid revenues only 
two points above the international inflation rate. The then-secre- 
tary of Public Finance and Public Credit, Jesus Silva Herzog, also 
insinuated the possibility of a unilateral moratorium.
13 Excelsior, February 22, 1986, P. 1.
14 Excelsior, April 22, 1986, P. 1.
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In May in the extraordinary national council of the PRI and in 
June in Hermosillo, Sonora, de la Madrid insisted on these plans to 
break with the policy of compliance. By mid-June the nation was sur­
prised by news of Jesus Silva Herzog's resignation and his replace­
ment by the until-then-general director of Nafinsa, Gustavo 
Petriccioli. The change provoked a lot of conjectures, some contra­
dictory. For some analysts, the resignation stemmed from his radical 
declarations over the past three months that had included the possi­
bility of a moratorium. For others, the resignation was obligatory 
if a change toward a more firm policy with external creditors was 
desired. Others still saw the resignation in terms of the beginnings 
of the presidential succession.15
The Mexican strategy of gaining better conditions in debt pay­
ments bore its first fruits in July of 1986. Despite the favorable 
conditions for Mexico in the pact, independent analysts continued 
emphasizing that other important demands of the Mexican government 
were not accepted by the IMF, such as substantial modifications in 
the terms of payments and concessions regarding interest rates and 
length of loans.
The conditions agreed upon with the international financial 
centers and the return of rising oil prices that began in October of 
1986 generated a certain flexibility in the internal adjustment pro­
gram and strengthened the goal of diversifying our exports as well 
as increasing the national acquisition of foreign exchange.
Internal pressures
Three types of internal pressures can be identified as a result 
of the decision to respond to the 1982 crisis by scrupulous compli­
ance with international financial agreements: pressures from the 
popular bases of workers and peasants; pressures from leftist orga­
15 El Nacional, June 24, 1986.
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nizations and parties; and pressures from right-wing organizations 
and parties.
Regarding popular pressures we can say that since the 
Immediate^ Program of Economic Recovery (PIRE) was put in place in 
December of 1982, the workers expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the economic policies of the de la Madrid government, especially 
with the policy of wage and price controls. The growing opposition 
to wage containment, price hikes and public tariffs, reduction and 
elimination of subsidies and liberation of price controls on some 
general consumer goods had been coordinated through all of the coun­
try's labor organizations including independents as well as members 
of the Labor Congress.
The intensive and extensive growth in labor pressures arose 
at the end of 1982 through the unusual increase in alternative pro­
posals to existing economic policies, the number of strikes, public 
criticism of the government's management of the economy, different 
protest movements and demonstrations, as well as the growth of labor 
demands. In fact, top government officials had recognized the social 
cost that the economic crisis and policies were causing in the work­
ing class .
The CTM as well as the CT developed alternative economic and 
social policies and used generalized strikes as resources in the de­
fense of their corporatist territory. However, the organized labor 
movement mainly developed a pressure campaign of criticism and oppo­
sition to the programs, measures and policies that the public sector 
implemented. It questioned as well the accuracy of the government's 
assessments and the viability of its prescriptions along with the 
competence of some public officials.
The independent labor movement, which was organized into large 
groups such as the la mesa de concertacion sindical, had pushed the 
majority of strikes and demonstrations against the so-called auster­
ity program, had struggled more combatively for salary increases,
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employment and price controls and had generated greater opposition 
to different aspects of the government's economic policy.
Among the main worker mobilizations recorded in 1983 are the 
strikes by 10 university syndicates; the general strike of the CTM 
which some independent syndicates joined (May); the break out of the 
Uramex faction of Sutin and the work stoppage by 176,000 employees 
of SARH (June); the abandonment of moderation in the context of the 
solidarity pact of the labor movement (November). In 1984 the mobi­
lizations of teachers in Chiapas and Oaxaca (February); the demon­
strations of discontent in the labor parade (May); the 10 proposals 
of the Labor Congress to protect basic mass consumption and the 
president's response not to cave in to pressures (June); the 
REQUISA??? of Telephones of Mexico and the confrontation among work­
ers (September).
In 1985 the strike of 1,300 miners (February); the slowing down 
movements of the Mexicans Airlines employees (July); the strike of 
the section of the Siderurgica de Lazaro Cardenas in the state of 
Michoacan (August); demonstrations against massive layoffs of public 
employs (July); conflicts in institutions of higher education, among 
them Colmex and UAM (August); the doctors' demands on Hospital 
General and Juarez (October). In 1986 the threaten of the oil 
workers in the visit to the president (January); the demonstration 
of 100,000 independent workers (end of January); the strike of Dina 
(February); the demonstrations by more than 100,000 workers (March 
and July); the criticisms by CTM and CT of economic policy (July); 
the student and worker mobilizations convened to create a conflict 
in UNAM by the CEU (November).
The campesino movement also created some pressure during the 
de la Madrid sexenio. In contrast with the labor movement, whose 
struggles and demonstrations took place in urban centers and as a 
result received wide press coverage, the campesino struggles took 
place in remote places and their magnitude and gains were much less
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known. Nonetheless, certain mobilizations have captured a broad seg­
ment of national public attention, among them are the following:
The land conflict in Ocoyoacac, Mexico (January 1983); the 
Chiapas peasant mobilization of CIOAC (October 1983); campesino 
marches from the valley of Toluca and the north of the state of 
Mexico to Mexico City (February 1984); the national campesino cara­
van of solidarity with a final destination of Mexico City as well 
(March 1984); the mobilization of the national coordinating Plan de 
Ayala (CNPA) (march 1984); the violent confrontation between members 
of the CNC and the CIOAC in the city of Venustiano Carranza, Chiapas 
(October 1984); the campesino eviction of Tequixquiac, state of 
Mexico (April 1984); the conflict between the Ruta 100 union and 
campesinos for the possession of some property in Acolman, state of 
Mexico (February 1985); the new armed confrontation between cam­
pesinos of CNC and CIOAC (August 1986); the merge between the inde­
pendent campesino movement of the CNPA and the popular independent 
urban movement, organized in Conamup, to make a joint march toward 
the Zocalo in Mexico City on the anniversary of Emiliano Zapata’s 
birth.
The main campesino demands were for increases in basic consumer 
goods and transportation, guaranteed prices, supports and subsidies 
for agriculture, a crackdown on the corruption and inefficiency in 
the agrarian bureaucracy, the delays in their trials, the allotment, 
tenancy and restitution of land, the unionization of day labor and 
an end to repression in the countryside.
With respect to pressures from the left it was obvious that 
President Miguel de la Madrid continued the line of opening and 
tolerance begun by his two immediate predecessors. Once again the 
legalization of leftist organizations and the channeling of official 
funds to registered parties were a political counterweight to the 
general malaise in the population due to the drastic austerity mea­
sures taken to fight the crisis; the policy worked as well to coun­
teract the advances of the right.
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Regarding the economy, the leftist parties constantly criti­
cized the adjustment policies, arguing that in practical terms such 
policies did nothing but put the full burden of the crisis on the 
working classes, exacerbated employment problems as well as income 
distribution and exclusively favored large monopolies and 
oligopolies.
The leftist parties took, among others, the following demands 
to the de la Madrid regime: push a profound fiscal reform that would 
burden capital; remove the value added tax; eliminate subsidies to 
private business; establish severe controls over foreign investment; 
break with the IMF and declare a moratorium on debt payments; estab­
lish general exchange rate controls; nationalize the foodstuff, 
pharmaceutical and export industries; increase public spending on 
education, health, housing, public transport and other social pro­
grams; reform government institutions and the judiciary; democratize 
the Federal District through the popular election of the municipal 
government in Mexico City; clean up the judiciary and elect its min­
isters and judges; dismantle presidentialism; create an agency to 
certify elections that would be completely independent from the 
presidency; free political prisoners and reveal the names of those 
who were disappeared for political reasons; completely respect de­
mocratization of the unions; stopping unemployment; reduce the 
concentration ©f wealth and the capacity to declare strikes non­
existent; upscale salaries; reform several aspects of labor law in 
favor of the unions; remunerate salaries and pay workers 56 hours in 
wages for working 40; unionize day labor and peons; reduce limits to 
small-scale farming and ranching and form collective ejidos; fix 
guaranteed wages for peasant labor; channel credit to ejidatarios, 
communes and organized peasants; reduce and freeze rents; make a 
radical urban reform; grant decent housing to laborers; preserve the 
environment and protect the ecology.
In support of their demands leftist parties and organizations 
frequently promoted demonstrations, marches, meetings, highway
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blockages and other forms of popular mobilization. In the demonstra­
tions that the left periodically organized, party members usually 
marched with independent unions, tenant farmers, student groups and 
sometimes with campesinos as well.
The moments of greatest pressure from the left came during 
electoral campaigns, especially for municipal governments. The most 
important include the August 1983 elections in Oaxaca when the PRI 
recaptured the government of Juchitan and the COCEI installed its 
own parallel government that eventually was removed from town hall 
by public force. Three years later, in August of 1986, the PRI de­
clared victory in Juchitan and once again the COCEI denounced elec­
toral fraud and demanded the elections be annulled.
After local elections in Chihuahua and Oaxaca, in July and 
August of 1986 respectively, the left captured new ground in its 
politics of alliances upon announcing the formation of a forum for 
effective suffrage with the parties and organizations of the right 
to ensure respect for the vote and to travel the country denouncing 
the presumed electoral fraud committed against both sides. The left­
ist parties closest to the PRI — PPS and PST—  decried the decision 
of the PSUM, PMT and PRT to join forces with the PAN and the PDM to 
combat electoral fraud. In addition, the leftist parties made new 
attempts to form alliances, at least electoral alliances. The poli­
tics of alliances on the left seemed to tend to overcome its his­
toric fragmentation that had made electoral politics so adverse for 
the individual organizations.
The relations between the de la Madrid government and dissident 
intellectuals in general were stable. Nonetheless, they passed 
through two difficult moments: One stirred up by the introduction of 
the crime of moral injury in the civil code and the other provoked 
by the assassination of journalist Manuel Buendia. Another cause for 
concern in the newspaper guild was including the crime of disloyalty 
in the law of responsibilities of public servants, which could 
implicate a functionary who leaked information.
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For its part, the intellectual community has shown a great deal 
of interest and willingness to get involved in the political debate 
and in electoral results during the past few years. After the elec­
tions of 1986 in Chihuahua and Oaxaca, against the backdrop of re­
peated protests by the PAN — supported by the leftist parties—  and 
amid a general feeling that major fraud had been committed in favor 
of the PRI, a group of 20 distinguished intellectuals publicly de­
manded that the elections be annulled.16
Regarding pressure from the organizations and parties on 
the right, it should be noted that beginning in 1982 they were 
centered mainly in a systematic attack challenging the government's 
capacity and direction in managing the economic crisis; the repre­
sentativeness of the national political leadership; the democratic 
forms and procedures in the Mexican political system; and the peace, 
liberty and security that existed in Mexico.
In this sense, Mexico's conservative groups were homogenized, 
articulated and founded dynamically and organically among themselves 
and they established tacit alliances with some North American 
groups, with private sector associations and groups and with some 
university and mass media organizations. In a framework of civil 
disobedience, the right intensified its pressure campaign using cor­
ruption, fraud-and the government's authoritarianism as vehicles to 
call attention to the crisis. Also, the increase of the church's po­
litical and partisan activities has been notable for its open par­
ticipation in favor of the right in the North of the country and in 
favor of the left in the South and for its discrete opposition to 
the public sector.
Since 1982 the conflicts and inconformities surrounding elec­
toral processes have increased. The most frequent complaints have
16 La Jornada, July 24 and August 30, 1986, P. 5 and P. 4.
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come from opposition parties and practically all of them are based 
on accusations of some type of electoral fraud.
The conflicts, increasingly on a larger scale, are being accom­
panied by, political mobilizations in the from of protests and demon­
strations in front of public buildings, threats of civil disobedi­
ence — particularly in the payment of taxes—  hunger strikes, 
occupations of state and municipal offices as well as of roads, 
bridges and important avenues. For their part, the mobilizations are 
the antecedents of violent confrontations among partisans in 
conflict or between them and public forces. This is illustrated by 
some municipal confrontations in the states of Oaxaca (August 1983), 
Sinaloa (September 1984), Chiapas (February 1985), San Luis Potosi 
(January 1986), Puebla (April 1986), Chihuahua (July 1986) and 
Durango (August 1986).
The electoral advance of the PAN in 1983 that brought the party 
31 municipalities — among the most noteworthy were important 
capitals such as Chihuahua, Durango, Hermosillo and San Luis Potosi- 
- shows that the rightist offensive was focused on large important 
cities, mainly in the north of the country where it found much 
support from business and the church. In fact, the PAN's strategy 
seems to be based on running regionally important businessmen as 
candidates who in some way are government dissidents, the clearest 
examples of this are found in Puebla, Sonora and Baja California.
The elections for federal deputies in July 1985, as mid-term 
elections in the sexenial perspective, caused particular unrest and 
political reflection because they became tests of strength for the 
PAN, the left and the PRI as well as indicators of the national po­
litical system's stability. Most analyses referred to the PAN's 
electoral rise, the militancy and support of rightist businessmen to 
this party, the church's participation in politics, the North 
American interventions on behalf of the PAN, the descent of the PRI 
and the fragmentation of the left.
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The process of the politicization of business and its insertion 
in political parties was seen by some as a decision with a view to­
ward obtaining recognition as a political actor with an organized 
legitimate public presence, as well as specific political positions 
that contributed to guaranteeing the existing mechanisms of 
consultation, to broadening the channels of business participation 
in the highest decisions and, in general, to assuring entrance into 
new political-ideological spaces that would serve as the basis for 
promoting the right's hegemony.
Even when Mexican conservatives lacked their own articulated 
national program17 they had, however, a private point of view about 
the functioning of society with which they openly defended free en­
terprise, acting as well in defense of the interests of capital. The 
objective was to take control over the national economic project, 
using among other things the withdrawal of investment and capital 
flight as well as the disparagement of the state's managerial abil­
ity.
Some proposals from the right were: promote the increase and 
broadening of national capital as a real alternative to overcome the 
crisis and guarantee the survival of national unity; eliminate 
barriers to the free flow of commerce and capital; liberalize or 
privatize public enterprises; condition and limit the public sec­
tor's intervention in the economy; exclude and politically fragment 
the left; articulate and contain the social demands of labor.
Some ex-private bankers had argued that the Mexican State was 
unable to further national development. In this context, their ideo­
logues proposed the dissemination of a neoliberal ideology to aid 
the gradual transformation of the Mexican political system to a bi­
party PRI-PAN system that would keep the state apparatus from func­
tioning in a monolithic way. As a result, the response the private 
sector developed was not chance, because it was conditioned in the
17 Basanez (1981a), P. 109.
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causes, circumstances and effects of the crises of the last 20 years 
and structurally responded to the participation of the public sector 
in certain economic-productive and service areas, in a mixed economy 
that conditioned its enrichment.
4. THE 1987 CRISIS
The 1987 crisis — the Mexican stock market crash that began 
October 5—  is perhaps the clearest illustration, on one hand, of 
the narrow ties between politics and the economy and, on the other 
hand, of the fundamental role that perception, subjectivity and 
awareness play in the development of the crises and, therefore, in 
the transformation of reality. But, additionally and in contrast 
with the three previous crises, the 1987 market crash shows that the 
influence of perception not only effects the small number of actors 
in the national leadership but a much broader segment of society 
that at least includes the 375,000 players in the stock market. That 
is, it would seem that an old and in other countries well-known 
actor opened on the Mexican political stage: the phenomenon of the 
formation of public opinion.
In October of 1987 there were no real changes in the economy or 
society, in contrast with the months of February of 1986 and 
September of 1985, when there were concrete reasons that justified 
use of the word crisis because of the respective fall in oil prices 
and the Mexico City earthquakes. However, neither the oil crash nor 
the earthquakes were generally conceptualized as crises because at 
no time were they perceived as such but rather as abnormal situa­
tions and emergencies that required broad social measures.
The stock market rise that began in 1983 was inconsistent with 
the real behavior of the economy; that is, the stock index grew 
while production fell. Government policy sent clear signals of 
encouragement to capital and subjection and control to labor, giving 
a positive picture of the future to businessmen and investors, moti­
vating them to risk capital not on industry but on assets. The mar­
ket rise was detained and left with no real basis other than the 
culmination of the presidential succession process, sprinkled just 
in case with some important announcements which, when signs of the 
crash increased, became a phenomenon of public opinion and acquired 
the force and capacity to arrest real and important economic vari­
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ables: the price of the dollar, interest rate, salary demands, pub­
lic sector prices and tariffs, among other things, generating the 
fourth crisis.
And so, market euphoria and presidential succession are the two 
cores to understanding the formation of the fourth crisis. The imme­
diate reactions such as the economic pact of solidarity should be 
explored provisionally to complete the analysis. However, in a 
couple of years, once the current policies have fully developed, it 
will be possible to revise and deepen the analysis. Meanwhile and to 
help identify some characteristics of the crisis, it is important to 
review the economic context behind the market crash without loosing 
sight of the market disturbances in New York, Tokyo and London, 
among others.
Market euphoria
The Mexican stock market (BMV) began a long-term rise in 1983 
that was not detained until the crash of 1987. The path of its gen­
eral index gives us an idea of the magnitude of this gain: in 1982 
the market closed at 676 points with a loss of 271 on the last day 
of 1981. As is remembered, the market had suffered an abrupt drop in 
June of 1979 and was not able to recover despite the oil boom that 
drove the economic bonanza during the next two years. At the end of 
1983 and despite the fact that the economy suffered a drastic drop 
in GDP of 5.3 points that year, the market index had multiplied by a 
factor of four to 2,451 points. In 1984 growth persisted and at the 
end of the year the index reached 4,038 points. In 1985, it jumped 
to 11,197 points (177 percent growth) and in 1986 shot up to 47,101 
points (320 percent growth). As is observed, there was a total lack 
of correspondence between the path of the market and that of the 
general economy. The most notable growth came during the two most 
difficult years for the real sector (1983 and 1986) and was least -- 
although important as well—  in the years of production growth: 1984 
and 1985.
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Considering everything, growth in 1986 remained completely ob­
scured by what happened in 1987, particularly in the last trimester 
of the year. In the first semester of 1987 the index grew 114,586 
points. Between 1983 and June of 1987 the total price of assets in 
circulation increased 9,541 per cent, passing from 436 million to 
42.3 billion pesos, practically without a change in the number of 
assets. From the 161,668 points that the index had reached by June 
30, 1987, the figure grew to 343,544 over the next three months --an 
increase of 181,876 points or more than the market had grown in its 
previous 93 years of existence.
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1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Jan 793 3375 3710 14204 60281 139620
Feb 865 4032 4202 14150 79825 200586
Mar 837 3350 4396 13378 98524 174398
Apr 918 2885 4818 12802 120303 154159
May 1098 3282 4597 14677 143308 188067
Jun 1424 3172 4958 15998 161667 184189
Jul 1598 3302 5698 19399 226988 188078
Aug 1571 3885 6743 22365 287395 196524
Sep 2013 4366 7286 28629 343545 197872
Oct 2002 3997 9608 35251 200018 197822
Nov 2037 4200 10832 41699 113628 229579
Dec 2452 4038 11197 47101 105670 211532
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As the price index grew so did the number of market
investors, increasing from 84,476 in 1983 to 186,023 in 1986 and to
373,822 in August of 1987 and dividing among themselves practically 
the same number of assets.1 The brokerage houses built branches in 
the biggest cities of the province, covering all important places 
from Ciudad Juarez to Merida. As September ended, the BMV reached 
the zenith of its vigor and prestige and its meteoric rise attracted 
the enthusiasm and optimism of the investors and drove them away 
from the enormous, bureaucratic and low-profitable national banking 
system. How could the market grow so much in so little time? It is
necessary to list government support first among the reasons that
explain the rise.
From the day de la Madrid took office, the government tried to 
recover business confidence lost during the bank nationalization, 
announcing the reprivatization of 34 per cent of the capital of the 
banks that had been nationalized three months earlier. Months later, 
a generous program of indemnification for the expropriated ex­
bankers was completed and implemented; a decision that was followed 
by a perhaps more important one — giving priority to the ex-bankers 
in acquiring the reprivatized banks. Among such businesses were bro­
kerage houses, insurance companies and the rest of the non-bank fi­
nanciers. However, all of this was still not enough. The financial 
faction of the’business sector had been deprived of its means of ac­
cumulation—  the banks. Even though brokerage houses had been re­
turned, they were still weak institutions unable to serve even as 
substitutes for the nationalized banks. It was unthinkable to en­
courage a process of accelerated growth that would convert the small 
and almost insignificant brokerage houses into powerful instruments 
of capital accumulation.
The most effective mechanism that the federal government adopted to 
drive the growth of brokerage houses was to deposit volumes of 
growing government assets in them. The Bank of Mexico --the key
1 Zufiiga, Juan: 1988.
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institution in the recovery of lost business confidence—  sponsored 
the triangulation of the federal government’s internal debt in favor 
of the non-bank financiers by limiting government access to what was 
the traditional source of internal resources: the encaje legal. In a 
totally contradictory way, if it is considered that the rates of 
encaje legal are lower than those in the capital markets, the Bank 
of Mexico sponsored the release of treasury certificates and other 
government assets of insured value PAGAFES, oil bonds, etc.) that 
would be deposited precisely through the brokerage houses. With this 
fundamental change, volumes of capital and investors began to flow 
increasingly to the stock market. Talk began as well of the 
existence of a parallel bank.
The State strengthened its strategy of consolidating non-bank 
financiers by promulgating new bank legislation that, among other 
things, prohibited banks from possessing brokerage houses, leaving 
the management of the stock market exclusively in private hands and 
by limiting to a predetermined amount the maximum level of financing 
that the Bank of Mexico could grant to the federal government. In 
this way the private mediation of the the public sector's internal 
financing remained institutionalized. Banks were prohibited from 
managing even their own stock market investment funds. Only the 
brokerage houses would have access to the trading floor of the 
Mexican stock market and their agents would be the only ones 
authorized to buy and sell assets and stocks.
At the same time, the credit policy dictated by the central 
bank contributed to the market peak. From July 1985 a virtual total 
freeze of bank credit was decreed that in practice temporarily can­
celled the traditional function of financiers as channels between 
bank savings and investment. Businesses began to see the stock mar­
ket as an alternative for obtaining funds that strengthened the role 
of the non-bank financiers. But above all, the banks were subject to 
an interest rate policy that objectively favored the stock sector, 
as the bank rates were always maintained considerably below those of 
treasury certificates negotiated in the brokerage houses. In this
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way, the bank share that had shown a moderate advance in 1984 and 
the first of 1985 began to decline at the end of this second year 
and was depressed from then on.
The peak of the asset market had as its point of departure and 
support base the money market, particularly that of treasury 
certificates, CETES. The attractive returns on these instruments, 
added to an exchange policy that offered a stable flow from pesos to 
dollars, reversed a considerable part of the capital flight that 
flowed en masse to the flowering stock market and provoked the boom 
of 1986 and 1987. The money market was unable to absorb it and 
skillful management of the investment community (whose portfolios 
normally included a mix of fixed- and variable-return assets) 
provided the going up of business stocks quoted on the market. And 
so began the market boom that would not end until October of 1987.
It was noticeable that even stocks from companies with clear 
problems of production and marketing --for example, the Pliana group 
in 1986—  went up as if they were completely successful. A gap 
opened between the real and market values of the assets that was 
growing more and more thanks to the affluence of the new contingents 
of investors who flowed into the market to buy practically anything.
The broad intense publicity campaign undertaken to attract a 
growing flow of investors — through a broad distribution of profits- 
- should be counted among the props of the market boom. The 
enthusiasm of financial columnists of various newspapers was carried 
through the formal channels of publication and, with rare 
exceptions, encouraged readers to run to the market. The main reason 
behind market growth — speculation in the price of assets—  was 
carefully couched and explained in the rosiest scenario of the 
nation's economy or, rather, in the context of investor confidence 
in the government's economic policies. It can be accepted that 
confidence was an essential factor in explaining the market boom,
, , 2but not general confidence as can be seen in the following figure, 
nor even that of the investors who were directed to the stock 
market. It was only the confidence of the financial faction of the 
business elite, carefully rebuilt by the government after having 
blown it to pieces in September 1982.
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The government drove the market boom, as we have seen, and not 
only that but maintained an almost complete deregulation of the mar 
ket despite the notorious growth of the market as repository and ad 
ministrator of’the savings of many Mexicans. Such a deregulation, a 
was proved later, set off the gigantic speculative mechanism that 
precipitated the October crash and, also, fraud and abuse against 
investors in some brokerage houses. However, all of this was subor­
dinated to the objective of mending the broken alliance at the apex 
of power, which was essential for maintaining the traditional hege­
mony of the Mexican State.
The market crash itself and its immediate result of dollariza­
tion, capital flight and devaluation, should not be considered as
2 For the 1983 and 1987 polls see the Appendix.
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the loss of recovered confidence, but rather as the cost of such a 
recovery. The profit taking that unleashed the fall would have con­
solidated in the end with private finance capital and would have 
marked a point of no return on the road to restoring its old deci­
sion making power over the Mexican financial network. Five years 
later, the country once again had a solid and influential financial 
sector in the dominant class, reconciled finally with the Mexican 
government.
The presidential succession
The municipal governments in state capitals won by the PAN 
after 1982, the federal legislative elections in 1985 that attracted
3
scholarly attention and above all the 1986 elections in Chihuahua 
encouraged a debate about the prospects for democratization of the 
Mexican political system, initiated to a great extent by Enrique 
Krauze, that was extended throughout the entire pre-nomination pe­
riod for the PRI presidential candidate. Certain prominent PRI 
voices were lifted to request internal democratization, such as 
those of ex-president of the PRI, Porfirio Muftoz Ledo; ex-governor 
of Michoacan and son of Lazaro Cardenas, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas; and 
ex-secretary general of the PRI and then-embassador to Spain,
Rodolfo Gonzalez Guevara.
In August- 1986 the formation of a democratic current was an­
nounced that demanded fundamental internal structural and procedural 
changes as well as a global reorientation of government policy in 
favor of the interests of the popular classes. However, the current 
was not the only source of demands for profound internal changes in 
the political system. Many observers and intellectuals in magazines 
and journals such as Vuelta, Nexos and La Jornada speculated about 
the suitability of widening the circle where the next PRI presiden-
3 Twenty researchers participated in the compilation of Las Elecciones en 
Mexico, edited by Gonzalez Casanova in 1985 With abundant use of historical 
material and empirical data. For another source, Cfr Basaftez's electoral 
predictions in Nexos 91, July of 1985.
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tial candidate was decided; a circle that was presumed to include 
only the president of the republic.
At the same time, it was taken as fact that the succession —  
including^ the electoral process—  would be different from what it 
had been on the previous five or six occasions, given the heavy 
influence that the economic crisis had on the world of political 
relations. The possibility was not discarded of some type of opening 
in the system to respond to the malaise generated by the crisis. 
Besides, the internal dissidence of the PRI did not stop denouncing 
the problems that impeded a real participation of the bases in the 
decision-making process.
In this context, three presidential aspirants who had been cov­
ered widely by the press were brought before the Congress: Manuel 
Bartlett, Alfredo del Mazo and Carlos Salinas. A month later the 
president of the PRI in the Federal District, Salazar Toledano, said 
that there were four precandidates: the three previously mentioned 
ones plus Miguel Gonzalez Avelar, secretary of Education. The an­
nouncement made before a group of women journalists had a marked im­
pact on public opinion. In fact it recalled the list revealed in 
1974 by Rovirosa Wade, secretary of Hydraulic Resources for 
Echeverria.
In the following months and through the national leadership of 
the PRI, other names were added to Salazar Toledanofs list: Sergio 
Garcia Ramirez, general procurator of the republic and Ramon 
Aguirre, head of the Department of the Federal District. These half 
a dozen names of aspirants occupied the columns of all of the news­
papers. It was known that one of them would be the next president of 
Mexico, although speculation persisted about the possibility of a 
dark horse, as commentators and politicians talked about the possi­
bility of a candidate different from the six aspirants that could 
come from the ranks of former cabinet members. Cited as such was ex­
secretary of Public Finance, Jesus Silva Herzog.
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The political system was receptive to demands for change in the 
presidential succession process. At the end of June the six distin­
guished priistas who had been commonly cited as probable candidates 
were trotted out by the party in front of the television cameras to 
discuss their views about the big national problems. The comparisons 
took place in July and set a precedent. For the first time in the 
post-Cardenas era, the aspirants dared to make known their positions 
before the general public without the fear of being disciplined; on 
the contrary their own party invited them to talk openly. This pro­
voked an overestimation of the importance of public opinion, above 
all that of the middle class, which began to be reflected in several
. i 4opinion polls that showed preferences for Mazo and Bartlett.
The comparison of the six aspirants generated commentaries of 
every type in the national press, which, despite their diversity, 
can be classified into three groups: those of known apologists, who 
tried to present the situation as irrefutable proof of the preva­
lence of democratic procedures in the PRI; negative commentaries 
that cast the comparison as a legitimate mechanism without real con­
tent; and the intermediate positions that, although noting the situ­
ation was not an indicator of effective democratization, accepted 
the comparisons as a healthy indication of a willingness at the top 
to open the system that could lead to more profound changes.
And so the awaited moment arrived, without the occurrence of 
any unforeseen event. In the two months that preceded the unveiling, 
the PRI's national leadership insisted that the dates set during its 
13th National Assembly in March would be respected. On October 4, 
nomination day, the representatives of the three sectors of the 
party attended the speech of PRI president Jorge de la Vega, in 
which he made known the name of the pre-candidate of the PRI: Carlos 
Salinas. On the same morning there was a strange misunderstanding 
spread by prominent politicians who said erroneously that Sergio
4 Highlighted in particular are polls by Adip Sabag (Excelsior, September 18,
19 and 20, 1986, Pag. 4 and Universal, March 25 and June 4, 1987, Pag. 1) and 
those by El Norte (September 11, 12, and 13, 1987).
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Garcia Ramirez was pre-candidate. But except for this incident that 
made presidential intervention in the process more apparent, the 
first phase of the presidential succession --to many the most diffi­
cult—  concluded according to traditional patterns.
The disappointment of some PRI sectors with the Salinas de 
Gortari nomination was evident. Two cases are particularly notewor­
thy: that of the democratic current, which subsequently abandoned 
the PRI, and that of the CTM. The first had to do with ideology and 
differences over economic policy; the second had more pragmatic 
causes. Fidel Velazquez had tried to block the candidacy of the bud­
get secretary because it was taken as fact that the president would 
be inclined toward del Mazo. Thus, the PRI campaign went forward 
with little enthusiasm from the CTM and with a growing opposition 
that had emerged within the union and that finally crystallized 
around the presidential candidacy.
For the first time since the PRI's founding, the small subordi­
nate parties to the government decided not to support the 
government's candidate and threw their support to Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas. The PARM registered his presidential candidacy and was 
joined by the PPS and the PST, which changed its name to the Party 
of the Cardenist Front for National Renovation (PFCRN). A few weeks 
before the election, Heberto Castillo renounced his presidential 
candidacy in the PMS in favor of Cardenas. The left created a broad 
electoral front in support of the presidential candidacy of 
Cardenas; only the PRT remained on the outside.
The 1988 political campaigns were perhaps the most competitive 
and real in the last 35 years. However, the government and the PRI 
did not share this opinion, being accustomed to the lack of opposi­
tion and their capacity to fill the plazas at top. It had not 
occurred to anyone that the old corporatist structure could mobilize 
large contingents but not guarantee the content of the vote. The
95
first surprise came with the publication of an opinion poll5 that 
showed for April a high level of support for Cardenas in the Federal 
District (26 percent) and placed Salinas at less than half of the 
electorate (45 percent). A second poll6 — this time national—  gave 
the victory in the Federal District to Cardenas and nationwide to 
Salinas with barely 50 percent, such as the electoral results 
confirmed. A few days later the PRI itself announced the end of the 
"single-party era." The popular discontent produced by the crisis 
oddly had been channeled toward the new Cardenist option instead of 
the established PAN opposition. The official figures give 50, 31 and 
17 percent of the vote to the PRI, Cardenistas and PAN, 
respectively.
The fourth crisis: the market crash
We can place the beginning of the 1987 crisis in the stock mar­
ket close decreed at the request of the financial authorities on 
Monday, October 5. The traditional journalistic voices of finance 
capital --Luis E. Mercado and Jose Perez Stuart, among others—  ex­
pressed the discontent that the measure generated among non-bank fi­
nanciers. On behalf of financial capital and as partial compensation 
for having nationalized the banking system, the federal government 
had thoroughly interfered in a market that in theory should have 
functioned only according to the law of supply and demand.
The non-bank financiers responded to the interventionist mea­
sure by spurring a drop in the stock market. The drop --that origi­
nally was intended for moderate levels—  not only would underscore 
the discontent of the non-bank financiers but would complete the 
work of purging investment portfolios, forcing the small investors 
to the brokerage houses. However, the market drop in Mexico was re­
inforced 10 days later with the crash on Wall Street and other mar­
kets in the west during the second half of October, and acquired its
5 La Jornada, May 23, 1988.
6 La Jornada, July 5, 1988.
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own dynamic independent of the calculations of the financiers that 
precipitated a drop in the stock index to unforeseen levels.7
The drop in stock quotes created capital flight. An important 
part of the capital that had returned in the last few years left the 
country again on evidence that the great stage of profit taking had 
ended on the Mexican stock market. There are different and contra­
dictory assessments of the amount of capital flight for the first 
half of October. New York experts calculated the figure at more 
than a billion dollars; finance executives at 80 million dollars a 
day for most of the month preceding the devaluation (2.4 billion 
dollars in total); sources close to the Bank of Mexico at 3 billion 
dollars.
Jose Angel Gurria, top-level official to the secretary of 
Public Finance, affirmed that among the factors that precipitated 
the exit of foreign exchange was the wave of prepayments to the ex-
t 9
tenor by indebted businesses. In reality, the prepayments can be 
considered a euphemism for planned speculation with controlled 
currency. It seems that such businesses acquired controlled dollars 
not to make pre-payments but to negotiate them in private exchange 
houses (tied directly to the brokerage houses) at a cost, in effect, 
of the reserves of the Bank of Mexico. The speculation in controlled 
dollars would have completed the necessary circuit for the flight of 
capital. The private exchange houses functioned as capital flight 
carriers by buying such dollars for their clients1 accounts to place 
them in the exterior. And so, the market fell along with the 
resources that were drained into foreign banks.
Under these circumstances, the Bank of Mexico had no other al­
ternative but to withdraw from the free market to safeguard, at
7 For future studies it will be important to try to establish what the impact, 
psychological rather than economic, of the international market signal could 
have been on the fall in the Mexican stock market.
8 Matt Moffett, Excelsior, November 26, 1987, P. 1, seccion financiera and 
William Cline, UnomasUno, November 21, 1987, P. 16.
9 Excelsior, November 19, 1987, P. 1.
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least through this channel of speculation, its monetary reserves. A 
primary conclusion derived precisely from this process is that, de­
spite the new legislation of the central bank and despite the state 
character of the bank, finance capital was able to find the appro­
priate mechanisms to reconstitute its capacity to place capital in 
the exterior. The State's economic rectory, which seemed to be 
strengthened with the bank nationalization, had shown its limits 
against the action of the private financiers. They were able once 
again to organize capital flight on a large scale and provoke an­
other currency devaluation.
Although the central bank was able to save part of its re­
serves, the political, social and economic cost was great. Upon 
withdrawing from the free exchange market, the Bank of Mexico took 
another measure, criticized severely by the orthodox Director of 
Bancomer, Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado — raising interest rates to 
unprecedented levels in order to encourage internal savings. The 
Bank of Mexico had opposed repeatedly any type of exchange controls 
and had made interest rate increases its main weapon against 
speculation and capital flight. The increase in interest rates, 
nearly 20 points in only three weeks, would introduce serious 
disturbances in the economic strategy planned for 1988, by provoking 
the boom in internal public debt service and therefore the govern­
ment deficit, as well as pushing a long run increase in inflation.
The devaluation of the dollar, made on November 18 with the 
Bank of Mexico's withdrawal from the free exchange market, provoked 
a wave of speculation in prices that translated into the 
reappearance of inflation. Despite the fact that no direct relation­
ship exists between the type of free exchange and the goods and ser­
vices produced internally, during the next four weeks a process of 
merchandise mark up was unleashed that in some cases generated price 
increases up to 50 percent. The secretary of Commerce applied eco­
nomic sanctions and temporary closings of businesses that refused to 
respect controlled prices or else hid merchandise — the measures did 
not exclude large commercial businesses such as Sears and Aurrera—
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that nonetheless did not work very well against the magnitude of the 
speculative wave. The mark up was a factor that brought the country 
close to hyperinflation and, above all, that exacerbated the labor 
malaise given the drop in real wages. It became even more urgent to 
contain inflation.
At the same time, the devaluation of the free parity made 
virtually inevitable a devaluation of the controled parity, in order 
to narrow the exchange gap in favor of the first, which objectively 
encouraged speculation with controlled dollars — as much with 
dollars acquired by exporters as those supplied by the Bank of 
Mexico to indebted businesses for compliance with external con­
tracts. In addition, the devaluation of the controled parity had 
been demanded by exporters since before the October crisis, given 
that the growth in internal prices throughout much of the year had 
considerably exceeded the percentage of the peso's slide against the 
dollar and reduced the competitiveness of Mexican products in for­
eign markets. The devaluation of the free parity was a factor that 
had, since then, encouraged even more inflation.
The economic solidarity pact
The rapid growth of internal prices not only effected competi­
tiveness of exports but public finance as well: public sector prices 
and tariffs outstripped for most of the year the general inflation 
index; a fact that at the end of 1987 was cutting into the public 
sector's operative balance. Despite the addition impulse toward in­
flation that the price and tariff adjustments would mean, they were 
indispensable if major imbalances were desired.
And so several factors made necessary the adoption of a radical 
and urgent anti-inflation program. It was necessary to respond to 
labor demands, to exporter demands, to the worsening of the public 
deficit and to the increase in internal and external debt service 
provoked by the devaluation of the controled parity and the rise in 
internal interest rates enacted to avoid dollarization and capital
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flight in a contest of growing internal inflation. The federal 
government responded to everything within a framework of not 
disturbing the financial arrangements for external debt service with 
the adoption and implementation of the so-called economic solidarity 
pact.
The pact was presented as the product of negotiation between 
the federal government and the three main sectors of the Mexican so­
ciety, whose essential goal would be to abate inflation.10 This rep­
resented the formal end to the program of encouragement and growth 
and of any intent to recover economic growth in the short run. The 
goal of abating inflation was put before any other economic objec­
tive. The pact — announced the night of December 15—  stipulated the 
following measures: 1) an emergency salary increase of 15 percent 
for the minimum wage and contracted salaries. The traditional mini­
mum wage hike in January would be 20 percent and would not apply to 
contract wages; 2) 85 percent increases in the prices of gasoline, 
natural gas, telephones and electricity with the promise of not 
increasing public sector prices and tariffs during January and 
February and tying further increases beginning in March to the 
predicted inflation rate for each month; 3) stable evolution of 
peso-dollar parity that in fact did not change in January and in 
February took a very moderate path, of three pesos daily, with the 
rationale that maintaining this rate would reduce inflationary 
pressures; and-4) acceleration of the commercial liberation program.
A commission was created to monitor and evaluate the pact with 
the participation of the secretaries of Commerce, Labor and Public 
Finance and representatives from the private, labor and campesino 
sectors and a broad public awareness campaign was initiated to per­
suade the general population that the program's success was 
indispensable to the future health of the economy. To counteract 
labor malaise given the evident disparity between salary increases 
and hikes in public sector prices and tariffs, the federal
10 The three sectors involved were business, labor and peasant as business was 
substituted for the popular sector of the PRI.
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government announced at the end of the year a plan to index the 
prices of a bundle of basic goods to the minimum wage, beginning in 
March.
According to an opinion poll,11 the public responded in a bal­
anced way to the publicity campaigns: 26 percent of the respondents 
described the pact as good or very good, 21 percent as bad or very 
bad, 4 6 percent as fair and 7 percent had no opinion. However, the 
perception of individuals concerning the behavior of prices and 
their future expectations were not very encouraging. Forty-nine per­
cent said that they felt as though March prices were higher than 
February prices, while only 18 percent said that they seemed lower. 
In a similar way, 43 percent said that the rise in April prices 
would be greater than in March and only 20 percent said that it 
would be less. It is important however to remember that public per­
ception about prices is mainly tied to consumption goods — food and 
clothing-- while a much broader array of goods and services is in­
cluded in the inflation indicators.
On the other hand, public opinion perceived the beneficiaries 
of the pact as follows: the government (46 percent), everyone (20 
percent), workers (11 percent), no one (6 percent), business (6 per­
cent), the United States (5 percent) and who knows (6 percent); the 
losers were perceived as follows: workers (30 percent), everyone (23 
percent), business (14 percent), no one (13 percent), the government 
(6 percent), the United States (6 percent) and who knows (8 per­
cent) . It can be observed that nearly half of the population saw the 
government as the main beneficiary, while a similar number saw the 
main losers as workers and everyone. In other words, the technical 
complexity of the pact made it difficult for the public to under­
stand, but the perception of its consequences, at least immediate, 
was very polarized.
11 Perfil de La Jornada, May 31, 1988, P. V.
101
The real economy
Taking into consideration that the social function of the econ­
omy is to satisfy the general population's need for goods and ser­
vices and, not only that of the financial sector, the most accurate 
form — though not the simplest—  of measuring the economy's perfor­
mance is through identifying the means of satisfying this need: in­
come distribution. Another less exact but more practical form is 
measuring the production of the domestic economy: growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP).
Regarding domestic production we find that in 1982 GDP dropped 
0.6 percent. For 1983 the drop was 4.6 percent, almost two points 
more than predicted by the National Plan of Development, which fore­
cast a decline of between two and four points for the year. In 1984 
GDP experienced a favorable rise, growing 3.57 points; the recovery 
continued into 1985 --more precisely, in the first semester—  and by 
the end of the year GDP had grown 2.6 percent.
The imbalances that this moderate growth created in the balance 
of payments and public finances, led economic authorities to promote 
a new deceleration which produced a 3.99 percent drop of GDP in 1986
in real terms. Throughout most of 1986 the effects of the oil shock
12were exacerbated, reducing all of the macroeconomic aggregates.
For 1987 GDP recovered lightly with 1.4 percent growth.
From 1982 to 1987, GDP growth was reduced to an annual rate of
0.9 percent, which meant that its 1987 level was 2.8 percent less 
than its 1982 level in real terms. This path resulted from two im­
portant drops in 1983 and 1986, Increases were registered in the 
other years, although of minor proportion.
The analysis of Mexico's commercial relations with the rest of 
the world from 1982 to 1987 shows an average annual growth of 19.6
12 SHCP: 1987, P. 72; Bank of Mexico: 1985, P. 65; 1986, P. 22.
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percent in non-oil exports — with the notable 41.1 percent increase 
in the last year being the salient figure—  among the most important 
aspects. Non-oil exports doubled during these years, going from 4.8 
billion dollars in 1982 to 9.7 billion in 1986.13
The value of oil exports between 1982 and 1986 droped 10.2 bil­
lion dollars, going from almost 16.5 billion dollars in the first 
year to only 6.3 billion in the second, which was the last year that
14registered a major drop (8.5 billion dollars). The problems of the 
international hydrocarbon market implied a reduction in the implicit 
price of Mexican crude oil that went from 29.24 dollars a barrel in 
1982 to 24.02 in 1985 and 11.84 dollars a barrel in 1986.
From 1983 to 1986 the value of merchandise imports (11.2 bil­
lion dollar annual average) was substantially less than that during 
the 1980 to 1982 period (19.1 billion dollars). This reduction 
stemmed from, among other causes, the drop in the nation's economic 
activity, as well as the exchange policy that raised the price of 
foreign products and spurred import substitution.
Merchandise imports have faithfully reflected the evolution of 
GDP, registering equally with GDP reductions in 1983 and 1986 and 
increases in 1984 and 1985. This behavior was observed in all im­
ports and in their three main aggregates: consumer goods, intermedi­
ate goods and capital goods. However, during the period the accumu­
lated reductions were very different: -44.1 percent, -8.2 percent 
and -36.6 percent respectively for each of the three types of goods.
As a result, the commercial balance, traditionally in deficit 
up to 1981, was in surplus from 1983 to 1986, however, the reduction 
in oil exports produced a gradual reduction in the positive balance 
for the remaining years of the period, going from 13.8 billion 
dollars in 1983 to 4.6 billion in 1986.15
13 SHCP: 1985, P. 75. SHCP: 1987, PP. 26 and 28.
14 Ibid, PP. 75, 26 and 28.
15 SHCP: 1987, P. 73.
103
The real rate of growth of public investment between 1978 and
1981 was 20 percent annually, a figure that contrasts with the nega­
tive average registered between 1982 and 1985 of -10.95 percent. 
Private investment registered negative averages in 1982 and 1983;
8.8 percent real growth in 1984 that rose a little more than 4 point 
in 1985, reaching 13.1 growth. And so, the 1985 recovery stemmed 
from greater private investment, considering that the real volume of 
public investment remained practically unchanged.
Regarding sectorial results of production, it can be said that
1982 to 1986 severely effected all types of productive activities 
with the exception of some farming, forest and fishing activities. 
Equally affected were commerce and services with the notable 
exception of financial services. The overall result of these effects 
was a stagnation in the evolution of the productive structure that 
in previous decades sought changes in the secondary sector as the 
basic motor of the economy, which at the time spurred growth in the 
tertiary sector. This dynamic was lost from 1982 to 1986, giving 
rise to irregular movements. However, the long-run tendency measured 
in terms of the population employed in the three sectors is not as 
impressive as the graph indicates, because industry has been unable 
to absorb more than a fifth of the economically active population, 
while those leaving the agricultural sector have moved to the ser­
vice sector.16 ,
Industrial GDP dropped to an annual average rate of 1.2 percent 
between 1982 and 1986. Every year it behaved much like the national 
economy in its entirety: abrupt drop in 1983 (-8.1 percent); impor­
tant recovery between 1984 and 1985 (4.4 percent and 4.8 percent re­
spectively) and strong drop in 1986 (-5.5 percent). The last year 
not only counteracted the 1984 and 1985 advances but contracted in­
dustrial GDP to a level less than the 5 percent of 1982.17
16 Nafinsa: 1981, P. 14 and Nafinsa: 1985, P. 20.
17 Ibid, PP. 165 and 3.
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In terms of its components, this behavior was determined by 
manufacturing industrial sector that began at the same level with 
commerce, almost one-fourth of GDP, and reduced its share to an av­
erage annual rate of 0.7 percent during the period. And so in 1983, 
GDP for this sector dropped 7.3 percent in 1982; grew 4.8 and 5.8 
percent respectively in 1984 and 1985; and contracted again by 5.6 
percent in 1986. With this last drop, manufacturing GDP ended up 2.9 
percent below its 1982 level. This behavior was practically general
for all manufacturing branches, although the rates varied reflecting
18important differences among them.
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In cumulative terms, between 1982 and 1986 only three indus­
trial branches showed positive results: food; paper products; and 
chemicals and oil derivatives, which registered higher GDP levels in 
1986 than in 1982. The rest of the branches greatly resented the 
productive contraction of 1986, which reversed the recovery observed 
in 1984 and 1985. Service sector GDP dropped to an annual average 
much like the rest of the economy (0.5 percent). Notwithstanding the 
dynamism registered in 1984 and 1985, GDP of this sector did not re-
18 Inegi-SPP: 1987a, P. 170; Inegi-SPP: 1987b, P. 4.
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cover its 1982 level and the fall of 1986 piaced service sector GDP 
3.1 percent below this level.19
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* The figures for m unicipal reve nue s from 1970 to 1975 for INEGI in 1982, were 
corrected one year due to a typogra ph ica l error.
** The sum of re venues from 1970 to 1 975 does not ma tch the INEGI series be ca use 
INEGI discoun ts  federal funds (50% of local revenues) from the total.
19 Inegi-SPP: 1987a, P. 165; Inegi-SPP: 1987b, P. 3
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The unequal behavior pattern shows, on the other hand, a con­
stant, sustained decline in the distribution between federal, state 
and municipal levels as well as between distinct strata of society 
that would seem to follow more profound causes and reasons than the 
efforts and intentions of an administration. In the 15 years from 
.1970 to 1985, the federation absorbed four-fifths of the national 
government's income, leaving only 20 percent to the states where 
only half went to their own income and the other half to federal 
projects. All of the country's municipalities, together, have not 
received more than 4 percent, which explains their dependence on the 
governors who depend in turn on the federation, as the graph of the 
distribution of government income shows.
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Regarding income distribution, the Gini coefficient for 1950 to
1977 is 0.50 and appears to have remained basically constant
20throughout the period, which is not certain and become more 
evident taking into consideration the distinct strata of the 
population. On the contrary, a tendency to deteriorate is observed 
in the graph of the inequality index. The top line indicates the 
income of the upper 20 percent of the population, which maintains 
itself at 60 percent of the total; the bottom line shows the income 
of the poorest 20 percent of the population and drops from 6 percent 
in 1950 to 2 percent in 1987. The bars indicate how much richer the 
upper strata is than the lower: 10 times in 1950 and almost 30 times 
in 1987.21
Finally, by 1985 the average real salary had been dropping 9.5 
percent a year. In the last five years, the increases in the legal 
minimum wage were lower than the inflation rate: while the official 
inflation rate reached 98.9 percent in 1982, the minimum wage was 
allowed to rise only 73.8 percent. In 1983, both figures were 80.8 
and 44.22 percent respectively; in 1984 inflation reached 59.2 per­
cent, while the minimum wage rose 56.6 percent; in 1985 inflation 
was 63.7 percent and the minimum wage grew 54.05 percent. For 1986 
inflation hit 105.7 percent and the minimum wage grew 102.5 per-
20 Aspe: 1984, P. 40.
21 Fuentes:
1950: VII Censo General de Poblacion, Dir. Gral. de Estad. Sria. Ind. y Com. 
1958: Encuesta sobre Ingresos y Egresos, Dept, de Muestro, Sria. Ind. y Com,
1963: Encuesta sobre Ingresos y Egresos, Banco de Mexico, S.A.
1968: Encuesta de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, Banco de Mexico, S.A.
1975: Encuesta de Ingresos y Gastos Familiares, Ceniet, Styps.
1977: Enc Nal de Ingr y Gastos de los Hogares, Dir. Gral, de Estadistica. 
1981: I Encuesta Nacional sobre los Valores de los Mexicanos, Banamex.
1987: II Encuesta Nacional sobre Los Valores de los Mexicanos, Banamex.
22 Nacional Financiera: 1985, PP. 52 and 301; Banco de Mexico 1986, P. 109.
PART TWO: THE FIGURES
In the introduction it was mentioned that the purpose of this 
second part consists in establishing an empirical profile for the 
historical process described in the first four chapters, in such a 
way that common factors can be identified to measure the depth, 
longevity and severity of the analyzed crises as well as to compare 
their similarities and differences. The social changes seem to coin­
cide more with economic than political changes, the latter seeming 
secondary. And so, the popularity that the system enjoyed in 1982 
and that will be seen more clearly later on when public opinion is 
analyzed does not seem to stem as much from political factors them­
selves as from the incremental improvements in day-to-day living 
standards during the long period from 1940 to 1982. As a result, the 
loss of popularity after 1982 is not only explained in the personal­
ity of de la Madrid but rather in the economic hard times of the pe­
riod. So many years of growth had given the country much room to ma­
neuver and had allowed for political stability despite the severity 
and depth of the crises.
Several statistical series from 1940 to 1987 are presented as a 
way to measure the political, economic and social behavior of the 
country before and after 1968, which is taken as the inflection 
point of the period of crisis, with the aim of clarifying the rela­
tionship between the qualitative historical facts and the quantita­
tive data. The analysis of the statistical data available in the 
country shows the difficulties and inconsistencies inherent in work­
ing with significant and useful long-run series. In a good number of 
cases, Mexican statistics should be considered as relative truths —  
the product of an agreement among specialists and not as a reflec­
tion of reality. Notwithstanding all of their limitations and de­
spite the fact that they come from official sources, the data pre­
sented here can help place the historical events in a less specula­
tive context. How severe was each of the four crises? What limits 
did they push? How are they expressed in quantitative terms? What 
long-term effects can they expose? How are they affected by politi-
109
cal, economic and social problems? Are there strong relationships 
among them, weak and indirect ones or practically none? These are 
some of the questions that the following chapters attempt to ad­
dress .
To study social change several important aspects are 
considered: 1) the confidence that the government generated in 
society; and 2) the government's policy orientation; 3) demographic 
behavior; 4) the level at which the population's basic needs were 
satisfied; and 5) the degree of government attention to social 
problems. The confidence that the government generated in 
society attempts to identify the signals that the government was 
sending and the form in which the society perceived them through 
indicators of defense spending, annual creation of new businesses 
and capital flight. The balance of government orientation between 
promotion of economic growth and attention to social needs is sought 
through the historical behavior of variations in per-capita federal 
budget outlays and government social spending. The study of 
demographic behavior tries to identify population pressures on 
the economy and government through data concerning the rate of 
population growth, average family size, proportion of rural-urban 
populations and the annual net balance of migration and immigration. 
The level of basic needs acquired by the population attempts to 
identify the pressure for basic necessities put on the government or 
the economy and is explored through indicators of nutrition, 
education, health and transportation. Finally, the level of 
government attention to social problems, which can indicate 
the level of government perception of the problems of individuals 
and its awareness of population tensions, is studied in data about 
illiteracy, social security and university students.
Data concerning production, finance and employment are used to 
survey economic behavior. Regarding production, statistics about 
economic growth, gross domestic product, trade and payment balances, 
exports and finance are explored. Finances are analyzed through 
statistics about inflation, internal savings, public investment,
110
foreign investment, payments to the exterior, fiscal revenue and the 
share of the federal budget in GDP. Finally the study of employ­
ment includes statistics on salaries, economically active popula­
tion, and the share of the economically active population employed 
in industry and the service sector.
To explore political behavior several aspects that have re­
ceived scholarly attention are reviewed: 1) plurality in the politi­
cal elite; 2) the electoral behavior of the society; 3) the level of 
conflict within the government. The study of plurality in the po­
litical elite attempts to establish the ties between the base of 
the social pyramid and the elite, starting from the fact that the 
Mexican political system beginning with the revolution of 1917 was 
an important social mobilizer for the popular sectors and received 
from them important doses of cohesion and legitimacy. Eight indica­
tors of elite characteristics are taken: 1) popular origin; 2) fam­
ily ties; 3) studies in private schools; 4) university studies; 5) 
studies abroad; 6) party membership; 7) electoral experience; and 8) 
representation of popular, labor or peasant sectors. The electoral 
behavior of the society attempts to measure the degree of par­
ticipation in public processes through percentage of electoral ab­
stention, votes for the opposition in general and for the left in 
particular, and the yearly formation of new national parties. 
Conflict within the government is identified through the 
impeachment of.state governors.
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5. THE SOCIETY
To explore social behavior several important aspects are cov­
ered: 1) confidence generated by the government in society; 2) gov­
ernment policy orientation; 3) demographic behavior; 4) level of ba­
sic needs satisfied within the population; and 5) the amount of gov­
ernment attention to social problems. The behavior of each selected 
social indicator is shown graphically.
Confidence
The analysis of confidence focuses on reactions of intranquil­
ity, reproval, force and conflict within the public sector as well 
as between the public sector and the private or social sectors. 
Capital flight and increases in defense spending are elements that 
reflect decline because they express ruptures and threats, while the 
creation of new businesses acts in an opposite sense because it as­
sumes a perception of political stability and tranquility.
Confidence oscillates constantly although with an upward trend 
between 1940 and 1968. In 1969, a phase of contrast with previous 
years begins, which, seen together, conform to a stage of stagna­
tion. A prolonged drop begins in 1969 that ends in 1976 with an 
ephemeral peak in 1972. Confidence begins to recover in 1977, but it 
was a short improvement as in 1980 it drops off again only to 
recover in 1983.
This description agrees to a great extent with other well-known 
interpretations of the evolution of public confidence: the drop in 
1969 is normally explained by the disturbance provoked by the 1968 
student movement and its infamous outcome along with the uncertainty 
generated by the presidential succession. The 1972 recovery is in­
terpreted as a result of the economic upturn that followed the 
atonia of the previous year, and the 1973 regress is explained as a 
result of the assassination of Eugenio Garza Sada and the beginning 
of conflict between Luis Echeverria and the Monterrey Group. The re-
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covery of 1977 is attributed to Lopez Portillo's speech upon taking 
office and the implementation of an IMF adjustment program. The new 
drop in 1981-1982 is interpreted as a result of the international 
oil market decline, the subsequent complication of public finances 
and, finally, the bank nationalization. The recovery of confidence 
in 1983 is associated with the arrival of a government committed to 
eradicating populism and to complying with an IMF adjustment program 
in public finance.
All of this makes sense with the rest of the variables consid­
ered here. The fall of 1969 is associated with the return of capital 
flight that year, which flared up again in 1973 and 197 6 and reached 
its highest levels in history in 1981 and 1982. The decline of the 
first half of the 1970s was exacerbated by the increasing number of 
state governments abolished through impeachment, a sign of political 
instability. The fall that began in 1980 is explained as well by a 
decreasing number of new business starts per-capita, a process that 
became acute in 1982 and lasted until 1987 at the rate of the 
general economic decline. If the evolution of confidence has not 
been worse in the last 20 years, it is due to the behavior of 
military spending as a percentage of the total budget, which has 
been reduced to minimum levels and in fact continued declining in 
the last year considered in this study.
1. Creation of new businesses' firms
As an indicator of private sector confidence, the creation of 
new businesses per 1,000 inhabitants varied between a minimum of 97 
in 1949 and a maximum of 250 in 1980. The figure is presented pro­
portionally to the population to give it comparative significance, 
because in absolute terms the 2,950 businesses created in 1943 seem 
very small compared with the 15,000 established in 1984, when in 
proportional terms the magnitudes are similar. A period of relative 
stability in the curve is observed until 1963, when a phase of con-
tinual ascent begins that is temporarily interrupted between 1975 
and 1977 and in 1980.1
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40 119.1 50 111.3 60 137 .8 70 160.8 80 249.7
41 119.3 51 108.0 61 127.5 71 174.2 81 231 . 7
42 130.1 52 112 .0 62 109.8 72 162 . 8 82 193 . 9
43 138.4 53 105.2 63 100.4 73 181. 3 83 183. 9
44 130.1 54 101 . 7 64 116.8 74 191.5 84 194 . 4
45 120.4 55 115.3 65 138.8 75 180.4 85 152 . 4
46 134 .0 56 123.2 66 143.2 76 168 . 4
47 122 . 4 57 128.0 67 145.7 77 150.3
48 108.5 58 119.6 68 148.6 78 171.2
49 97 .2 59 126.6 69 158.8 79 196.5
2. Capital flight
Capital flight is represented here with the change in the num­
ber of "errors and omissions" in the balance of payments. To better 
appreciate the real impact of capital flight it is expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. The overall curve shows relatively stable 
behavior until 1976, when capital flight as a percentage of GDP 
jumped to almost 3 percent. From then on its behavior is erratic,
1 The series of new businesses was obtained from the Anuarios Estadisticos (AE 
1942 P. 1264, AE 1943-45 P. 790, AE 1946-50 P. 572, AE 1982 P. 475, AE 1985 
P. 615-616 and AE 1986 P. 662) and from La Economia Mexicana en Cifras 
(Nafinsa 1981 P. 302-303) and is divided among the series corrected for 
population in Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico (INEGI 1986, P. 311).
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rising to two maximum values during the period: 3.5 percent in 1981 
and 5 percent in 1982. In the last few years it has been relatively 
stable.2
Capital Flight 
(% of GDP)
1 9 4 0 1 9 46 1 9 5 2 1 958 1 9 6 4 1 9 7 0  1 9 7 6 1 9 8 2  1
40 0.00 50 -1 .23 60 -1.41 70 -1 .13 80 1.96
41 -1.05 51 -1 . 75 61 0.65 71 -0.48 81 3.49
42 -0. 91 52 0.00 62 0. 60 72 -1.77 82 5.10
43 -1 . 12 53 -0 .29 63 0 . 06 73 0 . 72 83 0. 69
44 0.52 54 1 .38 64 0.41 74 0 .78 84 0.52
45 -1.41 55 -0 . 69 65 -0.84 75 0.97 85 0. 92
46 -0.52 56 -0.36 66 -0.38 76 2.74 86 -0.34
47 0.31 57 -0.95 67 -0.77 77 0.02 87 -0.59
48 0.17 58 0 .00 68 -1.04 78 0 .13
49 1.10 59 -0.53 69 0.53 79 -0.51
3. Defense spending
The defense budget from 1940 to 1987 varied from 16.5 to 0.6 
percent of the federal budget, showing an invariable downward trend 
and an annual average of 4.8 percent during the period. We find 
three well-differentiated cycles: one of elevated spending from 1940
2 The line of errors and omissions in the balance of payments from 1940 to 1969 
defined capital in the short run. However, the series was eliminated from 
1970 to 1987, which means the two periods are not strictly comparable. Here 
it was converted from pesos to the value of average parity and divided by 
current GDP.
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to 1954; one of moderate spending from 1955 to 1964 and one of low 
spending after 1965.3
Defense Spending 
(% of the Federal Budget)
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194 0  1946  19 5 2  1958  1 9 6 4  197 0  1 9 7 6  19 8 2
40 16.3 50 7.4 60 3.4 70 1.5 80 0.9
41 16.1 51 6.0 61 3.8 71 1. 4 81 1.1
42 150 52 5.2 62 4.2 72 1.4 82 1.0
43 14.2 53 6.4 63 4 .4 73 1.2 83 0.5
44 11 . 4 54 5.1 64 3.7 74 1.2 84 0.8
45 11. 9 55 4 . 9 65 1.7 75 1.1 85 1 .1
46 11. 3 56 4 .7 66 1.8 76 1.4 86 1.0
47 10.5 57 4 .2 67 1.5 77 1.2 87 0 . 6
48 8.3 58 4 .4 68 1.7 78 1.1
49 6.6 59 4.5 69 1.7 79 1.1
Government orientation
The orientation of the government's social policies seeks to 
measure the priority the government assigned to the satisfaction of 
basic needs by the population and therefore is indicated by the 
level of social spending and where public money is spent in the so­
cial pyramid. It is assumed that increases in per-capita federal 
spending and the budget share of social spending can be politically 
advantageous, although, on the other hand, can do economic damage.
3 Nafinsa 1981 P. 313-317, IV Informe de Gobierno, Anexo Estadistico (IGAE 
1986) P. 95-96, Diario Oficial de la Federacion (DOF), December 31, 1986. 
Cfr ONU 1983, CELEE 1986 and ONU 1986.
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The government policy orientation toward social problems shows 
an initial phase of relative decline that encompasses the sexenios 
of Avila Camacho and Aleman Valdes. During the Ruiz Cortines govern­
ment the decline ends but without a significant improvement. 
Improvement does not come until 1959, then accelerates up to 197 6 
when it momentarily stops and recommences in 1980 and reaches its 
highest level in 1982. The following year a new phase of pronounced 
decline begins and persists until 1986.
The decline that is observed in the first 12 years of the pe­
riod considered here is explained by the contraction of social 
spending as a percentage of the budget during the Avila Camacho and 
Aleman Valdes sexenios. The year 1952 is precisely the lowest point 
on the curve of social spending. The recovery begins in the first 
year of the Ruiz Cortines government and continues until 1963, only 
to fall in 1964 and remain stagnant during the Diaz Ordaz adminis­
tration. During the Echeverria sexenio social spending reaches its 
historic high — in 1972—  then drops slowly and recovers by 1976, 
Beginning with 1977, social spending drops almost vertically, 
falling to 1969 levels by 1987.
The evolution of social spending alone explains a good part of 
the behavior of what falls under the heading of government policy 
orientation, although another factor considered here — per-capita 
budget spending—  at times counteracts the variation of the first, 
as happened in the Lopez Portillo sexenio. Although social spending 
dropped in relative terms during these years, it rose in absolute 
terms because budget outlays reached their historic highs up to that 
point. The highest value of per-capita spending is reached in 1982, 
only to fall the next year. It was thanks to the real budget in­
creases from 1976 to 1982 that the path of government attention to 
social problems continued rising until 1982. In the last years of 
decline in social spending and the budget, nothing has kept govern­
ment policy orientation from dropping to historic lows.
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4. Per-capita federal budget outlays
Between 1940 and 1987, per-capita federal spending varied be­
tween a low of 0.27 and a high of 8 thousands of pesos, showing an 
overall tendency to rise and an average annual growth of 2.04 per­
cent. We can observe three big cycles: one low and stable from 1940 
to 1964; one high and growing from 1965 to 1982; one high and de-
. . 4dining from 1983 to the present.
Federal Budget Per Capita 
(1970 Pesos)
T
h 0
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a e
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19401 1946 1952 1958 1964 1970 1976 1982 1
40 0.27 50 0.37 60 0.77 70 2 . 14 80 6.29
41 0.28 51 0 .41 61 0 . 73 71 2 .18 81 6.55
42 0.31 52 0 .51 62 0.68 72 2.46 82 8.02
43 0.33 - 53 0.43 63 0.64 73 2 . 92 83 5. 97
44 0.32 54 0.54 64 0.82 74 3.09 84 5.49
45 0.32 55 0.52 65 1 .75 75 3 .77 85 5.38
46 0.27 56 0.55 66 1 . 68 76 4.11 86 3.84
47 0.30 57 0.55 67 1. 90 77 4 . 35 87 4 .50
48 0.37 58 0.59 68 1 .89 78 4 . 61
49 0.46 59 0.58 69 2 .08 79 5.13
5. Government social spending
The share of social spending in federal outlays from 1940 to 
1987 has varied between 8 and 25 percent, with an annual average of
4 Nafinsa 1981 P. 313-317, IGAE 1986 P. 95 and DOF December 31, 1985 and 
December 31, 1986.
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16 percent. We can see in the overall path three big cycles: one low 
from 1940 to 1952/ one growing from 1953 to 1977; one declining from 
1978 to 1987, which registered the lowest value for the entire pe­
riod .5
Government Social Spending 
(% of Total Budget)
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194 0  194 6  1 9 5 2  1958  196 4  1 9 7 0  1 9 7 6  1982
40 18.2 50 13.0 60 13.4 70 22.5 80 14.8
41 18.3 51 11.1 61 14 .8 71 23.9 81 14 . 6
42 17 . 1 52 9.8 62 16.6 72 25.3 82 11.5
43 15.0 53 12 . 6 63 17.7 73 22 .5 83 12 .0
44 14.2 54 11.6 64 16.6 74 22.8 84 12 .8
45 16.1 55 11.2 65 13.8 75 21.1 85 10 . 8
46 15.0 56 12.0 66 18.3 76 23.7 86 12.4
47 15.0 57 12.7 67 15.9 77 22.4 87 8 .1
48 12 . 6 58 13.1 68 17.4 78 19.4
49 11.0 59 14.3 69 17.1 79 18.0
Demography
In this section an attempt is made to measure population pres­
sures on the economy and public policy through statistics on popula­
tion growth, average family size, the rural-urban population mix and 
the annual net balance of migration and immigration.
5 Nafinsa 1981 P. 313-317, IGAE 1986, P. 98 and Dof December 31, 1985 and 
December 31, 1896.
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Two cycles are observed in the demographic figures: one from 
1940 to 1970 characterized by a tendency to worsen constantly, and 
another from 1970 to the present with a constant tendency to im­
prove. Beginning with its best performance in the first year of the 
period considered here (1940), the demographic path begins a con­
stant decline up to 1970, when it reaches its worst point. Beginning 
in this year, a gradual recovery begins but still remains far from 
the zenith in 1940. This evolution is explained by three decisive 
factors: the increase in the rate of demographic growth (that 
reached its height toward the end of the 1970s), the growth of the 
average family size and the positive growth in the migration-immi- 
gration balance. Together, these three factors generate undeniable 
demographic pressure that only begins to ebb beginning in 1971, 
thanks to new demographic control policies.
6. Demographic growth
Demographic growth from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between a 
rate of 3.83 and 1.73 percent, with an annual average of 3.03 per­
cent. Two cycles are distinguished: one of accelerated growth from 
1940 to 1968, and another of continual decline from 1968 to 1987. It 
is assumed that a high rate of demographic growth pressures the eco­
nomic, political and cultural systems by quantitatively increasing 
the amount of demands on the systems.6
6 This is a fundamental series because population size affects many other
statistics. However, no single source exists that provides annual statistics 
since 1940. Further, the calculations by Inegi, Conapo, Banamex and Nafinsa 
are all inconsistent with each other. To arrive at these figures, the annual 
rates of population variation are calculated beginning from the most 
complete series, Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico, Inegi 1986, P. 311-312, 
but correcting the values for the years 1961 to 1971 that show an abrupt 
discontinuity between 1970 and 1971 (which becomes obvious by taking the 
second derivative) and the projections of Nafinsa 1986 P. 21. Finally, a 
smoothing function is applied for 10 periods. For other examples, Cfr 
Hernandez Millan 1974, Alba 1986 and Martinez 1987.
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Population Growth 
(Annual Rate)
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1 9 4 0 1 9 46 1 9 5 2 1 958 1 964 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 6 1 9 82 1 9
940 1.73 1950 2.30 1960 3.05 1970 3.29 1980 2.73
941 1.78 1951 2 .37 1961 3.10 1971 3.27 1981 2. 62
942 1.83 1952 2 . 45 1962 3.15 1972 3.21 1982 2.55
943 1.88 1953 2 .53 1963 3 . 18 1973 3 .18 1983 2.47
944 1. 94 1954 2 . 61 1964 3.21 1974 3.14 1984 2.39
945 1. 99 1955 2 . 68 1965 3.24 1975 3 . 09 1985 2 . 32
946 2 .04 1956 2.76 1966 3.26 1976 3.03 1986 2.25
947 2.09 1957 2.84 1967 3.27 1977 2 . 97 1987 2.19
948 2.14 1958 2 . 92 1968 3.28 1978 2 . 90
949 2.19 1959 2 . 99 1969 3.29 1979 2.83
7 . Average family size
Average family size has fluctuated between 4.12 and 4.98 mem­
bers from 1940 to 1987, with an annual average of 4.55. Two trends, 
closely tied to the rate of demographic growth, are observed: one of 
accelerated growth from 1940 to 1960 and another of continual de­
cline beginning in 1961. Greater family size means greater demand 
for basic necessities, contributing as well to more pressure on the 
economy and public policy.7
7 Coplamar 1982, Tomo 3, P. 34, X Censo de Poblacion y extrapolacion a 1987. 
For other examples, Cfr Valdes 1980, Lenero 1983, Juarez 1983 and Lopez 
1987 .
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Average Family S ize
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1 9 4 0 1 9 8 2  1 9 8 71 9 7 01 9 4 6 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 4 1 9 7 6
40 4.09 50 4 .32 60 5.15 70 4 .91 80 4.71
41 4.11 51 4 . 40 61 5.13 71 4.89 81 4 . 69
42 4 . 14 52 4 .49 62 5.10 72 4 .87 82 4 . 67
43 4.16 53 4 .57 63 5.08 73 4 .85 83 4 . 65
44 4 .18 54 4 . 65 64 5.05 74 4 .83 84 4 . 63
45 4.21 55 4 .74 65 5.03 75 4.81 85 4 . 61
46 4.23 56 4 . 82 66 5.01 76 4.79 86 4.59
47 4.25 57 4 . 90 67 4 . 98 77 4 .77 87 4 .57
48 4.27 58 4 . 98 68 4 . 96 78 4 .75
49 4.30 59 5.07 69 4 . 93 79 4 .73
8 . Migration balance
From 1940 to 1987 the balance of migration as a percentage of 
the total population has varied between 0.05 and 1.63 points. Three 
phases are distinguished throughout the period: one of relative sta­
bility and low values from 1940 to 1961; one of accelerated growth 
from 1962 to 1973; one of elevated levels but with notable oscilla­
tions from 1974 to the present. The peak year is 1981.
The migratory balance has been positive, which means that 
Mexico is a net receiver of immigrants presumably from Central 
America, a situation that has been insufficiently attended. Another 
possibility is that the official figures are totally unreliable, 
above all because of undocumented migration and immigration. It 
should be understood that increases in this variable DE SER TAL,
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augment natural population growth which places even greater demands
on the volume of basic necessities and the provision of goods and 
8services.
Migratory Balance 
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40 0.08 50 0.18 60 0.23 70 1.11 80 1.50
41 0.05 51 0.17 61 0.29 71 1.20 81 1. 63
42 0. 05 52 0.17 62 0.35 72 1 . 34 82 1.57
43 0.07 53 0.16 63 0.47 73 1 . 54 83 1. 38
44 0.05 54 0.23 64 0.54 74 1.21 84 1.20
45 0.07 55 0.22 65 0.56 75 1.19 85 1.45
46 0.07 56 0.21 66 0.64 76 1.21 86 1.48
47 0.06 57 0.26 67 0.68 77 1 . 10 87 1.52
48 0.09 58 0.25 68 0.90 78 1 . 38
49 0.13 59 0.24 69 0.91 79 1.27
9. Rural population
The rural population --those who live in locations with fewer 
than 2,500 persons-- shows a downward trend from 78.1 percent in 
1940 to 32.5 in 1987, with an average of 59.8 percent. A very clear 
constant decline is observed throughout, corresponding to the 
country's urbanization process. It is assumed that reductions in
This series refers to the net balance of entries and exits of residents to 
and from Mexico, and comes from series corrected for population with an 
extrapolation for 1986 and 1987: AE 1946-50 P. 125, AE 1960-61 P. 103, AE 
1970-71 P. 143, AE 1980 P. 69 and AE 1986 P; 305. For other examples, Cfr 
Brambila 1982, Diez Canedo 1984, Medina 1986, but above all the studies of 
the Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana, Baja California.
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rural population facilitate the provision of goods and services and
, 9
the integration of the national population.
Rural Population 
(% of Total) 
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1 9 4 0  1 9 4 6  1 9 5 2  1 9 5 8  1 9 6 4  1 9 7 0  1 9 7 6  1 9 8 2
40 78.13 50 71 .10 60 60.70 70 51 .02 80 39. 67
41 77 .52 51 70 . 06 61 59.73 71 49.78 81 38.63
42 76. 88 52 69.02 62 58.75 72 48.57 82 37.59
43 76.21 53 67 . 98 63 57 .78 73 47 .38 83 36.57
44 75.53 54 66 . 94 64 56. 81 74 46.22 84 35.56
45 74 . 83 55 65 . 90 65 55.85 75 45.08 85 34 .56
46 74.11 56 64 . 86 66 54 . 88 76 43. 96 86 33.55
47 73. 38 57 63 . 82 67 53. 91 77 42 .86 87 32.54
48 72 . 63 58 62 .78 68 52 . 95 78 41 .78
49 71. 87 59 61 . 74 69 51 . 99 79 40.72
The level of satisfaction of basic necessities within 
reach of the population tries to identify the degree of tension that
the demand for basic necessities puts on the economy or public pol­
icy and is explored through indicators of nutrition, education, 
health and transportation.
This variable has maintained an upward trend from 1940 to the 
present, owing to a constant improvement in minimum welfare (health, 
education and nutrition) that continues, with some ups and downs, to
the present. However, a phase of decline is observed that began in
9 Nafinsa 1981, PP. 4 and 5, with extrapolations for 1981-1987. For other 
examples, Cfr Unikel 1973.
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1966 and lasted 10 years. Such a decline is explained by three main 
factors: 1) the beginning, in 1966, from what can be called the 
agriculture crisis: a slow reduction in the per-capita production of 
basic grains stemming from the reorientation of public spending to­
ward investment in industry and away from the countryside. The de­
cline in production of basic grains would have cut negatively both 
in the external sector of the economy and in nutrition indicators;
2) the relative drop in education: the average number of students 
per teacher grew perceptively in 1970 and once again in 1976; and 3) 
the relative drop in health conditions, illustrated by the growth in 
the infant mortality rate in 1969 and again in 197 6 . The two last 
factors stem from demographic pressures that were never again so 
strong. In 1977, a notable recovery in welfare began which brought 
the path to its highest point in 1981. In 1982 another decline was 
registered that began to be reversed the following year, although 
not to 1981 levels.
10. Education
The number of students per teacher is taken as an indicator of 
the level of attention to education, although the statistic has only 
existed since 1950. The values have varied between a low of 25.6 and 
a high of 35.8, with an average of 32.6 for the period. Two cycles 
are distinguished: one high, from 1950 to 1975 and another low, from 
197 6 to the present. The greatest numbers of students per teacher 
are registered for the sexenios of Avila Camacho and Diaz Ordaz and 
the lowest numbers during the Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid sexe­
nios. The decline after 1976 can be related to the demographic crest 
stemming from the children born at the end of the 1960s. For the 
purposes of this study, it is assumed that a greater number of stu­
dents per teacher implies a lower level of attention to education.10
10 AE 1982, P. 225, AE 1986 P. 312 and extrapolations for 1986-1987. For other 
examples, Cfr Fuentes Molinar 1983.
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Education 
(Students per Teacher)
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1 9 5 0  1 9 5 6  1 9 6 2  1 9 6 8  1 9 7 4  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 6
50 35. 12 60 33,, 66 70 34 ., 80 80 29.,58
51 35. 43 61 33,, 42 71 34 ,21 81 27 ,. 69
52 34 .01 62 35,, 68 72 33., 34 82 27 ,02
53 35. 44 63 35,, 81 73 32 , 72 83 26,. 60
54 31. 41 64 35 , 67 74 32 ,73 84 27,,22
55 32. 64 65 35,,14 75 31 ,55 85 25,, 56
56 32. 23 66 34 , 90 76 33,,08 86 25 .56
57 32. 91 67 34 , 37 77 30,,16 87 25 ,56
58 32. 17 68 34 ,00 78 29,, 99
59 33. 56 69 33,,49 79 30,, 17
11. Health
Infant mortality is used as an indicator of attention to public 
health. From 1940 to 1987, the figure has varied between 126 and 29 
deaths of children younger than 1 year for every 1,000 live births.
A constant downward trend is observed, with a slight increase from 
1963-1969 probably because of demographic pressures that reached 
their highest level during the period; similarly, the subsequent de­
mographic deceleration contributes to the improvement in the perfor­
mance of this indicator. It is assumed that a higher infant mortal­
ity rate implies a lower level of government attention to public 
health.11
11 The data up to 1975 are for every five years, with the annual figures being 
interpolated; no information was obtained after 1984. Inegi 1986 P. 151, 
IGAE 1986 P. 316, and IGAE 1988 P. 183. For other examples, Cfr Aguirre 
1980, Mina 1984 and Jimemez 1985.
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Infant M orta lity
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40 125 . 70 50 96.20 60 74.20 70 63.75 80 37.24
41 122 .14 51 93 . 62 61 71.50 71 60. 80 81 35.15
42 118.58 52 91 .04 62 68. 80 72 57 . 85 82 33.03
43 115.02 53 88 . 46 63 66.10 73 54 . 90 83 30.10
44 111.46 54 85 . 88 64 63.40 74 51. 95 84 29.16
45 107.90 55 83 . 30 65 60. 70 75 49. 00 85 28.86
46 105.56 56 81.48 66 62.20 76 49. 69 86 27.79
47 103.22 57 79. 66 67 63.70 77 46.48 87 26.70
48 100 . 88 58 77 .84 68 65.20 78 39.56
49 98.54 59 76.02 69 66.70 79 36.88
12. Transportation
Annual per-capita consumption of gasoline is taken as an indi­
cator for government attention to transportation, which from 1940 to 
1987 shows an upward trend, varying between 30.5 to 307 litres, with 
an average of 142. It is assumed that an increase in the amount of
gasoline available for consumption indicates an improvement in the
, 12 
transportation of people and goods.
12 The series is not totally comparable because until 1976 the figures refer to 
consumption and after to production. The data for 1986 are preliminary and 
for 1987 are estimated. Nafinsa 1981 P. 192 and IGAE 1987 P. 493. For other 
examples, Cfr Islas 1986.
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Gasoline Consum ption 
(P e r -c a p ita )
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1 940 1 946 1 952 1 958 1 964 1 970 1 976 1 982 1 987
40 30.53 50 77 .31 60 129.2 70 162 . 4 80 299.2
41 34 .86 51 85. 12 61 129.5 71 167.7 81 293. 9
42 37.44 52 91 .81 62 126.8 72 175. 1 82 276.3
43 39.11 53 95.38 63 126.5 73 187.7 83 274 . 9
44 38.38 54 101 . 9 64 131 .7 74 187.7 84 274 . 8
45 42.42 55 105.3 65 132 . 6 75 186.6 85 270.6
46 50. 62 56 111.9 66 136. 7 76 194 . 9 86 268.2
47 57.46 57 115 . 6 67 143.2 77 211.8 87 307.5
48 66. 65 58 119.0 68 150.0 78 220.0
49 72 . 67 59 121.7 69 157 . 3 79 24 6.0
13. Nutrition
The production of maize is taken as an indicator, not of nutri­
tion, but of the degree of government attention to nutrition, de­
spite the many"problems and limitations of the measure. In the first 
place, corn is a basic product that is substituted for similar prod­
ucts such as beans, rice or wheat, and is also a means of income. A 
precise measure would require distinguishing the substitution from 
the income effects of corn production. However, corn production was 
supported for many years by the government and served as a symbol of 
government attention. For that reason this indicator was chosen.
From 1940 to 1987 it has fluctuated between 83 and 208 kilo­
grams per person, with an average of 156. Three cycles are identi­
fied: one of 27 years (1940-1956) of relatively constant growth; an­
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other of 10 years (1967-1976) in decline; and another of 11 years 
(1977-1987) characterized by instability and notable ups and downs, 
during which the effect of the Mexican Food System (SAM) is 
considerable. It is assumed that growth in the amount of corn avail­
able per person indicates a government concern with nutrition, be­
cause this foodstuff is a fundamental part of the diet among the
• 13middle and lower strata of the social pyramid.
Maize Production Per-capita
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40 83.44 50 121.1 60 154 . 9 70 174 . 3 80 178.3
41 105.2 51 128.8 61 171 . 9 71 185.1 81 204.2
42 113.9 52 116.9 62 168 . 0 72 168.7 82 138.5
43 84 .79 53 131 .8 63 175 . 4 73 152 . 4 83 174 .2
44 105.7 54 154 .2 64 207 . 9 74 134 . 6 84 168.4
45 97 . 1 „ 55 149. 6 65 211 . 7 75 140.5 85 177 . 7
46 103.0 56 141 .7 66 211.5 76 129.4 86 146.2
47 105. 9 57 141.1 67 189.0 77 158 . 9 87 172.5
48 115. 9 58 160.6 68 203 .2 78 166.5
49 114 . 4 59 164 .2 69 171.5 79 125.3
The degree of government attention to social problems,
which can indicated the level of the government's perception of the 
problems of individuals and its awareness of populations pressures, 
is examined in data about literacy, housing, social security and 
university education. It enables reckoning the provision of some
.13 The data for 1986 are preliminary and for 1987 are estimated. Nafinsa 1981 
P. 117 and IGAE 1987 P. 373. For other examples, Cfr Garcia Mata 1983, 
Barkin 1983, Luisselli 1985 and Inegi 1987.
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public services and supports to the base of the social pyramid and, 
consequently, the rise or decline of social pressure on the economy 
and public policy. In this sense, illiteracy and lack of housing do 
not contribute to the improvement of the popular classes, while the 
increases^ in university students and people insured through social 
security do contribute.
This variable, — mainly linked to governmental expenditure as 
well as that of welfare—  shows an upward trend from 1940 to 1965, 
while a slow deceleration appears as the period advances. In 1965 a 
phase of stagnation began that lasted six years and ended in an open 
reversal in 1970. In 1972, recovery begins, gains greater vigor in 
1978 and reaches its peak in 1981. However, the recovery was 
ephemeral as in 1982 a new phase of stagnation begins and lasts 
until the present. In the long run, however, the social spending of 
Echeverria and Lopez Portillo did not have the impact that the 
deceleration of population growth had. More than public spending, 
sustained economic growth seems to have been the important factor.
The stagnation of 1965 stemmed mainly from two factors: the de­
celeration of the percentage of the insured population and the ebb 
in housing shortages. In 1965 the gradual reduction in the housing 
shortage ended — which had persisted since 1940—  and an increase 
decline began that has not yet ended. The percentage of the insured 
population remained almost invariable in the second half of the 
1960s despite that country's experience of rapid industrial growth. 
Both processes stem, very probably, from the accelerated demographic 
expansion and the absence of any compensatory increase in government 
social spending.
In the 1970s rapid growth in the insured population and per­
centage of university students is observed, although the housing 
shortage continued rising. The new phase of stagnation, begun in 
1982, is explained by the erratic behavior of these same factors.
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14. Illiteracy
Illiteracy from 1940 to 1987 has dropped from 47.9 to 3.5 per­
cent with an average of 24.9 percent for the period. Two cycles are 
distinguished: one of high levels with a downward trend from 1940 to 
1960 and another moderate one with a slight acceleration in the 
downward trend from 1961 to 1987, with the arrival of low levels in 
recent years. A high percentage of illiteracy assumes the absence of 
formation and information in the population, which reflects restric­
tions on the provision and satisfaction of public education that has
* 14repercussions mainly for the lower strata of the social pyramid.
I l l i t e r a c y  
(% of Total P opu la t ion )
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1 9 4 0  1 9 4 6  1 9 5 2  1 9 5 8  1 9 6 4  1 9 7 0  1 9 7 6  1 9 8 2
40 47 .88 50 34 . 67 60 30.22 70 15.55 80 9.52
41 46.37 51 34 .25 61 28.40 71 14.80 81 9.05
42 44 . 90 52 33 . 82 62 26.66 72 14 .08 82 8.22
43 43.48 53 33. 39 63 25.02 73 13.40 83 7 .42
44 42 .10 54 32 . 95 64 23.45 74 12.75 84 6.52
45 40.76 55 32.51 65 21. 96 75 12 .14 85 5. 62
46 39.47 56 32 .07 66 20.54 76 11.56 86 4 .51
47 38.21 57 31. 62 67 19.20 77 11.01 87 3.51
48 36.99 58 31 .18 68 17. 92 78 10.48
49 35.82 59 30.73 69 16.71 79 9. 990
14 Up to 1977 the series includes a population of 6 years and older who do not 
know how to read and after this date the seties refers to the above-15 
population. AE 1958-59, P. 48-50, AE 1962-63 P. 36-37, AE 1986 P. 179-180 
and IGAE 1987 P. 281-282. For other examples, Cfr Ruiz 1977 and UNESCO 1982.
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15, University Students
The percentage of university students in the population has
varied from 1950 to 1987 (no previous data exists) between 0.07 and
1.53, with an average of 0.55. Two cycles can be identified: one low
and stable from 1950 to 1960; another of rapid growth after 1961.
Note that in the last two years a tendency to stagnate arose. The
growth in the proportion of university students assumes an opening
to higher education, a greater provision of public university educa-
. 15tion, which increases expectations for social mobility.
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<31 51 0.07 61 0.23 71 0. 60 81 1.41
<32 52 0. 12 62 0.25 72 0. 65 82 1.44
<33 53 0.10 63 0.25 73 0.72 83 1 .50
44 54 0.08 64 0.27 74 0.81 84 1.49
45 55 0.16 65 0.33 75 0. 90 85 1 .53
46 56 0.08 66 0.40 76 0.92 86 1.49
47 57 0.15 67 0.43 77 0.95 87 1.48
48 58 0.08 68 0.47 78 1.11
49 0.09 59 0.07 69 0.50 79 1.26
One of the profound long-term impacts will be the formation of well- 
developed, critical, participative individuals, which in time will
15 The series includes normal education to the'licenciate level. Inegi 1986 P. 
86 and IGAE 1987 P. 279. No data were gathered for the 1940-1948 period and 
1987 is estimated. For other examples, Cfr ANUIES 1983 and Gomez 1983.
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give rise to the appearance of a new actor on the political scene: 
public opinion. This is going to be a phenomenon at the end of the 
1980s that will be witnessed in the explosion of opinion polls, 
studies and research projects.
16. Insured population
The population insured by the Mexican Institute of Social 
Security (IMSS) from 1944 to 1987 is taken as an indicator of this 
variable. The percentage has varied between 1.6 and 40.2 percent of 
the total population, with an average of 16.7 percent for the pe­
riod .
Insured Population 
(% of Total)
4
3
2
1
1940 ' 1946 1952 19761958 1964 1970 1982 1987
40 - - - 50 3.78 60 9.55 70 19.43 80 34 .77
41 - - - 51 3. 95 61 11.19 71 19. 38 81 37 .78
42 - - - 52 4.21 62 12.66 72 21.21 82 36.77
43 - - - 53 4 .42 63 13.28 73 23.70 83 35. 98
44 1.62 54 4 . 63 64 15. 61 74 24 .53 84 38.27
45 2.37 55 5.25 65 16.14 75 26.29 85 40. 15
46 2.73 56 5.86 66 16.37 76 26.83 86 38.75
47 3.15 57 6.58 67 16.73 77 27.23 87 39.73
48 3.41 58 7 . 65 68 17.33 78 30.14
49 3.56 59 8.33 69 18.50 79 31.08
We find two cycles: one of constant sustained ascent from 1944 to 
1981; one of instability between 1982 and 1987. It is assumed that
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growth in the provision of insurance by the institutions of social 
security and public health implies government attention to the 
increase of welfare for the base of the social pyramid.16
16 The series refers to data of IMSS only and is not available for prior to 
1944. Inegi 1986 P. 140 and IGAE 1987 P. 327. For other examples, Cfr 
Hernandez Llamas 1984 and IMSS 1984.
6. THE ECONOMY
To study the economy data about production, finance, income 
distribution and employment are used. The behavior of each one of 
the chosen economic indicators is shown graphically.
Production
To examine this topic data concerning economic growth and gross 
domestic product are reviewed. Between 1940 and 1987 the curve shows 
a general upward trend, although several phases are observed along 
the path. The first, from 1940 to 1957 is one of stagnation and low
values despite the variations. In 1958 a stage of long-term ascent
begins and lasts until 1972, when the first big drop of the period 
is observed, which only begins to rise again in 1976. In this year,
accelerated growth resumes and reaches its maximum value in 1983. In
recent years high values have been maintained, although with an ap­
preciable tendency to fall.
This behavior in recent years stems from a combination of sev­
eral factors: a notable improvement in the external sector, as much 
in the commercial balance as in the balance of payments, combined 
with a stagnation of internal finance and a rapid deceleration of 
economic growth that has shown its only negative values for the pe­
riod.
17. Economic growth
Economic growth from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between -5.3 
and 11.7 percent, with an average of 5.7 percent. The period is 
marked by unstable behavior with years of ups and downs. The years 
of highest growth are 1950, 1954 and above all 1964. The low-growth 
years are 1982, 1983 and 1986, when the economy, after 42 years of 
positive growth, registered negative rates for the first time.
1 This series is calculated from the annual variance of gross domestic product 
by Inegi 1986 P. 311, Banxico 1986 P. 207 and Banxico 1987 P. 199.
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Economic Growth 
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1 940 1946 1952 1958 1964 1 970 1 976 1 982
40 1 . 38 50 9.89 60 8 .12 70 6. 92 80 8 . 32
41 9.74 51 7 .73 61 4 . 93 71 4 .17 81 7 . 95
42 5 . 61 52 3. 98 62 4 . 67 72 8.49 82 -0.54
43 3.70 53 0.27 63 7 . 99 73 8.41 83 -5.27
44 8.16 54 10.00 64 11 . 69 74 6.11 84 3 . 68
45 3.14 55 8.50 65 6.48 75 5. 61 85 2 . 78
46 6.57 56 6.84 66 6. 93 76 4 .24 86 -3.75
47 3.44 57 7 . 58 67 6.27 77 3.44 87 1.43
48 4 .12 58 5. 32 68 8 . 14 78 8.25
49 5.48 59 2. 99 69 6.32 79 9.15
18. Gross domestic product
Gross domestic product per-capita has fluctuated between 3.56 
and 12.75 thousands of pesos (measured in constant terms of 1970 pe­
sos) during the period. The behavior shows a practically uninter­
rupted upward trend from 1940 to 1981, when a downward phase begins 
and lasts until the present. The phase of positive growth shows a 
moderate growth cycle between 1940 and 1962 and one of rapid growth 
between 1963 and 1981.^
1 Inegi 1986 P. 311, Banxico 1986 P. 207 and Banxico 1987 P. 199.
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Gross Domestic Product Per-capita 
(1970 Pesos)
1 2 . 5
T 1 1 . 5
h 0
f 1 0 . 50
u 9 . 5
s P 8 . 5
a e 7 . 5
n s
d 0 6 . 5
s s 5 . 5
4 . 5
A
.♦*
3.5 ctT? I I I I I
1 9 4 0 1 9 4 6 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 4
♦ ♦♦
1 9 7 0  1 9 7 6  1 9 8 2  1 9 8 7
40 3.56 50
00 60 6.44 70 8.72 80 12 . 13
41 3.80 51 5.06 61 6.51 71 8.75 81 12 . 75
42 3.91 52 5.10 62 6.56 72 9.19 82 12 .36
43 3 . 94 53 4 . 96 63 6.83 73 9. 64 83 11 .42
44 4 . 15 54 5. 30 64 7 . 35 74 9. 90 84 11.56
45 4.17 55 5.57 65 7 . 53 75 10.14 85 11 . 62
46 4 .32 56 5.78 66 7.76 76 10.26 86 10. 95
47 4 . 35 57 6.03 67 7 . 94 77 10.31 87 10.90
48 4.41 58 6.16 68 8.27 78 10.84
49 4 .52 59 6.15 69 8 .47 79 11 . 51
Finances
The state of national finances is analyzed through data on in­
flation, internal savings, public investment, foreign investment, 
profits to the'exterior, fiscal revenue and the federal budget.
After an initial phase of high financial instability coincident with 
the World War II years, the general curve begins in 1945 with an 
upward trend that lasts until 1972. In 1973 a stagnation period 
begins that includes some peaks with strong drops. In the last two 
years decline has characterized the pattern after a notable recovery 
between 1983 and 1985. Recent behavior is explained above all by the 
initial recovery of the price index and the lower percentage of 
profits taken by foreign investors, followed by a return of 
inflation (1986 and 1987) and the progressive erosion of real 
savings.
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19. Inflation 2
The annual inflation rate from 1940 to 1988 has varied between 
-2 and 159.2 percent, with an average of 18.2 percent. We observe a 
general upward trend with three cycles: one moderate and unstable 
between between 1940 and 1958, with 1953 being notable for defla­
tion; another low and stable from 1959 to 1970; and one of marked 
increase from 1970 to 1987. It is assumed that inflation does not 
contribute to economic improvement because of the disturbances it 
generates in financial and productive markets, as well as the lack 
of confidence and instability it creates among consumers, producers 
and investors.
In f la tion 
(Annual Rate)
.. . . . . . . . . . . . 7!__ __ : : ; ~ . . i• ►\H  _ _ . . . . . V 11 •
h- Trrri « ■<***«. - X  - X  -
1 940 • 1946 1952 1958 1964 1 970 1 976 1982 198
40 1.3 50 6.7 60 4.9 70 4 . 8 80 29.8
41 3.4 51 12.3 61 1.7 71 5.2 81 28 . 7
42 16.5 52 14 .3 62 1.2 72 5.5 82 98 . 8
43 30 . 7 53 -2.00 63 0.6 73 21.3 83 80.8
44 25.7 54 5.0 64 2.2 74 20.7 84 59.2
45 7.5 55 15. 7 65 3.6 75 11.2 85 63.7
46 24 . 7 56 4 . 9 66 4 .3 76 27.2 86 105.7
47 11.9 57 5.5 67 3.0 77 20.7 87 159.2
48 6.4 58 11.5 68 1.5 78 16.2 88 51 . 7
49 5.0 59 2.5 69 3.5 79 20.0
2 Nafinsa 1981 P. 235, Nafinsa 1986 P. 303 and Banxico 1987 P. 21. For other 
examples, Cfr Fiorella 1983, Blejer 1984 and Silva 1984.
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20. Savings 3
Real savings from 1940 to 1987 has varied between 90 and 3,860 
pesos (in constant 1970 pesos) per-capita. We identify two cycles 
during the period: one of constant ascent that lasts until 1982 and 
another of decline from 1983 to the present. It is assumed that in­
creases in real savings improve the economy, because they imply mon­
etary surplus that is recycled productively through the banking and 
financial system.
Annual Savings P e r-c a p ita  
(1970 pesos)
3.5 
3
2.5 
2
1.5 
1
0.5
1940 1946 1952
4-f V
J r
k
1958 1964 1970 1976 1 982 1 987
40 0.09 50 0.30 60 0. 61 70 1.26 80 2 . 39
41 0.11 „ 51 0. 37 61 0 . 68 71 1.36 81 2 . 84
42 0.15 52 0. 35 62 0.74 72 1.41 82 3.86
43 0.18 53 0.46 63 0.83 73 1 .39 83 3 . 14
44 0.16 54 0.51 64 0. 91 74 1.44 84 2 .72
45 0.21 55 0.45 65 0. 95 75 1.76 85 2 . 65
46 0.19 56 0.43 66 0. 98 76 2 .33 86 2 . 31
47 0.21 57 0.42 67 1 .10 77 2 .36 87 2 .16
48 0.25 58 0.44 68 1 .20 78 2 . 15
49 0.25 59 0.47 69 1 .25 79 2.42
3 This series includes the obligations of the banking system up to 1984 and 
beginning in 1985 the total intake. The data come from Inegi 1986 P. 829 and 
Banxico 1987 P. 215. For other examples, Cfr Cornejo 1964, Goldsmith 1965 and 
Gelover 1970.
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21. Public investment
The proportion of public investment over gross fixed investment 
from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between 25.7 and 71 percent, with 
an average of 42 percent. We find three cycles: one of a downward 
trend that combines two high and low points between 1940 and 1957; 
another with an upward trend between 1958 and 1965; one with a 
downward tendency that includes moderate and low periods between 
1966 and 1987.
Public Investment 
(% of Total Investm ent)
a 37 . 5 ?ffj'Vrr4..4rif ( H
♦ ♦
1 9 4 0  1 9 4 6  1 9 5 2  1 9 5 8  1 9 6 4  1 9 7 0  1 9 7 6  1 9 8 2  1 9 8 7
40 48 , 33 50 49. 48 60 34 , 38 70 38 .00 80 54 ,29
41 42 ,.12 . 51 38. 71 61 40., 95 71 42 .59 81 50,,25
42 66,,29 52 38. 16 62 49.,09 72 34 .05 82 48 .,41
43 71,.00 53 33. 03 63 41 ., 89 73 39 .43 83 45,, 94
44 59,. 73 54 36. 62 64 48 ., 32 74 37 . 34 84 31 , 68
45 49,.88 55 30. 42 65 51 ,37 75 43 .20 85 27 ,.77
46 37 ,.00 56 25. 69 66 42 , 60 76 40 . 59 86 39,,03
47 39,.70 57 25. 69 67 38 ,.49 77 41 .32 87 27 ,40
48 41,.59 58 31. 48 68 38 , 66 78 45 . 66
49 44 .45 59 31 .96 69 39,. 32 79 44 . 94
It i s a s s u m e d t h a t g r o w t h i n p u b l i c i n v e s t m e n t o v e r g r o
investment does not contribute to economic improvement in the 
current context, because it implies government expansion in an
4 Nafin 1981 P. 321, Nafin 1986 P. 108, AE 1985 P. 390, AE 1986 P. 458, Banxico 
1985 P. 78, Banxico 1987 P. 76, IGAE 1987 P. 582.
140
economy that inhibits and generates lack of confidence in domestic 
and foreign private enterprise. Of course, a distinction in the 
objectives of public investment would have to be made to study this 
topic in more detail.
22. Foreign investment
Foreign Investment 
(% of Total Inves tm ent)
1 2
P
e 1 o
r
V
\ / N
# v - /
1 940 1 946 1 952 1958 1 964 1 970 1 976 1 982 1987
40 9.72 50 7.49 60 4 .00 70 2 . 84 80 2 . 32
41 9.50 51 7. 98 61 5 .15 71 2.86 81 2.74
42 9.28 52 3.29 62 4 .55 72 1. 99 82 1 . 95
43 9.05 53 4 .39 63 3 . 63 73 2 .17 83 1 . 31
44 8.83 54 9. 66 64 3 . 81 74 2 .10 84 0. 95
45 8. 61 55 9.81 65 4 . 93 75 1 . 15 85 1 . 30
46 8.38 56 8. 85 6 6 2 . 70 76 1 .22 86 4 .03
47 8.16 ’ 57 8.24 67 1 .86 77 2 . 18 87 11 .57
48 7 . 94 58 5.36 68 2 .22 78 1.74
49 7.71 59 4 .56 69 3.38 79 2 .17
Foreign investment from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between 
0.95 and 11.57 percent of total investment, with an average of 4.87 
A general downward trend is observed that is divided into three cy­
cles: one high and in decline from 1940 to 1951; one moderate with 
ups and downs between 1952 and 1965; one low and relatively stable 
from 1966 to 1984. In the last three years of the period, foreign 
investment tended to grow rapidly, registering its peak in 1987 
mainly because of swaps. It is assumed that growth in the foreign
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share of total investment improves the economy in the short run, but 
not in the long run because it implies increases in profits taken 
abroad.5
23. Profits sent abroad
Profits sent abroad from 1940 to 1987 have fluctuated between
11.9 and 857.8 percent of direct foreign investment, with an average 
of 145.4 percent.
Profits Abroad 
(% of Foreign Inves tm ent)
8 7 6
3 5  0
3 0 0
2 5 0
2 0 0 ■ -
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 2  1 9 8 71 9 4 0 1 9 6 4
40 351 . 4 50 88 . 1 60 192.9 70 69.9 80 41.4
41 194 . 6 . 51 73. 1 61 130.6 71 74.3 81 48.2
42 152 . 8 52 226,3 62 136.3 72 92 .2 82 108.9
43 354 .8 53 207 . 3 63 183.8 73 75.5 83 39.9
44 63 . 9 54 77 . 7 64 166.4 74 65.4 84 61 .6
45 875. 8 55 72 .2 65 114.6 75 102.7 85 78.7
46 181. 9 56 93 . 6 66 186.7 76 163.7 86 21 . 6
47 129. 9 57 86.1 67 24 3.9 77 57 .8 87 11.9
48 214 .7 58 130.1 68 227 .5 78 55.6
49 156.4 59 173. 1 69 161.3 79 53 . 6
Two cycles are distinguished: one unstable with moderate and 
high movements between 1940 and 1969; one low and relatively stable 
between 1970 and 1987. It is assumed that increases in profits sent
5 Nafin 1981 P. 348, Nafin 1986 P. 108, Nafin 1986 . 318, AE 1985 P. 390, AE 
1986 P. 458, Banxico 1985 P. 78, Banxico 1986 P. 227 and Banxico 1987 P. 213. 
For other examples, Cfr Bohrisch 1968 and Freixas 1983.
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abroad as a percentage of direct foreign investment do not improve 
the economy, 
the exterior.
because they imply an increase in capital transfers to
6
24. Fiscal revenue
The proportion of fiscal revenue to the federal budget (PEF) 
has fluctuated from 1940 to 1987 between 50.6 and 91.7 percent.
Fiscal Revenue 
(% of Federal Budget)
1 o o
1 9 4 0 1 9 4 6 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 4 1 9 7 0  1 9 7 6 1 9 8 2 1 91
40 74 .84 50 84 . 32 60 50.56 70 85 . 68 80 93.55
41 81. 96 51 85. 91 61 53.11 71 87 .03 81 75. 95
CMvr 74 .43 52 69.52 62 59.89 72 80.78 82 65.26
43 86.52 * 53 73.84 63 68.39 73 80.50 83 64 . 41
44 76.73 54 60. 78 64 59. 64 74 82 . 62 84 77 . 64
45 77.43 55 76.17 65 71 .10 75 80 . 92 85 77 .78
46 91.70 56 73.49 66 81 . 87 76 75.35 86 60 . 18
47 83. 39 57 65. 63 67 79.76 77 81 .15 87 63 . 36
48 67.58 58 63.98 68 84 . 82 78 83 . 95
49 66.29 59 64 .23 69 82 .34 79 87 .52
Despite the great instability of overall behavior, three cycles 
are distinguished: one of decline from 1940 to 1960; one of ascent 
from 1961 to 1980; one of decline from 1981 to the present. The 
growth in the percentage of fiscal revenue over the federal budget
6 Nafinsa 1981 P. 348, Nafinsa 1986 P. 317 and Banxico 1987 P. 202. Cfr 
Henriquez 1962, Brothers 1967 and Bennett 1974.
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contributes to economic improvement, because it implies a balance
7
between public revenues and spending.
25. Federal budget outlays
The share of the federal budget in gross domestic product (GDP) 
from 1940 to 1987 has varied between 6.34 and 37.4 percent. Three 
cycles are seen in the period: one low and relatively stable from 
1940 to 1971; one high and growing between 1972 and 1982; one with 
great ups and downs from 1983 to the present.
Federal Budget 
(% of GDP)
s ttTTTNY
1 9 4 0 1 9 4 6 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 4 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 2  1 9 8 7
40 7. 66 50 8.21 60 12 . 62 70 11 .86 80 20 .45
41 7.39 51 8.59 61 11.75 71 11 .39 81 24 .78
42 7.84 52 10. 60 62 10.82 72 13 . 68 82 37 . 43
43 8.25 53 9.05 63 9.76 73 14 .81 83 26.06
44 7.73 54 10.71 64 11 .52 74 15 . 10 84 23.79
45 7. 65 55 9.86 65 13.73 75 18.23 85 24 . 17
46 6.34 56 9. 98 66 10 . 93 76 20.07 86 33. 13
47 6. 91 57 9.56 67 12 .57 77 20.09
48 8. 38 58 10.11 68 11.43 78 19.58
49 10.27 59 10.06 69 12 .52 79 19.02
It is assumed that increases i n the federal budget shar
above a level of 15 to 20 percent do not contribute to economic
7 Inegi 1986 P. 632, Banxico 1985 P. 165 and Banxico 1987 P. 233. This series 
includes revenue from the parastate sector from 1965 on to make it consistent 
with the federal budget, which incorporates the expenses of the parastate 
sector after 1965.
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performance because they imply an excess of public spending relative
g
to national production.
EMPLOYMENT
Finally, the study of employment includes data on real 
salaries, economically active population, proportion of economically 
active population employed in industry and in the service sector.
The employment data indicate the level of work in the formal sector 
as well as the distribution of jobs in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors of the economy.
Three phases are observed along the employment time patch be­
tween 1940 and 1987: one of high values and great stability between 
1940 and 1960, which stems from sustained growth in the economically 
active population as a percentage of total population and from the 
economically active population employed in industry. In 1960 a phase 
of long-term decline begins and lasts until 1977, as a result of the 
decreasing percentage of the economically active population that 
stems from the rapid demographic growth in those years. In 1978, a 
relatively stable phase at low levels begins, which is explained by 
the temporary recovery of the economically active population up to 
1980, combined with a stagnation of industrial employment and moder­
ate growth of employment in the service sector.
26. Real wages
Real salaries from 1940 to 1987 have fluctuated between 6.49 
and 39.48 pesos (1970) per day, with an average of 18.61. We observe 
three cycles: one low and relatively stable from 1940 to 1959; one 
of growth from 1960 to 197 6; one unstable and in decline between 
1977 and 1987. It is assumed that increases in real salary con­
8 Inegi 1986 P. 628 and 642, IGAE 1987 P. 101. This series represents total 
public sector spending; from 1965 on parastate expenses are subtracted to 
make the series consistent with the figures from 1940 to 1964.
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tribute to economic improvement because they imply greater acquisi-
g
tive power for the middle and lower strata of the social pyramid.
Daily Real Wages
4 0
9
7 3 0  
0
2 5
P 20 
e
s 1 5
s
5
1 9 4 0 1 9 4 6 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 4 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 2 1 9 8
40 11.09 50 8.05 60 12 .52 70 26. 99 80 30.43
41 10.41 51 6.49 61 12 .41 71 25. 63 81 30. 94
42 9.44 52 10.00 62 15 . 32 72 28 . 90 82 33 .86
43 7.79 53 10.19 63 15.24 73 30.44 83 24.19
44 7. 95 54 11 .05 64 20 . 36 74 28 . 32 84 22 . 90
45 7.14 55 9.72 65 19. 99 75 34 .55 85 22 .36
46 8.10 56 10.61 66 22 . 79 76 38 . 98 86 17 . 64
47 7. 65 57 10.18 67 22 .16 77 33.23 87 16. 68
CO 8.65 58 10. 93 68 25 .23 78 32 .10
49 7. 90 59 10.81 69 24 .43 79 31.71
27. Economically active population (PEA)
The PEA as a percent of total population from 1940 to 1987 has 
fluctuated between 27.2 and 32.3, with an average of 30.46 percent. 
Four cycles are distinguished: one growing from 1940 to 1959; one 
declining from 1960 to 1970; one growing between 1971 and 1980; and 
one of decline that begins in 1981. It is assumed that growth in the 
economically active population improves the economy, but does not 
imply that workers are necessarily better off.10
9 This series refers to the minimum wage denominated in 1970 pesos. Nafin 1981 
P. 356 and Nafin 1986 P. 52.
10 Nafin 1981 P. 14 and Nafin 1986 P. 20. For other examples, Cfr Levy 1980, 
Gollas 1982 and Kuri 1983.
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Economically Active Population 
(% of Total P opu la t ion )
32.5
p
'3 2
e
31.5r
c 3 1
e 30.5
n 30
t 29.5
a 29
g 28.5
e
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>
(V
1 940 1 946 1 952 1 958 1 964 1 970 1 976 1 982 1 987
40 29.81 50 32.07 60 32.22 70 27.23 80 31 . 80
41 30.20 51 32.09 61 31 . 68 71 27.46 81 31 . 48
42 30.56 52 32.11 62 31 .16 72 27 . 69 82 31 .18
43 30. 87 53 32 .14 63 30. 64 73 27 . 93 83 30. 94
44 31 .14 54 32 . 16 64 30 .12 74 28.16 84 30.73
45 31.38 55 32.18 65 2 9.62 75 28.39 85 30.57
46 31.58 56 32 .20 66 29.13 76 28 . 62 86 30.36
47 31.75 57 32 .22 67 28 . 64 77 28.85 87 30.26
48 31.89 58 32 .24 68 28. 17 78 29.07
49 32.00 59 32.26 69 27 . 69 79 29.30
Population employed in industry
The proportion of the PEA employed in industry between 1940 and 
1987 has fluctuated between 15.02 and 22.95 percent with an average 
of 19.09. Two cycles are observed: one growing from 1940 to 1969 and 
another in sharp decline from 1971 to 1987. The sexenios of Diaz 
Ordaz and Luis Echeverria registered the highest levels of indus­
trial PEA. The growth of industrial PEA as a percentage of total 
population contributes to economic improvement because it implies 
higher levels of aggregate value with the employment of a greater 
number of people in the secondary sector of the economy.11
11 Nafinsa 1981 P. 14 and Nafinsa 1986 P. 20.
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Population Employed in Industry 
(% of Population Economically A c t iv e )
23
p
22e
r 2 1
c 20
e 1 9
n
t 1 8
a 1 7
g 1 6
e
x:
1 940 1 946 1952 1 958 1964 1 970 1 976 1 982
40 15.52 50 15. 95 60 19.02 70 22 . 95 80 20.23
41 15.02 51 16.24 61 19.41 71 22 . 68 81 20.33
42 15.09 52 16.56 62 19.80 72 22.41 82 20.39
43 15.18 53 16.87 63 20.20 73 22 .13 83 20 . 47
44 15 . 30 54 17.17 64 20.59 74 21.86 84 20. 97
45 15 . 43 55 17.48 65 20.99 75 21 .59 85 20.63
46 15 .58 56 17.79 66 21 . 38 76 21 .32 86 20.79
47 15.75 57 18.09 67 21 .77 77 21 .05 87 20.86
48 15 . 94 58 18.40 68 22 .16 78 20.77
49 16.15 59 18.71 69 22 .56 79 20.50
29. Population employed in the service sector
The proportion of the service sector PEA within the total popu­
lation from 1940 to 1987 has varied between 15.02 and 55.3 percent 
showing an upward trend throughout the period that continues to the 
present. Two phases of rapid growth are distinguished: from 1941 to 
1950 and from 1961 to 1980, separated by intervals of moderate 
growth.12
12 Nafinsa 1981 P. 14 and Nafinsa 1986 P. 20.
Population Employed in Services 
(% of Population Economically A c t iv e )
y
y
.♦*
2 0 ; I ■ I
1940 1946 1 952 1 958 1 964 1 970 1 976 1982 1987
40 19 .09 50 25.74 60 26.,83 70 37 , 65 80 53 , 94
41 9.i010 51 25.86 61 27 .91 71 39,,28 81 54 ,. 12
42 11 .38 52 25. 98 62 28., 99 72 40,, 91 82 54 , 30
43 13 .55 53 26.09 63 30.,08 73 42 ,54 83 54 ,44
44 15 .53 54 26.20 64 31 ,16 74 44 , 17 84 54 ,.58
45 17 . 35 55 26. 32 65 32 .,24 75 45 , 80 85 54 , 75
46 19 .02 56 26.43 66 33,, 32 76 47 , 42 86 55,.05
47 20 .55 57 26.55 67 34 ,40 77 49,. 05 87 55,.25
48 21 . 96 58 26. 67 68 35 ,49 78 50 ,. 68
49 23 .25 59 26.79 69 36.,57 79 52 ,.31
7. POLITICS
In this chapter data about three important aspects of political 
life from 1940 to 1987 are presented: 1) the plurality of the elite; 
2) the society's electoral behavior; and 3) the level of conflict 
within the government. The behavior of each indicator is shown 
graphically.
PLURALITY
The political elite is analyzed to determine the degree of ac­
cess to leadership positions --whether the channels for 
incorporating the lower and middle strata of the population are open 
or closed-- and to study the upward social mobility of the country. 
The study is based on data about 1,846 political leaders in the top 
200 government positions over the last nine sexenios from 1935 to 
1985.1
Seen in historical perspective, the plurality of the political 
elite has tended to worsen because a progressive exclusionary pro­
cess has closed the channels of mobility and ascent. Nonetheless, it 
has not been a linear process. In fact, the greatest decline has oc­
curred in the last two decades. After a moderate improvement in 1952 
--because Ruiz Cortines incorporated a greater percentage of leaders 
of popular origin in his government-- the plurality of the elite 
began a long-term decline that was only interrupted during the Lopez 
Portillo sexenio. In 1958 it dropped slightly, despite the fact that 
the number of leaders of popular origin had risen, because of the
1 All information about the elite comes from the data base of Roderic Camp, who 
has studied the topic in greatest detail. The government posts considered 
include presidents, secretaries, sub-secretaries, governors, directors of 
large public agencies, rectors and directors of the main education 
institutions, principle embassadors, supreme court justices, senators, 
deputies and leaders of important syndicates; the numbers break down by 
sexenio as follows: 1934: 227; 1940: 151; 1946: 156; 1952: 145; 1958: 141;
1964: 190; 1970; 243; 1976: 190; and 1982: 129. Other analyses can be
consulted in Brandenburg 1955, Smith 1981, Rendon 1984, Philip 1985,
Castelazo 1985 and Salim 1987.
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influx of leaders with university degrees but without membership in 
the PRI and without any experience in elected office.
During the Diaz Ordaz sexenio the degree of plurality did 
change, only to drop abruptly in 1970 to unprecedented levels for 
the period. The drop in the plurality of the leadership in the 
Echeverria sexenio seems to contradict the apparent populist charac­
ter that is often attributed to his government; what is certain is 
that never before had there been such high levels of exclusivity in 
the leadership, which was characterized by elites with university 
studies and degrees from foreign universities but totally lacking in 
electoral experience. The percent of leaders of popular origin was 
reduced to 26, the lowest percentage at least since 1934. To under­
stand such a pronounced reversal in the plurality of the elite, it 
is necessary to remember the student movement of 1968 and its ef­
fects on the composition of top political leadership. Luis 
Echeverria, as one of his responses to 1968, coopted several young 
university students to give substance to his democratic opening, but 
the cost of such a policy was precisely the elitization of the lead­
ership, an issue that did not seem to cause much concern at the 
time.
The sexenio of Lopez Portillo marked an important recovery of 
plurality that is explained by a notable increase in leaders of pop­
ular origin with electoral experience and by a decline in the per­
centage of leaders who had studied abroad. The percentage of leaders 
who represented agriculture and labor interests also improved in re­
lation to the Echeverria sexenio. Despite all of this, the elite did 
not recover the level of plurality it had during the Ruiz Cortines 
administration.
In 1982, elite plurality fell to its lowest level for the en­
tire period considered here. Leaders of popular origin with member­
ship in the PRI dropped to their lowest level (with PRI members al­
most disappearing from the top posts). In addition, leaders with 
electoral experience from the labor and agriculture sectors reduced
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in ranks as well. On the other hand, those with private-school and 
foreign educations increased, in both cases, to the highest levels 
for the period.
The shrinking plurality of the elite, evident since 1970 and 
acute since 1982, becomes one of the central factors in explaining 
the erratic political behavior of the last two decades. With the ex­
ception of nepotism, which historically has tended to decline in the 
government, practically all other indicators of elite plurality have 
worsened. The leadership has become more of a plutocracy, slowly 
distancing itself from the social base and closing one important 
channel of mobility and ascent.
30. Government leaders of popular origin
The percentage of political leaders of popular origin from 1940 
to the present has fluctuated between 24 and 49, with the lowest 
values registered during the de la Madrid and Echeverria sexenios 
and the highest during the Lopez Mateos administration. The overall 
behavior of the curve shows a series of up and down cycles that, 
seen in historical perspective, seem to tend to decline, which would 
imply a gradual elitization of the political leadership.
Leaders of Popular Origin
1 934 1 940 1 946 1 952 1 958 1 964 1 970 1 976 1 982
31. Leaders with family ties among themselves
The percentage of political leaders related to other politi­
cians from 1940 to the present has fluctuated between 22 and 34 per 
cent, with lowest values --contrary to popular opinion-- in the de 
la Madrid and Lopez Portillo sexenios and highest levels during the 
Avila Camacho and Ruiz Cortines sexenios, with an average of 28 per 
cent for the period. The historical behavior of the curve shows a 
downward trend that accelerates after 1976, which would indicate an 
overall slow reduction in the nepotism index.
Leaders with Family Ties among Themselves
34
32 -
1 934 1940 1946 1970 19761958
32. Leaders with university studies
The percentage of politicians with university studies between 
1940 and the present has risen constantly from 68 to 97 percent, 
with lowest values during the Avila Camacho and Ruiz Cortines sexe­
nios and highest values during the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo 
years. The historic tendency has been to rise, although it would 
seem to have reached its highest possible level.
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Leaders with University Stud ies
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33. Leaders who have studied in private universities
The percentage of politicians who have studied in private uni­
versities declined from 1940 to 1970 and rose from then on, which 
indicates an initial strengthening of public university education 
and a subsequent weakening. Although the values for this variable 
have not been very high in the period considered, the important in­
formation here is more qualitative than quantitative. That is, pri­
vate university graduates, despite their few numbers, are those who 
have increasingly occupied the best government positions.
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34 . Leaders who have studied abroad
The percentage of politicians who have studied abroad from 1940 
to the present has grown from 5 to 28, with a relatively stable time 
path until 1958 and notable growth since then. Once again, the 
Echeverria and de la Madrid sexenios register the highest values.
Leaders from Foreign Universities
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35. Leaders with party membership
The percentage of politicians with party experience from 1940 
to the present varied between 13.5 and 0.8, with the highest levels 
during the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo administrations and the 
lowest during that of de la Madrid. The curve shows erratic behav­
ior, although relatively stable until 1982, when it fell to an un­
precedented low.
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Leaders with Party Membership
19821940 1946 1952 1 964 1970 1976
36. Leaders with electoral experience
The percentage of leaders with electoral experience varied be­
tween 38 and 52 percent from 1940 to the present, with the lowest 
levels during the Avila Camacho and Luis Echeverria sexenios and the 
highest levels during the Ruiz Cortines and Diaz Ordaz regimes. 
Despite the oscillations, the historic tendency seems to be decline. 
The drop during the Echeverria government seems to be explained by 
the replacement of old-line politicians with university students.
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37. Leaders with popular representation
The percentage of politicians with agricultural or labor repre 
sentation from 1940 to the present has fluctuated between 10 and 20 
percent, with lowest levels during the Avila Camacho and de la 
Madrid regimes and the highest level during the Diaz Ordaz sexenio, 
with an overall average of 16 percent. The historic behavior seems 
to include two phases: one rising from 1940 to 1970 and one declin­
ing from 1970 to the present.
Leaders with Popular Representation
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P A R T I C I P A T I O N
The analysis of participation includes electoral and party be­
havior. It is assumed that an increase in abstentionism in an urban 
and educated society like modern Mexico is a negative sign, because 
it implies a lack of participation that can be due to apathy, in­
credulity or a rejection of political life. On the other hand, it i 
assumed that within certain margins, votes for the opposition in 
general and the left in particular --because of its ties to the 
popular strata-- as well as the formation of new parties indicate
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that participation is being channelled institutionally, which
1 * 1  2implies an improvement.
In contrast with elite plurality, participation has evolved fa­
vorably bpt not uniformly. It rose continuously until 1975 only to 
drop notably in 1976 and recover in 1982. This behavior is explained 
by the growing participation of the opposition in general and the 
left in particular, as well as in the progressive reduction in the 
level of electoral abstention and the moderate increase in the for­
mation of new parties. The conjunction of these four factors ex­
plains the rise in participation between 1940 and 1975.
The apparent acute decline in 1976 stemmed from the equally 
abrupt reduction in electoral participation by the opposition, 
caused by the absence of opposition presidential candidates in elec­
tions that year. In 1982, the participation curve shows an important 
recovery, thanks mainly to the democratizing effect of the political 
reform, which was expressed in a very participative presidential 
election, which in turn produced the highest percentage of votes for 
the opposition and for the left and a minimum rate of abstention, 
according to official figures. However, the unreliable official 
figures on abstention in 1988 pose a serious reliability problem for 
all previous available information.
38. Electoral abstention3
The official figures, which are not reliable but are the only 
ones available, show abstention in presidential elections between 
1940 and the present varied between 25 and 58 percent, with an aver­
age of 39 percent. The lowest levels came during the de la Madrid 
and Diaz Ordaz sexenios and the highest during the Ruiz Cortines and
2 For analyses of participation and elections Cfr Leher 1980, Granados Chapa
1982, Gonzalez Casanova 1985, Arriola 1985, Loaeza 1987, Nuncio 1987 and 
Lopez Moreno 1987.
3 Gonzalez Casanova 1967 P. 88, Idem 1985 P. 193 and Excelsior, July 13, 1988.
The 1958 value rose because suffrage was extended to women; the 1988 rise 
created a great controvery. The best consensus points to a high level of 
particiaption and a low increase in the number of fictitious votes.
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Lopez Mateos regimes. Two big cycles are observed: one of high ab­
stention from 1940 to 1958 and another of lower abstention from 1964 
to the present, with an overall downward trend. Abstention in Mexico 
has two modes: one passive, that would run from 1920 to 1960, as a 
product of a predominantly rural and dispersed society; another ac­
tive, that would run from 1960 to the present, stemming from an ur­
banized, politically mobilized society with the will to reject the 
system.
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39. Votes for the opposition1
Votes for the opposition varied between 6 and 29 percent from 
1934 to 1982, with low participation during the Avila Camacho and 
Lopez Portillo sexenios and moderate participation in those of 
Miguel Aleman, Ruiz Cortines and Miguel de la Madrid, who all sur­
passed the overall average of 15 percent. The low levels up to 1946 
probably are explained by the centralization of power within the 
triumphant groups of the revolution; after 1946 we find three 
twelve-year cycles: one of moderate opposition from 1946 to 1958;
4 Gonzalez Casanova 1967 P. 22 and Gonzalez Casanova 1985 P. 192.
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one of little opposition from 1958 to 1970; an atypical cycle that 
includes little and moderate opposition from 1970 to 1982. The peaks 
of 1950 and 1982 are explained by the postulation of oppositions 
candidates with relatively high profiles: Miguel Enriquez Guzman in 
the first< case and Pablo Emilio Madero in the second. The fall in 
1976 is explained by the absence of officially registered opposition 
party candidates in the presidential elections that year.
The case of 1988 is unique in its dimensions. In the first 
place, the biggest opposition emerged from an internal split within 
the PRI in a context of popular discontent, stemming from a severely 
restrictive set of economic policies. On the other hand, opposition 
votes have channeled toward Cardenism, a recent electoral phe­
nomenon, rather than toward the PAN with a longstanding opposition 
tradition.
Opposition Vote
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40. Votes for the left
The vote for the left has varied between 0.1 and 8.6 percent 
from 1940 to 1982 with an average of 2.3 percent and two cycles: one
5 Gonzalez Casanova 1967 P. 180 and Gonzalez Casanova 1985 P. 204.
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low and stable from 1940 to 1970 and one of relative growth from 
1970 to 1982, this last as a result of the political reform and the 
appearance and reorganization of leftist parties. Before 1970 the 
notable growth in votes for the left in the 1952 elections was due 
to the candidacy of Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The case of 1988 
breaks from the pattern of the period with the candidacy of 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas attracting almost 4 times more votes than the 
previous all-time high in 1982.
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41. Formation of new national parties
The formation of new national parties from 1940 to the present 
shows an average of 2.4 per sexenio, with two periods of intense 
formation: 1940 to 1958 and 1970 to the present. In this last pe­
riod, the emergence of new parties can be interpreted as a cushion 
to the political tensions stemming from 1968.6
6 Cfr Conchello 1975, Gonzalez Casanova 1981, Moreno 1982, Lajous 1985, Todo 
Mexico: 1985, P. 89, Carr 1986.
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42. The impeachment of state governors
The disqualification, dissolution or anticipated change of 
state powers from 1940 to the present has varied between 3 and 12 
with an average of 5.4 per sexenio. The sexenio of Diaz Ordaz regis-
, 7
ters the lowest number while that of Miguel Aleman the highest.
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7 Cfr Camp 1982 P. 426 and Ortiz Rocha 1973.
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PART THREE: PUBLIC OPINION
Throughout this work an attempt has been made to analyze the 
Mexican reality with objective criteria, without paying much atten­
tion to the necessarily subjective views held by different groups in 
the society. The first four chapters focused on qualitative histori­
cal information and the four subsequent chapters on statistical 
data. In this section, the perceptions of a representative sample of 
the population are analyzed against the encompassing objective real­
ity. The analysis reveals a heterogeneity in Mexican society that 
gives the nation capacity to resist the four crises studied here.
The differences among the different regions of the country are 
relatively well-known. The greater development of the regions of the 
north, compared with the majority of the central entities or the 
backward areas in the south. A brief review of the statistics indi­
cates that a great heterogeneity exists in health, education, hous­
ing, nutrition, urbanization, purchasing power, per-capita GDP and 
many other social and economic variables among the different enti­
ties, making it possible to distinguish comparable regions according 
to their states of development.
Much less know are the regional cultural and political differ­
ences that cut into and affect national life. Despite the fact that 
it is easy to assume that the social and economic heterogeneity 
would be correlated with cultural heterogeneity, this last topic has 
received little attention. To the present there is a dearth of in­
formation about the socio-cultural disparities that exist in the 
country, with only some exceptions.1
Heterogeneity is explored by comparing the responses to eight 
central themes contained in two national opinion polls taken in 1983
1 The work of Leopoldo Zea, Samuel Ramos, Abel&rdo Villegas, Pablo Latapi.
Octavio Paz, Carlos Fuentes, Luis Leftero Otero, Gilberto Jimenez, Frederick
Turner, Erich Fromm and Enrique Alduncin.
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and 1987 : 1) party preferences; 2) government approval rating; 3) 
opinion of the bank nationalization; 4) opinion of the right to 
strike; 5) opinion about church participation in politics; 6) opin­
ion of military participation in politics; 7) personal attitude to­
ward change; and 8) newspaper preference. The responses were ordered 
by social strata and later filtered by federal entity and geographic 
region, which facilitated the identification of large horizontal 
cleavages in the social pyramid and regional differences.
The social pyramid includes three large strata — popular, 
middle and elite—  which are each disaggregated into three sub­
strata because of important differences found within each stratum. 
The popular class includes three groups that conform to the Mexican 
social base: workers, peasants and marginals. The first two groups 
are relatively self-explanatory, while marginals include the 
underemployed who survive in urban centers thanks to a variety of 
activities outside of the formal sector and the unemployed who 
subsist on support from family networks. More generically, they 
include the rural population without land and the urban dwellers 
without jobs. The middle classes include professionals or 
technicians with credentials, private sector employees and public 
sector bureaucrats.
Finally, the elite includes three groups that direct Mexican 
society: business leaders who hold economic power; public func­
tionaries and political leaders who monopolize political power; and 
intellectuals3 — in the broad sense of the term: journalists, teach­
ers, analysts, artists, writers-- who have power over the formation, 
communication and transmission of ideas. Although in quantitative
2 See Appendix.
3 The business stratum in the sample comprises the results obtained from five
different groups in the private sector: business leaders (functionaries in 
business associations, congresses and management syndicates), industrial 
magnates, merchants, growers and ranchers, and service providers. Public 
functionaries include politicians at the highest level of federal, state and 
local administration as well as directors of political organizations, even 
if they are not clearly integrated into the state machinery.
164
4 . , . , ' , . .terms it is important to include housewifes and m  qualitative 
terms students, they were omitted from the data base to simplify the 
analysis.
It will be seen repeatedly that party preferences, opinion of 
the government and opinion about the bank nationalization changed 
substantially during the period for different reasons. Party prefer­
ence changed because the 1983 poll clearly captured the effects of 
the 1982 presidential campaign that translated into low abstention 
and high definition of preferences, while the 1987 poll found the 
contrary: high abstention and low definition of preferences. Opinion 
of the government changed in an important way, possibly as a result 
of the country’s difficult economic conditions during the period. 
Finally, the shift in opinion about the bank nationalization ex­
pressed the loss of initial enthusiasm, surely the result of 
confirming years later that the nationalization meant really little 
for the general public and the country, given the de la Madrid gov­
ernment's distaste for the measure.
It is valid to ask why three and not five or eight regions, 
when it is possible at times to identify socio-economic and socio­
cultural contrasts within the same state. A first response is prac­
tical. The breakdown of a large number of regions would have expo­
nentially multiplied the quantity of comparisons and analyses, ex­
ceeding the scope of this work. In addition, because of the essen­
tially exploratory character of this study, the presumption could 
not be risked of the existence of hypothetical regions that by 
chance might not be real or, on the contrary, disregard differences 
worthy of attention. As a result, three regions were chosen that 
have been commonly accepted as legitimate entities in economic and
4 37,000 Politician = 0.09 percent, 59,000 businessman ■» 0.13 percent, 689,000 
intellectual = 1.59 percent, 861,000 professional *= 1.99 percent, 2,685,000 
employee = 6.19 percent, 2,044,000 bureaucrat = 4.72 percent, 5,450,000 
worker = 12.57 percent, 5,498,000 campesino’« 12.61 percent, 9,035,000 
marginal * 20.93 percent, 15,988,000 housewifes *» 36.88 percent, 1,000,000 
students = 2.30 percent; this breakdown comes from the 1980 census.
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socio-demographic studies, without forgetting that within the three 
regions important sub-regional contrasts surely exist.5
The first region, which we have labeled north, includes the six 
border states with the United States of America, plus Baja 
California Sur. These seven states share many similarities, among 
them the most salient is their geographic proximity with the exte­
rior. Besides, they are states with standards of living above the 
national average, greater degrees of agricultural and industrial 
productivity, relatively minor social inequalities and little influ­
ence from the center of the country.
The second and without a doubt the most heterogeneous of the 
regions is called center. It includes the greatest number of states 
and is the most populous of the three areas and definitely could 
have been divided into two or more sub-regions. It is made up of the 
Federal District and the states on the immediate periphery of the 
political and cultural center of the country, plus the states of the 
west, north-center and Veracruz. Despite its heterogeneity it is 
possible, however, to find some similarities such as the great po­
litical, ideological and socio-cultural influence of Mexico City in 
this region compared with that in states farther north and south and 
the persistence of pronounced social inequalities in all of the 
states considered, exacerbated at times by the presence of important 
core industrial areas such as the valley of Mexico, Puebla and 
Guadalajara.
The third region, the south, is made up of the southern Pacific 
states and those of the Yucatan peninsula. In general, these are 
states with a much lower level of industrialization than in the 
north and center, with indexes of productivity, per-capita income, 
welfare and living standards far below the national average and with 
much more visible social inequalities. In recent years, the develop-
5 Perhaps the most careful breakdown of the country is Angel Bassols' 8 large 
divisions (1986 P. 370), which for the purposes of this study are aggregated 
into the three that are clearly distinguishable in terms of public opinion.
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ment of oil in Tabasco and in parts of Chiapas and the rise of 
tourism in Quintana Roo have helped reduce some of the socio-eco­
nomic backwardness of the region, although the characteristic signs 
have basically remained constant.
The identification of the political and socio-cultural differ­
ences between regions and between strata led to the inference that 
cross tabulations of both series would yield significant results. In 
effect, they revealed notable variations in the perceptions of each 
strata with its correspondent region. They also showed that the 
differences among distinct strata are not uniform in each of the re­
gions, tending on occasion to attenuate and on others to polarize. 
This third part shows the differences that exist between the dis­
tinct strata in the same region and within the similar strata of the 
three different national regions for each of the chosen topics. 
Chapter 8 includes differences of opinion by region and by strata; 
Chapter 9 outlines public opinion in 1983; Chapter 10 outlines pub­
lic opinion in 1987.
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8. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION 
Regional differences
Regarding the question in 1983, Which political party do you 
prefer?, the PRI continued being the party with the majority of sym­
pathizers: 55.3 percent of those interviewed said they preferred the 
PRI, while 10.5 percent cited the PAN and 2 6.1 percent said none. 
Behind the PAN was the PSUM with 3.8 percent. The other parties en­
joyed little popularity, oscillating between 1.3 percent for the PST 
and 0.5 percent for the PMT. In 1987, the results were very differ­
ent, with preferences for the PRI suffering an acute drop, falling 
to 29.6 percent of the total and losing the majority. However, the 
reduction in preferences for the PRI did not result in an increase 
for other parties. The PAN registered a slight drop from 10.5 to
10.3 percent and the PMS, successor of the PSUM, only increased its 
margin from 3.8 to 4 percent, which could be due to the fact that 
the new party included several organizations that acted indepen­
dently in 1983. The rest of the parties considered together went 
from 4.3 to 9.6 percent.
Party Preference 
PRI PAN PSUM OTHERS NONE
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 48.2 36.2 16.4 16.9 2.7 1.4 3.2 5.5 29.6 39.9
CENTER' 56.9 26.0 9.8 8.6 4.2 4.8 4.4 10.6 24.6 50.1
SOUTH 56.5 37.8 6.5 10.3 3.1 3.2 5.2 9.3 28.6 39.4
NATIONAL 55.3 29.6 10.5 10.2 3.8 4.0 4.3 9.6 26.1 46.7
This important increase could have originated in better 
organization on behalf of several parties: the new PMS and PST and 
the renovated PDM on one hand, and the traditional but 
governmentally reinforced PARM and PPS. Nonetheless, it was the 
abstentionist option none that registered the greatest increase, 
from 26.1 to 46.7 percent, suggesting not a shift in party prefer-
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ences in the population but the important effect that the presiden­
tial campaigns had had on the electorate.
In 1983, in the three regions considered, the north held the 
largest number of PAN sympathizers and the least number for the PRI. 
Among all those interviewed in the region, 16.4 percent indicated a 
preference for the PAN compared with the national average of 10.5 
percent, while only 48.2 percent compared with a national average of
55.3 percent preferred the PRI. Sympathies for the other parties 
were very low, varying between 2.7 percent for the PSUM and barely 
0.2 percent for the PMT and the PRT. It was in the center where the 
PRI reached its highest number of sympathizers with 56.9 percent and 
also where the leftist parties made their best gains, especially the 
PSUM with 4.2 percent of the preferences. The PAN only won 9.8 per­
cent of the preferences, a percentage substantially lower than in 
the north (16.4 percent) and than the national average (10.5). The 
PAN obtained the least number of sympathizers in the south (6.5 per­
cent) , while the PRI reached a slightly lower percentage in the 
south than in the central zone but higher than in the north (56.5 
percent). The PSUM won a larger share of sympathizers than in the 
north (3.1 percent) although not as much as in the center.
In 1987, the regional distribution of sympathies changed sig­
nificantly for reasons mentioned. Although preferences for the PRI 
dropped in the*three regions, it was in the north, paradoxically, 
where the reduction was least: from 48.2 percent to 36.2 percent, a 
decline of 12 points. In the south PRI support fell from 56.5 per­
cent to 37.8 percent (18.7 points), but it was in the center — the 
most populous region-- where the PRI suffered its severest setback: 
from 56.9 percent to 26 percent, a drop of 30.9 points. From being 
the region with the greatest margin of PRI sympathizers, the center 
became the area with the lowest proclivity for the PRI, much less 
even than in the north. The PAN slightly raised its support in the 
north (16.4 to 16.9 percent) and in a more pronounced way in the 
south (6.5 to 10.3 percent), but it experienced a setback in the 
center, falling from 9.8 to 8.6 percent. The PMS lost popularity in
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the north (2.7 to 1.4 percent) but gained some in the center (4.2 to
4.3 percent) and in the south (3.1 to 3.2 percent). The none re­
sponse registered massive increases in the three regions, with the 
south being the most notable: The number of respondents who ex­
pressed their skepticism about all political parties rose from 24.6 
percent (the lowest in 1983) to 40.7 (the highest in 1987) in the 
center of the country.
To the question in 1983, How would you rate the current govern­
ment?, the national level response was 41.6 percent good or very 
good, 35.3 percent fair and only 14 percent rated the government 
negatively (bad or very bad). The most negative response came from 
the north (18.6 percent bad or very bad) and only 36.4 percent good 
or very good. The center registered the intermediate response with
42.5 percent favorable opinions and 13.8 percent negative, while the 
south was the region where the government was most popular with 43.2 
percent favorable opinions and only 9.2 percent negative opinions.
Government Approval
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 36.4 33.4 38.4 34.0 18.6 28.3 6.6 4.1
CENTER 42.5 27.2 33.7 34.3 13.8 30.9 10.0 7.5
SOUTH 43.2 33.9 39.6 36.1 9.2 22.3 8.0 7.6
NATIONAL 41.6 29.3 35.3 34.6 14.0 29.2 9.1 6.9
By 1987 things had changed. Along with shifts in party sympa­
thies, the government lost popularity in the three regions with a 
drop in favorable opinions and an increase in negative ones. At the 
national level, the favorable responses dropped from 41.6 to 29.3 
percent, while the unfavorable opinions rose from 14 to 29.2 per­
cent. It was once again in the center region where the government 
lost the most favorable responses, going from 42.5 to 27.2 percent - 
-a drop of 15.3 points. In the north positive opinions barely 
dropped, going from 36.4 to 33.4 percent, and in the south they fell 
from 43.2 to 33.9 percent, a setback of 9.3 points. Negative re­
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sponses themselves grew in all three regions: almost 10 points in 
the north, 17 points in the center and 13 points in the south.
In the first two months following the decree, the bank nation­
alization was supported widely by the population. To the question, 
The bank nationalization seems to be a .... measure?. 52 percent of 
those interviewed said they favored it, while only 11.3 percent said 
they opposed it and 19.2 percent described it as fair. If the non­
negative responses (fair and good) are summed, the approval rating 
is a very pronounced 71.2 percent.
The bank nationalization --as the right to strike, government 
approval rating, and the majority of the other political-ideological 
themes—  was less popular in the north than in the center and in 
both regions than in the south. This variable confirmed once again 
the correlation between geography and culture in our country, as it 
was not only supported less but rejected most in the north than in 
the rest of the nation. Only 5.1 percent of those interviewed in the 
south expressed a negative opinion of the bank nationalization, 
while 11.7 in the center and 15.2 percent in the north rejected it. 
Backing for the bank nationalization reached 48.6 percent in the 
north against 52.6 percent in the south and 52.8 percent in the cen­
ter .
Bank Nationalization
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 48.6 29.8 18.5 22.5 15.2 33.2 17.8 14.5
CENTER 52.8 30.4 18.9 23.0 19.9 28.2 16.5 18.3
SOUTH 52.4 40.3 21.5 21.5 5.1 18.0 20.9 20.2
NATIONAL 52.0 32.0 19.2 22.7 11.3 27.4 17.5 18.0
By 1987, however, public opinion of the bank nationalization 
had changed substantially. The favorable responses dropped 20 
points, hitting 32 percent, while the negative responses rose 27.4 
points. In this case, and in contrast with party preferences and
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government approval, the north remained the most skeptical of the 
three regions. In fact, unfavorable responses (33.2 percent) sur­
passed favorable ones (29.8 percent), which did not happen in the 
other regions. In the center, favorable responses dropped 22.4 
points and negatives rose 16.5; in the south the respective percent­
age changes were 12.1 and 12.9, leaving this region as the most 
amenable to the bank nationalization.
Right to Strike.
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 52.8 57.1 20.9 20.6 15.5 15.2 10.7 7.1
CENTER 56.4 58.9 16.1 17.2 12.2 13.5 15.3 10.3
SOUTH 62.1 60.5 17.8 18.2 10.4 10.8 9.6 10.5
NATIONAL 56.6 58.9 17.2 17.9 12.4 13.4 13.8 9.8
To the question, You believe the right to strike is...?, the 
nation expressed a high consensus, judging by the results of both 
polls. In 1987, favorable responses reached 58.9 percent, while only
13.4 percent responded negatively. As in the cases of government ap­
proval and preference for the PRI, the right to strike lost popular­
ity moving from south to north. The south registered the highest 
percentage of favorable responses (60.5), with the center coming in 
at 58.9 and the north at 57.1 percent. The level of negative re­
sponses came in inverse order: they were least in the south (10.8 
percent), intermediate in the center (13.5) and greatest in the 
north (15.2) .
Church Participation
GOOD SOMETIMES BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 3.2 18.1 22.1 12.7 62.5 61.8 12.2 7.5
CENTER 3.7 11.4 20.5 9.2 66.1 69.5 9.7 9.9
SOUTH 4.4 15.1 20.5 10.5 68.5 63.4 6.6 10.9
NATIONAL 3.7 13.1 20.8 10.0 65.8 67.3 9.7 9.7
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Both the 1983 and 1987 polls revealed a broad rejection to the 
question: how do you feel about the church participating in poli­
tics? In 1987, 67.3 percent of those interviewed were openly opposed 
to such participation while only 13.1 percent approved it, almost 4 
times more than in 1983. Another 10 percent conceded that the church 
could intervene at times in politics. By region, we find that the 
north registered the most tolerance to church participation in poli­
tics — favorable responses were the highest among the three regions 
(18.1 percent) and negatives were the lowest at 61.8 percent—  fol­
lowed by the south. The center was the region most averse to church 
intervention, registering the highest disapproval (69.5 percent) and 
the lowest approval (11.4 percent).
Military Participation.
GOOD FAIR BAD DK NA
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 14.2 22.8 18.4 17.5 37.1 47.5 4.1 6.9 24.2 5.3
CENTER 23.6 16.4 20.2 12.6 46.0 57.0 4.2 7.6 5.8 6.4
SOUTH 26.3 26.4 24.1 15.8 43.6 42.7 3.9 7.1 2.2 8.0
NATIONAL 22.7 19.1 20.5 13.9 44.2 53.2 4.2 7.4 8.5 6.5
Although not to the same extent as church participation in pol­
itics, the political participation of the military was also rejected 
by the majority. In 1987, 53.2 percent of those interviewed rejected 
the idea, while 191 percent approved it; in this case, however, it 
was in the south where military intervention was least unpopular 
with 26.4 percent in favor and 42.7 percent opposed, followed by the 
north. The center was revealed as the region least inclined toward 
political activity by the military, similar to the church participa­
tion issue. This fact would tend to confirm that the ideological le­
gacy of the post-revolutionary State continued being strongest in 
the center of the country and in the regions nearby than on the out­
skirts .
To the question in 1983, In your opinion, what we should do now 
is...?, the majority of the sample favored changes at the national
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level, but not necessarily radical ones. The most popular response 
was to change some things and conserve others, which, when added to 
the percentage of responses to the choice slightly change things, 
totaled 57.3 percent. However, 30.4 percent of the respondents fa­
vored radical change; in contrast, only 8.8 percent picked conserve 
as much as possible and an even smaller percentage (3.5) opted for 
leave everything the way it is. In total, the conservatives repre­
sented only 12.3 percent of those interviewed.
Attitude Toward Change 
Radical * Moderate Conservative
83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 34.8 25.8 57.4 56.5 7.8 17.6
CENTER 30.0 23.3 57.2 60.8 12.9 15.9
SOUTH 26.9 23.7 58.0 60.4 15.1 16.0
NATIONAL 30.4 23.72 57.3 60.07 12.3 16.21
* Radical here does not mean leftist, but willingness for change.
In agreement with the regional classification adopted here, we 
find the inclination toward radical change rises moving from south 
to north. Those favoring radical change were 2 6.9 percent in the 
south, 30 percent in the center and 34.8 percent in the north. In 
the same sense, those who preferred to keep things as they are were
15.1 percent in the south, 12.9 percent in the center and only 7.8 
percent in the,north. This paints a very clear tendency: The desire 
to introduce fundamental changes at the national level were greater 
in the north than in the center; and in both cases, greater than in 
the south.
In 1987 the level of radical responses dropped in the three re­
gions and there was an increase in the percentages of moderates and 
conservatives. It is not easy to explain this shift toward conser­
vatism within the Mexican population, above all if it is considered 
that the approval rating of the same government in power dropped, 
except for its international influence. The north continued being 
the region most inclined toward radical change (25.8 percent),
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though it came to be the area with the highest index of conservative 
responses (17.6 percent), which suggests a major polarization of at­
titudes in that region compared with the other two.
The influence of newspapers published in the nation's capital 
is very great in practically all parts of the country. More than 50 
percent of those who read a daily prefer one from the capital. In 
contrast, only 28.5 percent of those interviewed in 1987 named a lo­
cal periodical. Among the capital dailies included in the survey —  
those that we could call national newspapers-- the most read was 
Excelsior, which could be described as center on the partisan polit­
ical scale, followed by Novedades, which could be described as 
right. The other national periodicals received much less support.
Newspaper Preference.
EXCELSIOR NOVEDADES OTHER NAL LOCAL NA
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
NORTH 11.9 8.4 12.5 2.5 24.1 41.2 43.6 39.9 7.9 8.2
CENTER 19.1 11.4 10.9 4.9 46.2 47.8 15.1 22.4 8.7 13.4
SOUTH 19.8 10.5 20.3 8.0 23.9 25.8 24.6 42.5 11.4 13.4
NATIONAL 18.0 10.7 12.5 5.0 39.3 43.3 21.2 28.5 9.0 12.5
In the regions considered, we find a relatively high preference 
for local newspapers in the south (42.5 percent) and less for the 
nationals. In the north as well there is a clear preference for lo­
cal dailies (39.9 percent). The center, as could be expected, is 
where the national dailies have the highest percentage of readers, 
in contrast with a low percentage for local newspapers (22.4 per­
cent) . Two great tendencies seem apparent: one that points toward a 
reduction of readers from the traditional large newspapers 
(Excelsior and Novedades) to other nationals and, another, that 
indicates a growing preference for local newspapers, except in the 
north.
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Social differences
The following figure highlights in the first column the loss of 
sympathy for the PRI between 1983 and 1987 (from 55 to 30 percent), 
which is similar to the reduction in the percent of radicals in the 
same period (from 30 to 20), as is observed two figures back, and as 
well in the drop in the favorable rating of the government (from 42 
to 29), as is seen two figures ahead.
On the other hand, in 1983 the PRI reached its highest levels 
of popularity, as would be expected, among public functionaries and 
politicians, three-fourths of whom (74.9 percent) openly declared 
their sympathies for the government party. Among businessmen, pref­
erences for the PRI nonetheless reached 50.9 percent, with the low­
est levels among merchants (46.5 percent) and in the service sector 
(47.1). The lower affinity for the PRI among businessmen explains 
why sympathies for the party among elites only hit 62.9 percent. 
Nonetheless, this percentage was greater than that for the middle 
strata (57 percent) and the base (54).
Party Sympathy
PRI PAN PSUM OTHERS NONE
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Government 74.9 52.1 5.4 4.0 4.1 3.0 1.0 7.3 10.9 32.6
Business 50.9 31.7 13.5 11.0 2.8 2.9 0.8 11.0 28.7 43.4
Intelectual N.D 23.3 N.D 9.6 N.D 7.3 N.D 8.4 N.D 51.4
Professional 53.7 27.4 8.5 9.0 5.1 4.7 3.4 7.5 29.4 51.4
White Collar 50.2 28.5 9.4 11.6 5.8 2.8 8.0 9.9 26.6 47.4
Civil Servant 67.1 33.6 5.3 6.9 5.3 4.8 1.8 8.7 20.4 46.0
Blue Collar 52.7 21.9 14.9 14.7 4.7 6.3 5.2 11.6 22.4 45.4
Fanner 643 29.5 7.3 9.4 2.8 2.7 3.5 7.7 22.0 50.8
Unemployed 44.8 23.6 10.9 12.4 4.6 2.2 7.9 6.5 31.6 55.2
National 55.3 29.6 10.5 10.2 3.8 4.0 4.3 9.6 26.1 46.7
Regarding the PAN, its results among elites contrasted. Among 
public functionaries only 5.4 percent sympathized with the PAN, but 
support from business hit 13.5 percent, the second highest percent­
age among all strata with labor coming in at (14.9). The PSUM gained
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4.1 percent of functionaries and barely 2.8 percent of business for 
an average of 3.4 percent of elite sympathies.
Among the middle strata, the PRI had the most sympathies among 
bureaucrats (67.1 percent), but only obtained 50.2 percent of the 
employees and 53.7 percent of the professionals and technicians.
This made its average among the middle strata around 57 percent, 
less than that for the elite. Regarding the PAN, its average level 
of support among the middle strata was 5.3 percent, less than among 
the elites, given the low level of sympathy among bureaucrats (5.3) 
and the relatively high level of support among professionals and 
technicians (8.5 percent) and employees (9.4 percent). The PSUM 
reached its largest level of sympathies among the middle strata, 
especially among employees (5.8 percent), but followed closely by 
bureaucrats (5.3 percent) and professionals or technicians (5.1 per­
cent) .
Sympathies for the PRI at the base (54 percent) were even less 
than those among the middle strata and were markedly lower among the 
marginals (44.8 percent), while workers preferred the PRI in 52.7 
percent of the cases. If the average at the base was not even lower, 
it was because the campesinos remained loyal to the PRI (64.5 per­
cent) . Regarding the PAN, its support at the base was surprisingly 
greater than among the middle and elite strata: 11 percent. The 
strata that expressed the greatest level of preference for the party 
was labor (14.9 percent), a higher percentage than business regis­
tered. The marginals as well sympathized with the PAN in 10.9 per­
cent of the cases. The third highest source of PAN support came form 
the campesinos at 7.3 percent. For the PSUM, things did not bode 
well among the popular strata. Only 2.8 percent of the campesinos 
(similar to the level of business support) sympathized with PSUM, 
along with 4.6 percent of marginals and 4.7 percent of labor. Its 
average level of preference at the base was 4 percent, appreciably 
less than that from the middle strata.
177
As was indicated before, sympathies for the PRI suffered a 
marked erosion between 1983 and 1987 which should not be interpreted 
as a change in preference as much as an increase in political 
indifference, abstention or apathy for reasons cited above. In each 
one of the strata in the social pyramid the setback in sympathies 
for the PRI was evident. Politicians maintained the highest level of
support for the PRI and in fact only they remained above 50 percent.
Business, which in 1983 had registered among the lowest levels of 
support for the PRI, changed its relative position in 1987, not so
much by increasing its level of support but by not dropping off as
much as the majority of the other strata (31.7 percent) . 
Intellectuals, who figured only in the 1987 poll, registered very 
little sympathy for the PRI: 23 percent, which was only higher than 
that of labor. On average, the three elite strata preferred the 
party in power in 36.6 percent of the cases, an overall percentage 
higher than that of the middle and lower strata.
Regarding the PAN, the party's setback among elites was no- 
table. Its sympathies among politicians fell to 4 percent (5.4 per­
cent in 1983) and among businessmen to 11 percent (13.5 percent in 
1983) . Intellectuals, however, showed relatively high preferences 
for the PAN (9.6 percent) which did not keep the PAN average among 
elites from dropping to 8.2 percent. The PMS improved its perfor­
mance among elites in 1987. This was due not to its sympathies among 
politicians, which fell to 3 percent, or among businessmen, which 
remained constant at 2.9 percent, but because of the inclusion of 
intellectuals who supported the PMS at the rate of 7.3 percent — the 
best result for the PMS at the top of the social pyramid. In fact, 
the elites came to be the sector with the highest index of support 
for the PMS, surpassing that of the middle and lower strata.
Among the middle strata, the bureaucrats maintained their posi­
tion of closest affinity to the PRI, albeit at a very reduced rate 
from 1983: 33.6 percent. Among employees PRI preferences fell to
28.5 percent and among professionals it fell further still: to 27.4 
percent. On average, the middle strata preferred the PRI in 2 9.8
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percent of the cases. For the PAN, things improved considerably: all 
three middle strata registered increases in preferences for the 
party. Nine percent of professionals opted for PAN, 11.6 percent of 
the employees (the third highest percentage) and 6.9 percent of the 
bureaucrats. On average, the middle strata supported the PAN in 9.2 
percent of the cases. The PMS, on the other hand, experienced a 
marked setback among the middle sectors. It lost support among the 
three middle strata, falling to only 4.7 percent among profession­
als, 4.8 percent among bureaucrats and barely 2.8 percent among em­
ployees, for an average of 4.1 percent compared with 5.4 percent in 
1983.
At the base PRI sympathies averaged barely 25 percent, being 
particularly low among workers (21.9 percent) and marginals (23.6 
percent) and relatively high among campesinos (29.5 percent).
Workers came to be the strata less inclined toward the PRI, surpass­
ing the marginals who had occupied the spot in 1983, followed by em­
ployees and business. Workers themselves maintained their position 
as most supportive of the PAN: 14.7 percent, although the level was 
slightly less than in 1983 (14.9). On the other hand, the PAN im­
proved its cut among the marginals (12.4 percent) and even among the 
campesinos (9.6 percent), for an average of 12.2 percent of the 
preferences at the base. Together the middle and base strata seem to 
be more closely tied to the PAN today than five years ago, in con­
trast with changes at the elite level.
The PMS gained considerably among labor, with an increase to
6.3 percent of worker preferences; nonetheless, this advance was 
counteracted by a loss of popularity among marginals: to 2.2 percent 
from 4.6 in 1983. Among campesinos, things stayed about the same:
2.7 percent. The setback among marginals meant that preferences for 
the PMS remained almost constant: 4 percent, compared with 3.8 in 
1983.
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Government Opinion 
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Government 59.2 60.2 27.6 22.2 9.2 14.1 3.9 3.4
Business 39.2 31.2 35.7 33.8 15.3 29.0 9.7 5.9
Intelectual N.D 30.0 N.D 33.2 N.D 28.8 N.D 7.0
Professional 43.9 28.1 35.2 34.7 17.7 31.5 3.2 5.7
White Collar 39.6 26.1 37.6 39.0 15.2 28.4 7.6 6.5
Civil Servant 48.3 34.7 32.3 31.9 14.5 27.1 5.0 6.2
Blue Collar 32.7 23.8 39.1 39.6 16.4 31.5 11.8 5.1
Farmer 40.3 21.1 30.6 40.0 6.8 30.8 22.2 8.1
Unemployed 36.7 19.6 36.8 35.0 15.1 33.3 11.3 11.8
National 41.6 29.3 35.3 34.6 14.0 29.2 9.1 6.9
As in the case of the PRI, government popularity drops from top 
to bottom of the social pyramid. In 1983, we found the highest level 
of favorable opinions among elites, led by the strata of public 
functionaries and political leaders (59.2 percent). Nonetheless, the 
second elite strata (business) was much more skeptical of the gov­
ernment, granting it only a 39.2 percent approval rating. The aver­
age among both strata was 4 9.2 percent, greater, as has been said, 
than among the middle strata and greater still than among the lower 
strata. Regarding negative opinions, the same contrast is observed. 
Only 9.2 percent of the public functionaries and political leaders 
responded negatively, compared with 15.3 percent of entrepreneurs 
(one of the highest). The average of unfavorable opinions was 12.2 
percent, which is less than that among the middle and lower strata, 
which correlates with previous results.
Among the middle strata, positive opinions of the government 
were registered in 43.9 percent of the cases. The bureaucrats were 
the most positive (48.3 percent), followed by professionals (43,9 
percent). On the other hand, only 39.6 percent of employees (a per­
centage similar to that of business) spoke well of the government. 
Although the favorable opinions of the middle strata were not lower 
than those at the base, we find the negative opinions (15.8 percent) 
highest here among the three groups. Professionals were the most 
critical (17.7 percent) among all strata, but employees (15.2 per­
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cent) and bureaucrats (14.5 percent) showed high levels of govern­
ment rejection.
The base had the lowest level of positive responses (36.6 per­
cent), although unfavorable opinions (12.8 percent) were not as 
abundant as in the middle strata. Campesinos were — as in the case 
of the PRI—  the most favorable to the government (40.3 percent), 
followed by marginals (36.7 percent); workers expressed, among all 
strata, the lowest percent of positive responses: 32.7 percent. The 
workers also were the most critical (16.4 percent negative opinions) 
at the base, only surpassed by professionals among all strata. The 
marginals expressed negative views in 15.1 percent of the cases and 
campesinos only did so in 6.8 percent, revealing themselves again as 
the great bastion of legitimacy for the regime.
In 1987 as in 1983 the elites continued being the group tied 
most closely to the government, although in reduced numbers. 
Politicians remained the strata with the highest index of favorable 
opinions (60.2 percent, slightly higher than in 1983), but on the 
other hand, approval dropped to 31.2 percent among business; intel­
lectuals expressed positive opinions in 30 percent of the cases. On 
average, elite support for the government hit 40.5 percent — highest 
among all three strata owing, above all, to the predictable support 
from the politicians. Regarding negative opinions, intellectuals 
were the most critical strata at 29.8 percent, followed very closely 
by business at 29 percent. The politicians were the least critical 
sub-strata in the elite (14.1 percent) and throughout the entire so­
cial pyramid.
Among the middle strata positive opinions fell to 29.6 percent 
and the negatives grew to almost the same figure: 29 percent. The 
bureaucrats continued being the strata most favorable to the govern­
ment with 34.7 percent approval. Among professionals, the percent 
was 28.1 and only 26.1 among employees. Negative responses were 
higher than positive ones among these last two sub-strata, reaching
31.1 and 28.4 respectively.
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As in the case with the PRI, the base registered the most skep­
tical responses against the government. Only 21.5 percent of those 
interviewed in this level expressed positive opinions about the gov­
ernment, while 31.9 percent were critical, percentages that, in con­
trast with those of 1983, show a clear erosion of support for the 
government among the most populous sectors of society. Among 
marginals, positive opinions barely reached 19.6 percent (the lowest 
among all strata) and negatives rose to 33.3 percent (the highest); 
among campesinos the setback was more marked, with favorable re­
sponses dropping from 40.3 percent in 1983 to 21.1 percent in 1987 
and negatives rising from only 6.8 percent in 1983 to 30.8 percent 
in 1987. The labor strata became the least averse to the government 
although negative responses (31.5 percent) exceeded positive ones 
(23.8).
And so, a direct relationship can be established between socio­
economic level and support for the government. As we descend the so­
cial ladder, we find less favorable opinions of the government, 
which was already evident in 1983. Nonetheless, the 1987 poll reit­
erated that in the broad strata at the base the government already 
had lost the balance in its favor between negative and positive re­
sponses. Perhaps the clearest case is that of the workers who had 
changed its positions more than any other group, revealing perhaps a 
very low degree of class consciousness.
In 1983 an acute contrast is observed between the positions of 
two elite strata: public functionaries and politicians were the most 
enthusiastic defenders of the bank nationalization, while en­
trepreneurs were its biggest critics. The first group responded fa­
vorably to the bank nationalization in 72.4 percent of the cases, 
while the second group in only 43.2 percent. Despite this, the aver­
age level of support for the measure among elites (59.2 percent) was 
greater than that among the middle and lower strata.
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Bank Nationalization.
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Government 72.4 47.3 14.9 20.4 7.6 25.5 5.2 6.7
Business 43.2 33.7 21.7 20.8 18.5 30.6 16.4 14.7
Intelectual N.D. 39.0 N.D. 25.6 N.D. 28.7 N.D. 6.6
Professional/ 32.4 19.4 28.5 12.8 29.8 8.3 9.3
White Collar 48.4 31.7 20.5 24.1 9.6 27.7 21.4 16.4
Civil Servant 60.5 33.7 19.5 23.5 6.3 30.1 13.4 12.5
Blue Collar 54.8 28.3 17.8 28.0 4.8 25.3 31.6 18.4
Fanner 51.1 21.5 11.4 17.8 4.0 15.8 33.5 45.0
Unemployed
National
49.3 24.3 17.5 18.5 3.5 23.2 29.4 34.0
52.0 32.0 19.2 22.7 11.3 27.4 17.5 18.0
The difference between functionaries and business also sharply 
contrasts on the negative side. The average of negative responses 
was barely 7.6 percent, while business criticized the measure in
18.5 percent of the cases, the highest level among all strata. The 
relatively frequent expression of unfavorable views among en­
trepreneurs drove the overall average of negative responses among 
elites to 12.3 percent, also the highest level among all three 
strata.
The middle strata showed less enthusiasm for the bank national­
ization, but also were less critical. Favorable opinions averaged
57.4 percent and negatives 9.8, both less than among elites. The ma­
jor supporters of the nationalization were bureaucrats (60.5 per­
cent), followed by professionals (59.5 percent). Employees only sup­
ported it in 51.5 percent of the cases. However, regarding negative 
opinions, professionals were most critical (12.8 percent), followed 
by employees (9.7 percent) and in last place bureaucrats at 6.3 per­
cent .
Among the popular strata the bank nationalization seems to have 
awakened relatively minor interest, considering that support as well 
as opposition were much lower than in the middle and elite strata. 
The marginals supported it in 4 9.3 percent of the cases, which was 
less than the campesinos (51.1 percent) and workers (54.8 percent). 
Labor was also relatively more critical, with 4.8 percent unfavor­
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able opinions, followed by campesinos at 4 percent and marginals at 
3.5. Negative responses at the base barely averaged 4.1 percent and 
positives reached 48.7 percent, slightly higher than that among the 
middle strata.
Approval of the bank nationalization changed radically from 
1983 to 1987. All strata registered drops in favorable indices and 
increases in negative opinions. Politicians modified their positions 
to the greatest degree with only 47.3 percent expressing approval in 
1987 compared with 72.4 percent in 1983, while 25.5 percent disap­
proved in 1987 compared with only 7.6 percent in 1983. Business con­
tinued being the most critical sector of this federal government de­
cision. Their negative opinions were most intense (30.6 percent), 
although their positive opinions were not among the lowest. 
Intellectuals expressed a moderate attitude of the nationalization, 
with 39 percent positive responses (the second highest percentage) 
and 28.7 percent critical, also one of the highest percentages. 
Together, the elites constituted the stratum where the nationaliza­
tion enjoyed the most support (40 percent), much more than in the 
middle and lower strata.
In 1987, as in 1983, the middle strata supported the national­
ization less, but also criticized the measure less than the elites. 
Though the balance between negative and positive responses changed 
considerably -▼to the point of practically equaling each other—  bu­
reaucrats, who were the main supporters of the nationalization in 
1983, became the most critical sector of the measure registering the 
highest percentage of negative responses (30.1) in the middle strata 
and the second highest throughout the entire social pyramid, just 
behind business. It is probable that the growth in the number of 
university students has provoked among the middle classes a 
strengthening of a more independent set of attitudes than is 
expressed in a topic like this.
At the base, once again in 1983, the positive and negative 
opinions were, both, the lowest among the three levels, confirming
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the fact that the nationalization stirred and maintained much less 
interest among the less-privileged groups. Workers, campesinos and 
marginals supported the nationalization in 24.7 percent of the cases 
and criticized it in 21.4 percent (a percentage much higher than the
4.1 percent in 1983). Campesinos were distinguished as the strata 
furthest from the bank nationalization, registering the lowest mar­
gins of support (21.5 percent) and criticism (15.8 percent) in the 
entire social pyramid.
•
As in the case of the bank nationalization, public opinion 
about the right to strike tended to polarize at both ends of the so­
cial pyramid. The highest level of support is found among elites, 
but also the highest rejection rate of this labor weapon. Public 
functionaries were its biggest supporters in 1983 (74.6 percent) and 
business was one of the strata least convinced of the necessity of 
this right (50.2 percent). Regarding negative opinions, business 
registered the highest percentage (15.9 percent), while public func­
tionaries and political leaders the lowest at 8.1 percent. The elite 
averages were 62.4 percent for and 12 percent against.
Right to Strike.
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Governments 74.6 62.0 11.8 13.7 8.1 19.8 5.2 4.6
Business 50.2 56.7 20.2 18.8 15.9 14.8 13.7 9.8
Intelectual N.D. 66.8 N.D. 15.8 N.D. 12.4 N.D. 5.0
Professional 65.7 65.9 16.0 19.2 9.6 7.8 8.6 7.2
White Collar 51.4 59.3 16.0 21.4 14.0 10.3 18.6 9.1
Civil Servant 64.6 69.0 15.6 13.4 8.3 9.6 11.5 8.0
Blue Collar 65.1 56.2 13.6 20.2 9.5 15.1 11.8 8.4
Farmer 38.7 44.0 16.9 23.0 10.7 11.8 33.8 21.4
Unemployed 49.0 53.2 19.8 17.7 14.7 13.0 16.5 16.0
National 56.6 58.9 17.2 17.9 12.4 13.4 13.8 9.8
Among the middle strata, professionals were the biggest sup­
porters of the right to strike (65.7 percent); bureaucrats supported 
it in 64.6 percent of the cases and employees were the least enthu­
siastic middle stratum, registering positive opinions in only 51.4 
percent of the cases. Employees also were the most critical with 14
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percent negative opinions. Professionals rejected the right to 
strike 9.6 percent of the time and bureaucrats 8.3. The averages for 
the middle strata were 60.6 percent for and 10.6 percent against, 
both less than the elite averages.
The lowest indices of support for the right to strike in 1983 
were registered at the base. Among campesinos, the percentage of fa­
vorable opinions barely reached 38.7 percent, significantly less 
than that for business. The marginals only supported it in 49 per­
cent of the cases, another percentage lower than that of business. 
Only workers registered a majority of positive opinions, which can 
be easily explained by their personal stake in the right to strike, 
supporting it in 65.1 percent of the cases. The negative responses 
to the right to strike were higher at the base (11.6 percent) than 
among the middle strata. Marginals rejected it 14.7 percent of the 
time, a percentage only surpassed by business. Campesinos were crit­
ical in 10.7 and workers in 9.5 percent of the cases. It is inter­
esting to note that public functionaries, bureaucrats and 
professionals were less critical of the right to strike than were 
workers themselves.
Although profound differences are found between the 1983 and 
1987 results regarding party sympathies and opinion of the bank na­
tionalization, the tendencies remained firm concerning the right to 
strike, showing only minor differences in the responses from one 
year to the other. This fact should be taken seriously in evaluating 
the general results of both polls.
Among elites, the average of favorable opinions to the right to 
strike was 61.8 percent in 1987 compared with 62.4 percent in 1983; 
considering everything, it is worthwhile to mention some changes 
that, although small, should not go unobserved. Among public func­
tionaries the right to strike lost points, converting this stratum 
from the most favorable to the most critical. Its positive opinions 
dropped from 74.6 percent to 62 percent and the negatives rose from
8.1 to 19.8 percent, the highest in 1987. However, the overall re­
186
suits among elites do not change much, thanks to the inclusion of 
intellectuals in 1987, who were revealed as the most favorable sec­
tor to the right to strike (66.8 percent) and one of the least crit­
ical (12.4 percent); business, for its part, improved its position 
by increasing positive opinions 6.5 points (to 56.7 percent) and 
slightly reducing negative opinions from 15.9 to 14.8 percent.
Public opinion of the right to strike also improved among the 
middle strata, with marginal increases in positive responses among 
all three sub-strata and reductions of negative responses in two of 
the three. Bureaucrats were most identified with the right to strike 
(69 percent support) among all strata and their negative opinions 
(9.6 percent) were counted among the least critical. Employees con­
tinued being the least favorable among the middle strata.
Together, the base maintained its position: 51.1 percent favor­
able opinions (50.9 percent in 1983) and 13.3 negative (11.6 percent 
in 1983). Nonetheless, it was notable that worker support of strikes 
lost 9 points and rejection gained more than 5 points, although such 
results were offset by an increase in favorable opinions among cam­
pesinos and marginals. The loss of credibility of the right to 
strike among workers could have been due to the poor image that 
strikers created in recent years.
In accordance with the 1983 results, opposition to church par­
ticipation in politics — although elevated in all strata—  tended to 
slacken from top to bottom of the social scale. Opposition was more 
pronounced among elite than middle strata and more pronounced among 
both than at the base.
In contrast with what was observed in the previous variables, 
there were no marked differences among elite strata regarding church 
participation, although some differences persisted. Negative 
responses among business (66.3 percent) were less than among public 
functionaries and political leaders (76.7 percent), but open ap­
proval was equally low among both groups: 2.8 percent in the first
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case and 3 percent in the second. Regarding the possible responses 
little and very little, functionaries and political leaders ex­
pressed them in 14.4 percent of the cases and business in 20.4 per 
cent. And so we have elite averages of 2.9 percent open support,
17.4 percent of some tolerance and 71.5 percent rejection.
Church Participation 
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Government 3.0 11.5 14.4 9.2 76.7 74.4 5.8 5.0
Business 2.8 13.1 20.3 8.4 66.3 68.9 10.4 9.4
Intelectual •D 9.1 N.D 8.1 N.D 76.7 N.D 6.0
Professional 4.0 12.7 20.5 7.4 71.0 73.4 4.5 6.5
White Collar 3.2 13.7 23.0 13.0 66.8 64.8 7.0 8.5
Civil Servant 4.2 10.4 16.1 8.5 72.1 70.8 7.8 10.2
Blue Collar 3.6 16.6 29.1 9.9 54.2 61.3 13.1 2.0
Farmer 5.6 16.1 22.0 10.3 48.5 53.8 24.0 19.6
Unemployed 5.7 15.1 24.2 14.6 60.4 56.4 9.7 13.9
National 3.7 13.1 20.8 10.0 65.8 67.3 9.7 9.7
Among the middle strata, the rejection rate dropped slightly 
(70 percent), while tolerance (19.9 percent) and open approval (3.8 
percent) rose. Bureaucrats were most opposed to church participation 
(72.1 percent), although this sector also registered a relatively 
high level of open support: 4.2 percent. Professionals were opposed 
in 71 percent of the cases and in favor in 4 percent. Finally, em­
ployees showed the least amount of open support (3.2 percent) but 
were also least opposed (66.8 percent).
The popular strata showed much more tolerance of church partic­
ipation than the others. Open rejection among them reached only 54.4 
percent, compared with 25.1 percent of moderate tolerance and 5 per­
cent open support. Within this segment was a polarization similar to 
that of the middle strata, as is indicated by the fact that 
marginals were the strata most opposed (60.4 percent) but also most 
favorable (5.7 percent). Campesinos backed church participation in 
politics 5.6 percent of the time, which ‘was almost as high as among 
marginals, and their rejection rate was substantially less (48.5
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percent). Campesinos were the most tolerant sector. Workers rejected 
church participation in 54.2 percent of the cases — a percentage 
only higher than that of the campesinos—  and tolerated it at times 
in 29.1 percent. On the other hand, only 3.6 percent of workers ex­
pressed open support.
In 1987 the responses to this question showed some change, 
above all regarding favorable opinions.6 Among elites, approval went 
from only 2.9 percent in 1983 to 11.2 percent in 1987, even though 
intellectuals proved to be the least inclined of all strata to such 
intervention (9.1 percent). In the middle strata, the jump in favor­
able opinions was no less notable: from 3.8 to 12,2 percent. At the 
base it went from 5 to 15.9 percent.
At any rate, one result was confirmed in 1987: approval of 
church participation in politics grew from top to bottom on the so­
cial scale: less among elites, moderate in the middle, and more at 
the base. There was no sector more inclined toward such participa­
tion than the workers (16.6 percent). On the other hand, intellectu­
als distinguished themselves with the opposite sentiment followed 
closely by the bureaucrats whose approval rating was second lowest 
at 10.4 percent.
Possibly the different structuring of responses had something 
to do with the’drop in intermediate (fair) opinions in all strata as 
well. In reality, the sum of the choices good and fair in both polls 
yielded very similar results.
6 In 1987 the structure of responses was modified to make them coincide with 
the question about military participation in politics. Instead of the four 
possible responses for 1983 (a lot, a little, at times, and no), the 1987 
options were as follows: definitely yes, yes, at times, no and definitely 
no. To make the results comparable for both polls, the choices a little and 
at times were summed to constitute the response fair; in the 1987 poll, the 
choices definitely yes and yes were summed to constitute the positive 
responses and definitely no constitutes the,negatives, leaving three types 
of responses in each poll. It may explains why favorable opinions to church 
participation in politics went up in all strata, which should be taken with 
some reservation.
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Negative responses, higher in 1987 than in 1983, supported the 
idea that church participation in politics did not win any new con­
verts in recent years and probably lost some. Among elites the nega­
tives went from 71.5 to 73.3 percent, highlighting once again the 
intel/ectuals as the clearest opponents of church intervention in 
politics: 73.3 percent. It is worth mentioning that negative opin­
ions rose among businessmen and, on the other hand, dropped 
(although very slightly) among politicians.
In the middle strata negative opinions remained practically un­
changed, although registering an increase among professionals and a 
decrease among employees and bureaucrats. At the base, as among 
elites, negative opinions rose, except among the marginals. The same 
tendency emerged for criticism of church participation as for sup­
port of it: The most critical were the elites, followed by the mid­
dle strata, while the base demonstrated greater tolerance of such 
participation.
The responses in 1983 to military participation in politics 
were adjusted in the same way as those for church participation. 
Rejection of military intervention, once again, was greater among 
elites than among the middle strata and among both than at the base. 
Similarly, open approval was greater at the base than among the mid­
dle strata and among both than at the top.
Military Participation.
GOOD FAIR BAD DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Government 17.5 20.0 23.8 13.4 50.2 61.0 8.4 5.8
Business 21.5 17.3 19.4 14.5 46.2 55.8 12.6 12.4
Intelectual N.D 17.4 N.D 12.4 N.D 63.1 N.D 7.1
Professional 18.5 21.4 21.7 15.7 53.3 52.3 6.6 10.7
White Collar 20.4 22.0 19.2 12.4 48.2 48.0 12.2 17.7
Civil Servant 25.1 16.2 24.0 14.8 41.6 54.9 9.3 14.1
Blue Collar 28.4 22.1 20.4 13.1 35.5 49.0 15.5 15.7
Farmer 30.6 19.4 15.0 13.6 30.1 41.6 24.4 25.4
Unemployed 29.7 20.3 18.7 12.6 39.2 48.4 12.6 18.7
National 22.7 19.1 20.5 13.9 44,2 53.2 12.7 13.9
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In this there also were no evident differences among the elite 
groups. Although some differences persisted, they seemed instead to 
be hues of the same color. Rejections among public functionaries and 
political leaders (50.2 percent) was greater than among en­
trepreneurs (46.2 percent) and the approval rating among the former 
(17.4 percent) was less than among the latter (21.6). On the other 
hand, acceptance at times of military intervention among functionar­
ies and political leaders (23.8 percent) exceeded that among busi­
ness (19.4). The respective averages among elites were: 48.2 percent 
for open rejection, 21.6 percent for acceptance at times and 19.5 
percent for frank support. As was observed, even at this level, 
where the opposition to military intervention was great, it did not 
come close to the level of opposition against church intervention in 
politics. It can be definitely concluded that Mexican society is 
much more tolerant of military intervention than church 
participation in politics.
Among the middle strata, open opposition dropped (47.7 percent) 
and acceptance rose (21.3 percent) although both to very slight de­
grees. Acceptance at times (21.6 percent) was similar to that among 
the elites. The greatest rejection at this level came from the pro­
fessionals (53.3 percent) and also the least approval (18.5). 
Employees expressed opposition in 48.2 percent of the cases and ap­
proval in 20.4% The most inclined toward military intervention were 
the bureaucrats, among whom only 41.6 percent openly rejected and
25.1 percent supported it.
An increase of tolerance toward military intervention is really 
notable among the popular strata. At this level, only 34.9 percent 
were opposed while 29.5 percent admitted to open support. Campesinos 
were most inclined to such intervention with a refusal rate of only
30.1 percent, while their level of support was 30.6. This was the 
only strata in which backing for military participation in politics 
was greater than opposition to it and can be explained perhaps in 
the original high campesino composition of the army, although today
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the army is mainly made up of middle class and urban popular class 
enlistees. The marginals maintained a high level of support (29.4 
percent) although their level of refusal was higher than that of 
campesinos (39.2 percent). Workers favored military intervention
28.4 percent of the time and opposed it 35.5 percent.
Nationwide public opinion of military participation in politics 
showed slight changes between 1983 and 1987. The results in general 
were very similar for each of the strata, although a moderate reduc­
tion of positive responses and a slightly sharper increase of nega­
tives was noted. Among elites, politicians were one of the few 
strata to show a greater inclination toward such participation over 
the four-year period: 20 percent in 1987 compared with 17.4 percent 
in 1983. But, on the other hand, business reduced its approval rat­
ing to such an extent that it offset the increase among politicians. 
Intellectuals were not too keen on the idea; only 17.4 percent of 
them approved it. However, negative opinions rose almost 10 points 
among politicians and increased as well among businessmen. 
Intellectuals were the strata most opposed to military participa­
tion: 63.1 percent, for which, on average, elites constituted the 
most critical level against such participation. The choice fair lost 
ground not only among elites but in the other two strata in favor of 
open opposition.
In the middle strata, the level of approval dropped as well and 
negative responses increased. Nonetheless, professionals as well as 
employees became more inclined toward military intervention, so much 
so that in both cases while positive responses rose, negative ones 
declined. If the average of the three strata yielded the above-men­
tioned result it was because bureaucrats appreciably reduced their 
approval (from 25.1 to 16.2 percent) and increased their disapproval 
from 41.6 to 54.9 percent. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
except for the bureaucrats, the middle strata showed more receptiv­
ity to military participation.
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It was at the base where the idea in question lost the most 
ground. Favorable opinions dropped 9 points and negatives gained 12 
The campesino strata showed the greatest drop in approvals, falling 
from 30.6 percent in 1983 to only 19.4 percent in 1987, the biggest 
drop at the base. Regarding disapproval, the workers registered the 
largest increase, going from 35.5 to 4 9 percent. Also, positive re­
sponses dropped and negatives increased among marginals. In sum, 
although the base continued being the level least opposed to mili­
tary participation, its disapproval grew more than in other levels 
to the point of almost equaling them.
Attitude Toward Change 
RADICAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE DK
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Government 27.7 17.9 65.3 56.5 7.0 14.8 N.D 10.9
Business 31.6 17.8 56.2 50.5 12.0 15.8 N.D 15.9
Intelectual N.D 24.1 N.D 53.4 N.D 12.7 N.D 9.8
Professional 34.1 18.4 58.2 59.8 7.8 9.3 N.D 12.2
White Collar 29.0 22.4 55.8 53.1 15.2 9.8 N.D 14.6
Civil Servant 32.5 21.1 56.4 54.3 11.1 12.0 N.D 12.2
Blue Collar 28.0 20.9 52.4 45.6 19.5 15.1 N.D 18.2
Farmer 34.2 23.9 46.6 34.5 19.2 15.2 N.D 26.4
Unemployed 31.6 17.9 55.4 41.5 13.1 14.9 N.D 25.7
National 30.4 19.9 57.3 50.4 12.3 13.6 N.D 16.1
With the exception of the campesinos, all other strata came out 
in favor of moderate changes in national life, which remained the 
most firmly entrenched attitude among those interviewed.
Nonetheless, from the conservative and radical sides notable differ­
ences were observed. Contrary to what might be expected, the per­
centage of conservative attitudes was greatest at the base, moderate 
in the middle and least at the top. Preferences for moderate change 
were, in contrast, greater at the top, moderate in the middle and 
least at the base. Regarding radical change, the same distribution 
of attitudes was not observed, with the most radical being in the 
middle, followed by the base and then the elites.
Interesting results were observed among elites. Business ex­
pressed more conservative attitudes (12 percent) than public func-
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tionaries (7 percent) but also more radical ones, with the former at
31.6 percent and the latter at 27.7 percent. Public functionaries 
and political leaders exhibited a greater tendency among all strata 
for moderate change (65.3 percent). The averages among elites were:
29.6 percent for radical change, 60.8 percent for moderate change 
and 9.5 percent for keeping things the way they were.
Among the middle strata, the conservative responses were higher 
(11.3 percent) as well as radical ones (32.5 percent), reducing the 
preference for moderate change (56.8 percent) in relation to elite 
attitudes. Such results show a greater polarization in the second 
level than at the top, showing less social stability among the mid­
dle strata. The most radical were professionals (34.1 percent), fol­
lowed by bureaucrats (32.5 percent) and employees (29). Employees 
were, for their part, the most conservative (15.2 percent), followed 
by bureaucrats (11.1) and professionals (7.8 percent), who were 
identified as the most inclined among the middle strata toward great 
changes.
Conservatives at the base were proportionally more numerous 
(18.2 percent) than in the middle strata, although radicals were 
less abundant (31.2 percent). Those who opted for moderate change 
(51.4 percent) were also fewer than those in the other two levels. 
The most conservative sector at the base was the workers (19.5 per­
cent) with the-campesinos close behind at 19.2. Although less, the 
percentage of marginals who wanted the present reality to be con­
served continued rising (13.1 percent). Although the campesinos were 
the second most conservative stratum, they were also the most radi­
cal of all (34.2 percent), which made this the most polarized sector 
in its internal positions. Radical workers represented 28 percent of 
the cases with radical marginals coming in at 31.6 percent. Only 
public functionaries and political leaders were less radical than 
workers.
In 1987 the results were very different although it should be 
recognized in part as a result of the new questionnaire design: The
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inclusion of new choices (don’t know and no answer) reduced the mar­
gin of significant responses. Nonetheless, such a change is not 
enough to explain an almost constant result in all strata: the re­
duction in the percentage of favorable responses to radical change 
and a moderate increase in conservative responses.
The drop in radical attitudes was similar in all three levels; 
among elites radical responses dropped almost 10 points; among the 
middle strata 11 points and a little more than 10 points at the 
base. The strata that registered the biggest changes in this sense 
were business (14 points), professionals (16 points) and notably the 
marginals (14 points). It should be said that intellectuals proved 
to be the most radical stratum: 24.1 percent.
Moderate attitudes also registered drops in all strata, with 
the single exception of professionals. The most pronounced drops 
were registered at the base, especially among campesinos (12 points) 
and the marginals (14 points). The middle strata maintained their 
indices of moderate attitudes without apparent changes: 9 points in 
the case of functionaries and 6 points for business.
On the other hand, the percentage of conservatives went up at 
the national level, although with considerable variations among the 
sub-levels. At the top, functionaries and business tended more to­
ward conservatism, going from 7 to 14.8 points among the former and 
from 12 to 15.3 percent among the latter. Regarding intellectuals,
12.7 percent of them proved to be conservative. Among the middle 
strata, professionals and bureaucrats became more conservative, 
although at very small rates. Employees, on the other hand, reduced 
their percentage of conservative responses.
At the base,the percentage of conservative responses rose only 
among marginals and only to a small degree. Workers as well as cam­
pesinos proved to be less conservative than before, although in the 
case of the campesinos, as has been seen, all of their significant 
responses were reduced proportionally.
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In 1983, the two national newspapers with the largest circula­
tion — Excelsior and Novedades—  tended to be read with greatest 
frequency by the elites than by the middle and popular strata, 
while, OU' the other hand, the preference for local dailies was 
greater at the base than among the middle strata and among both of 
them than at the top.
Public functionaries and political leaders proved to have the 
greatest predilection for national dailies, especially for Excelsior 
(34 percent) and the least for local dailies (13.6 percent). 
Entrepreneurs also preferred Excelsior (15.5 percent), although 
their affection for Novedades (21.6 percent) was proportionally 
greater and they tended to read local dailies with more frequency 
(17.4 percent) than politicians. The average number of readers of 
local dailies at the top was 15.5 percent.
Newspaper Preference.
EXCELSIOR NOVEDADS OTHER NAL LOCAL NA
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
Government 34.0 14.8 17.6 5.3 33.6 41.8 13.632.7 1.2 4.2
Business 15.5 12.1 21.6 5.9 37.5 44.7 17.430.5 8.0 8.8
Intelectual N.D 18.2 N.D 4.7 N.D 51.1 N.D 26.7 N.D 4.8
Professional 24.9 11.9 12.8 7.4 35.8 44.7 20.930.1 5.6 6.0
White Collar 12.2 9.8 10.4 5.9 45.0 38.4 26.432.7 6.0 10.7
Civil Servant 16.4 9.0 12.7 5.1 41.6 51.6 25.5 32.6 3.8 7.9
Blue Collar 8.9 7.9 8.4 3.2 47.1 48.2 24.026.9 11.6 10.8
Fanner 5.3 4.4 3.0 1.1 52.2 40.1 22.019.2 17.5 34.1
Unemployed 6.1 5.9 8.4 2.0 42.3 43.0 27.8 19.4 15.4 28.6
National 18.0 10.7 12.5 5.0 39.3 43.3 21.228.5 9.0 12.5
The preference for Excelsior (17.8 percent), Novedades (12 per­
cent) and in general for all of the national dailies was lower among 
the middle strata, while the preference for local dailies was 
higher. Professionals read national dailies most frequently, 
although their preference for local dailies (20.9 percent) was 
higher than that among elites. At the other extreme, employees pre­
ferred locals in 26.4 percent of the cases and very infrequently
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read Excelsior (12.2 percent) and Novedades (10.4 percent). The bu­
reaucrats were in the middle, with a 25.5 percent preference for lo­
cal newspapers.
The preference for national dailies was particularly low among 
the popular strata, especially among campesinos, among whom only 3 
percent read Novedades and 5.3 percent Excelsior. It is important to 
observe that campesinos preferred two other national dailies: El 
Heraldo de Mexico (9.2 percent) and la Prensa (7.5 percent). On the 
other hand, 22 percent of campesinos opted for local dailies. The 
marginals showed little enthusiasm for Novedades (8.4 percent) and 
Excelsior (6.1 percent), preferring la Prensa (10.5 percent) and El 
Sol de Mexico (6.9 percent) more than Excelsior. At any rate, 27.8 
percent of them — the highest percentage within the group—  opted 
for local dailies, which is understandable give the need to find 
work. Workers, for their part, read the Esto as much as Excelsior 
(8.9 percent for each one), leaving Novedades (8.4 percent) in third 
place; 22 percent of them picked local dailies.
The design of this question changed considerably in 1987. 
Three more periodicals were included: El Dia, La Jornada and El 
Nacional, which made the percentages drop for the other newspapers. 
Excelsior especially registered drops up to more than 50 percent in 
some strata, such as among politicians (from 34 to 14.8 percent) and 
professionals <from 24.9 to 11.9 percent). On the other hand, in­
tellectuals proved to be most tied to Excelsior (18.2 percent). 
Preferences for this newspaper, although lower than in 1983, main­
tained the same pattern of distribution: greater at the top than 
among the middle strata and among both of them than at the base.
The drop in the margin of preference for Novedades was even 
more pronounced than in the previous case. In some cases the newspa­
per lost up to 75 percent readership, such as among marginals. Among 
politicians only 5.3 percent chose it (17.6 percent in 1983) and 
among business 5.9 percent (21.6 percent in 1983). Intellectuals 
preferred it in a scant 4.7 percent of the cases. Slightly less was
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the drop among the middle strata, which in fact ceased to be the 
level at which Novedades achieved its best results: 7.4 percent 
among professionals and 5.9 percent among employees. At the base, 
preferences for this periodical almost disappeared: 3.2 percent 
among workers, 2 percent among marginals and 1.1 percent among cam­
pesinos. In fact, Novedades fell to third place on the national 
preference list, coming in behind the Heraldo de Mexico, also con­
servative .
In contrast with what happened with these national dailies, 
preferences for local dailies and other national periodicals went up 
considerably across all strata. Highlighted among the other nation­
als for relatively high percentages of readers was the Heraldo de 
Mexico (5.3 percent), the Esto (4.3 percent) and la Prensa (4.6 per­
cent) ; the last two continued being preferred at the base, with 
Novedades, Excelsior and La Jornada preferred in the middle and 
Excelsior and the Heraldo preferred at the top. Functionaries ex­
pressed high preferences for El Nacional and Unomasuno and intellec­
tuals for La Jornada.
9. PUBLIC OPINION IN 1983
A low percentage of sympathies for the PRI and a high percent­
age for the PAN emerged in the north — not within one or a few 
strata but throughout the social pyramid in the region. Without 
exception all strata in the north expressed fewer preferences for 
the PRI than in the center, including the traditional bastions of 
PRI support: public functionaries, political leaders and 
bureaucrats. In the same sense and with the single exception of the 
bureaucrats, all strata in the north expressed greater preference 
for the PAN than did the strata in the center. In some cases the 
differences were quite notable, as among functionaries and political 
leaders. Those in the north sympathized with the PAN at rates higher 
than the national average.
PARTY SYMPATHY 
PRI PAN PSUM
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 65.3 77.1 75.5 74.9 3.9 13.1 2.5 5.4 3.2 4.4 4.4 4.1
Business 45.5 51.2 56.4 50.9 13.1 20.2 7.2 13.5 2.3 3.4 0.6 2.8
Average 55.4 64.1 65.9 62.9 8.5 16.6 4.8 9.4 2.7 3.9 2.5 3.4
Professional 52.2 55.6 45.8 53.7 8.4 12.0 4.2 8.5 2.2 5.2 8.3 5.1
White Collar 45.7 51.2 51.4 50.2 8.4 13.8 8.3 9.4 1.1 7.8 2.8 5.8
Civil Servant 57.0 70.3 65.3 67.1 5.9 5.4 2.8 5.3 5.4 4.7 8.3 5.3
Average 51.6 59.0 54.2 57.0 7.6 10.4 5.1 7.7 2.9 5.9 6.5 5.4
Blue Collar 38.2 57.2 47.6 52.7 12.5 22.4 17.5 14.9 3.9 5.1 3.2 4.7
Fanner 53.2 65.9 68.1 64.5 8.0 9.7 1.4 7.3 3.2 3.0 1.4 2.8
Marginal 32.4 44.9 56.2 44.8 10.8 16.2 6.8 10.9 7.4 4.8 1.4 4.6
Average 41.3 56.0 57.3 54.0 10.4 16.1 8.6 11.0 4.8 4.3 2.0 4.0
In the south, PRI preferences remained relatively constant in 
comparison with the center, while those for the PAN tended to drop. 
Nonetheless, the fact that workers in the south once again were the 
sector most closely tied to the PAN leads to the conclusion that the 
notorious inclination of labor to this party is not a regional phe­
nomenon but a general national characteristic. Regarding the PSUM, 
its low popularity in the north and relatively high popularity in
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the center is clear. If we consider the three parties together, we 
conclude that the north remains inclined toward the political right, 
in contrast with the greater plurality of the center and the rela­
tively high level of support for the government in the south.
The north once again showed the highest level of skepticism to­
ward the government. There was no stratum more skeptical than north­
ern workers, who also maintained this position in the other two re­
gions. But among northern elites as well there was very little back­
ing for the government. Almost one in three functionaries in this 
region expressed a negative opinion and only one in three business­
men expressed a positive one.
Government Opinion  
GOOD FAIR BAD
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 53.3 60.7 59.1 59.2 28.6 27.0 29.7 27.6 32.2 8.1 5.0 9.2
Business 32.3 39.8 45.3 39.2 41.3 33.5 40.5 35.7 21.2 15.4 7.4 15.3
Average 42.8 50.2 52.2 49.2 34.9 30.2 35.1 31.6 26.7 11.7 6.2 12.2
Professional 34.8 45.7 45.8 43.9 33.7 35.1 37.5 35.2 27.2 15.9 15.3 17.7
White Collar 30.8 42.5 37.5 39.6 41.5 35.3 43.1 37.6 19.2 15.0 11.1 15.2
Civil Servant 46.3 50.0 43.1 48.3 37.6 30.0 36.1 32.3 12.9 14.4 16.7 14.5
Average 37.3 46.1 42.1 43.9 37.6 33.5 38.9 35.0 19.8 15.1 14.4 15.8
Blue Collar 28.9 34.1 30.2 32.7 42.1 37.6 42.9 39.1 18.4 16.0 15.9 16.4
Farmer 40.3 41.3 36.2 40.3 38.7 28.8 31.9 30.6 9.7 6.5 5.7 6.8
Marginal 35.3 35.3 43.9 36.7 36.8 37.4 34.2 36.8 20.6 14.7 12.3 15.1
Average 34.8 36.9 36.9 36.6 39.2 34.6 36.3 35.5 16.2 12.4 11.3 12.8
In the center, the government's popularity rose considerably 
and was a little higher still in the south. A uniform tendency is 
observed across the three regions: Support for the government drops 
from top to bottom of the social scale; support is greater among 
elites than among the middle strata and among both than at the base. 
In conclusion, government popularity decreases in two directions: 
from south to north and from the elites to the popular sectors.
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Regarding variables such as political participation by the 
church and military, opinions polarized much more markedly in the 
south than in the center and north. While differences among elites, 
middle and base strata were minor in the north, they were acute in 
the south. Concerning church participation, the hypothesis could be 
advanced that businessmen in the north were less obstinate toward 
such intervention because in that region the church seems frequently 
allied with the more conservative business sectors in opposition to 
the political system. On the other hand, where the influence of the 
so-called popular church is great, businessmen vehemently challenged 
a political attitude that would incline itself to the popular 
strata.
Church Participation
Yes Sometimes No
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 2.6 1.9 8.6 3.0 18.9 13.3 14.1 14.4 66.7 79.7 74.7
Business 3.0 2.7 3.1 2.8 25.2 18.7 23.1 20.4 61.6 66.7 70.8
Average 2.8 2.3 5.8 2.9 22.0 16.0 18.6 17.4 64.1 73.2 72.7 71.5
Professional 3.3 4.9 0.0 4.0 21.7 20.7 18.1 20.5 70.7 69.2 80.6 71.0
White Collar 3.2 3.6 1.4 3.2 18.0 24.0 25.0 23.0 69.1 66.8 63.9 66.8
Civil Servant 4.3 3.8 5.6 4.2 21.5 16.2 8.3 16.1 65.6 71.8 81.9 72.1
Average 3.6 4.1 2.3 3.8 20.4 20.3 17.1 19.9 68.5 69.3 75.5 70.0
Blue Collar 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.6 21.1 32.5 22.2 29.1 55.3 52.4 61.9 54.2
Farmer 1.6 5.9 7.2 5.6 11.3 24.3 20.3 22.0 50.0 48.1 49.3 48.5
Marginal 2.9 6.0 6.8 5.7 16.2 25.2 27.4 24.2 69.1 59.3 57.5 60.4
Average 2.8 5.1 5.7 5.0 16.2 27.3 23.3 25.1 58.1 53.3 56.2 54.4
The great polarization of opinion in the south tended to be 
corroborated in the case of military intervention. Businessmen in 
this region opposed the idea more vehemently than their colleagues 
in the other regions; on the other hand, the popular strata sup­
ported it to such an extent that in the case of the campesinos sup­
port was considerably greater than opposition.
In this case, of course, a similar.hypothesis to that for 
church participation would not work. An explanation could begin from
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the assumption of a lower level of traditional values of civilian 
life in the south, or, rather, of a greater level of discontent 
among the popular strata -'-evidenced in the cases of PRI and govern­
ment approval—  which moves them to consider to a great extent the 
possibility of truly radical changes.
M ilitary Participation
GOOD FAIR BAD
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 18.1 16.5 20.9 17.4 16.4 25.9 22.6 23.8 38.3 52.6 54.7 50.2
Business 15.5 22.9 22.4 21.6 17.5 18.8 24.3 19.4 40.5 47.4 48.9 46.2
Average 16.8 19.7 21.6 19.5 16.9 22.3 23.4 21.6 39.4 50.0 51.8 48.2
Professional 14.2 19.9 16.7 18.5 19.6 20.4 30.6 21.7 47.8 54.8 52.8 53.3
White Collar 12.7 19.2 36.1 20.4 20.2 19.2 18.1 19.2 41.4 53.0 34.7 48.2
Civil Servant 18.3 28.6 18.1 25.1 26.9 22.4 27.8 24.0 32.3 42.4 50.0 41.6
Average 15.1 25.6 23.6 21.3 22.2 20.7 25.5 21.6 40.5 50.1 45.8 47.7
Blue Collar 21.1 31.2 23.8 28.4 10.5 21.9 25.4 20.4 27.7 36.0 42.8 35.5
Farmer 8.1 32.4 42.0 30.6 14.5 15.4 13.0 15.0 29.1 30.2 30.4 30.1
Marginal 16.1 31.5 32.9 29.4 16.2 17.1 28.8 18.7 38.2 41.3 30.1 39.2
Average 15.1 31.7 32.9 29.5 13.7 18.1 22.4 18.0 31.7 35.8 34.4 34.9
The analysis of public opinion about the right to strike con­
firmed a conservative tendency in the north as well as high polar­
ization across strata in the south.
Right to Strike
GOOD FAIR BAD
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 68.0 75.2 80.5 74.6 15.8 11.6 8.9 11.8 9.6 7.9 14.3 8.1
Business 40.1 50.9 59.5 50.2 26.7 18.6 20.5 20.2 21.1 15.0 13.5 15.9
Average 54.0 63.0 70.0 62,4 21.2 15.1 14.7 16.0 15.3 11.4 13.9 12.0
Professional 64.1 64.6 73.6 65.7 20.7 14.7 16.7 16.0 13.0 9.3 7.0 9.6
White Collar 56.4 47.3 63.9 51.4 12.8 16.8 16.7 16.0 21.3 12.9 9.7 14.0
Civil Servant 64.5 64.1 66.7 64.6 21.5 13.2 19.4 15.6 8.6 8.9 5.6 8.3
Average 61.7 58.7 68.1 60.6 18.3 14.9 17.6 15.9 14.3 10.4 7.4 10.6
Blue Collar 61.9 65.6 66.7 65.1 18.4 11.3 19.0 13.6 10.5 9.7 7.9 9.5
Farmer 46.8 39.1 28.9 38.7 14.5 16.0 23.2 16.9 8.0 13.0 1.4 10.7
Marginal 63.2 45.5 52.1 49.0 20.6 20.4 16.4 19.8 10.3 15.3 16.5 14.7
Average 57.3 50.0 49.2 50.9 17.8 15.9 19.5 16.8 9.6 12.7 8.6 11.6
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The elite and middle strata in the north expressed less 
inclination toward the right than their counterparts in the center 
who were even less inclined toward the right than those in the 
south. Things were different in the popular strata. Workers showed 
the same tendencies as the elite and middle strata, but campesinos 
and marginals supported the right to strike more in the north than 
in the south, which resulted in a great polarization of public 
opinion in this last region.
Regarding personal attitude to change, we find that two elite 
strata were more inclined toward radical change in the north than in 
the center and in both regions than in the south. In contrast, the 
popular strata in the south were the most radical and those in the 
north least. This was especially clear in the case of labor, 
although the same tendency was also observed among campesinos. The 
middle strata behaved similarly to the elites in general: more radi­
cal in the north than in the center and in both cases than in the 
south. Once again, extreme positions appeared in the south: high 
conservatism among elites and great radicalism at the base.
Attitude Toward Change 
RADICAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 35.1 26.8 22.9 27.7 61.0 62.4 68.2 65.3 3.8 7.5 8.8 7.0
Business 38.6 31.9 20.7 31.6 53.6 55.9 62.7 56.3 7.7 12.0 16.5 12.0
Average 36.8 29.3 21.8 29.6 57.3 59.1 65.4 60.8 5.7 9.7 12.6 9.5
Professional 41.3 31.1 40.3 34.1 56.5 59.1 55.6 58.2 2.2 9.8 4.2 7.8
White Collar 39.4 26.3 27.8 29.0 55.3 56.0 55.5 55.8 5.4 17.7 16.7 15.2
Civil Servant 32.3 32.1 34.7 32.5 58.0 55.9 57.0 56.4 9.7 12.0 8.3 11.1
Average 37.6 29.9 34.2 31.8 56.6 57.0 56.2 56.8 5.7 13.1 9.7 11.3
Blue Collar 21.1 27.3 39.7 28.0 63.1 51.1 46.0 52.4 15.8 21.5 14.3 19.5
Farmer 33.9 34.1 34.8 34.2 53.2 45.7 44.9 46.6 13.0 20.1 20.3 19.2
Marginal 39.7 28.1 39.7 31.6 53.0 59.0 41.1 55.4 7.4 12.9 19.2 13.1
Average 31.5 29.8 38.0 31.2 56.4 51.9 44.0 51.4 12.0 18.1 17.9 17.2
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THE TOP OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID 
The political elite
The identification of the government elite with what we could 
call the ideology of the Mexican state tended to clearly drop off in 
the north and intensify in the south. Preferences for the PRI and 
favorable opinions of the government, the bank nationalization and 
the right to strike were clearly higher in the south than in the 
center and in the center than in the north, where political leaders 
exhibited a clear tendency toward the right, defined in terms of 
preferences for the PAN and acceptance of church and military par­
ticipation in politics. The term right winger is not used here as a 
synonym for conservative regarding the existence of right wing radi­
cals in the northern states.
PAN preferences among public functionaries and political lead­
ers in the north hit a significant 13.1 percent, while it reached 
only 3.9 percent in the center and 2.4 in the south. Public func­
tionaries and political leaders in the north also showed more toler­
ance for church and military participation in politics than their 
counterparts in the center and south.
The fact that northern elites read local newspapers much more 
frequently than their counterparts in other regions suggests that 
their identification with events in the center is lower as well. 
There exists, however, a variant that merits consideration: public 
functionaries and political leaders in the north were much more in­
clined toward radical change than those in the center and more still 
than those in the south. In the same sense, the margin of conserva­
tives that did not desire changes in this strata was higher in the 
south than in the center and in both regions than in the north. But 
given the structure of previous responses, it seems necessary to 
conclude that a considerable segment of the northern political elite 
was clearly inclined toward the right.
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The business elite
The responses given by businessmen conform surprisingly to the 
pattern exhibited by the political elite, although of course busi­
ness identification with the government was notably less.
Businessmen in the south identified with PRI in a proportion higher 
than the national average; in the center it was slightly lower than 
the national average and in the north business identification was 
almost 10 points lower than the national average (45.5 percent com­
pared with 55.3).
Business identification with the main opposition party — the 
PAN—  ran in the opposite direction, with a 7.2 percent level in the 
south, 13.1 in the center and 20.2 in the north. Regarding the PSUM, 
sympathies were low among businessmen in all three regions, although 
highest in the south (3.4 percent).
Northern businessmen also were more critical of the government 
and the right to strike than were those in the center and in both 
cases than those in the south. Northern businessmen were also more 
tolerant of church and military participation in politics, with 
southern businessmen being more opposed.
Regarding the bank nationalization, on the other hand, business 
was generally skeptical across the three regions, without consider­
able variations.
Northern businessmen also were more faithful readers of local 
newspapers than were those in the center and south and also --as in 
the case of the political elite—  the inclination toward radical 
change was greater in the north than in the center and in both re­
gions than in the south.
The two elite sectors considered only had in common the unifor­
mity in regional tendencies. Great differences remained between them 
in terms of the eight themes analyzed here. Regarding party sympa­
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thies, business preference for the PRI was 20 points lower in the 
north, 26 points in the center and 19 points in the south. In fact, 
while the political elite was in each of the three regions the 
strata most enthusiastic about the PRI, the business elite, on the 
other hand, was among the strata least inclined toward the party.
Regarding government approval, the differences are equally sig­
nificant. In the north, favorable opinions among public functionar­
ies and political leaders were 21 points higher than among business­
men; in the center there was a similar difference and in the south 
the gap dropped to 11 points.
Opinions about the right to strike constituted another discrep­
ancy between the political and business elites. Support among polit­
ical elites in the north was more than 28 points higher than support 
among businessmen, 24 points in the center and 21 points in the 
south. In fact, the political elite was the most enthusiastic de­
fender of the right to strike, while the business elite was its main 
detractor in the north and one of the main detractors in the center 
and south.
The differences were smaller regarding church and military par­
ticipation in politics, although in almost all cases tolerance among 
businessmen was greater than tolerance among politicians. Business 
elites in the center and especially in the north proved to be more 
radical than functionaries and political leaders, although the con­
servative wing among business was larger than that among politicians 
as well. In the three cases, the politicians proved to be more in­
clined toward moderate change than businessmen. Some differences 
also appeared in the question about newspaper preferences. In the 
three regions, businessmen read local dailies more frequently and 
their taste for Excelsior --the most read paper by functionaries and 
political leaders—  was relatively less; in fact, in the north and 
south, businessmen preferred Novedades.
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THE MIDDLE CLASSES 
Professionals
Although professionals in the north — in almost every state of 
this region—  were inclined toward the right, those in the south 
tended toward the left, without implying, of course, that leftists 
constitute the majority of southern professionals.
The tendency was particularly notable in the case of party sym­
pathies: southern professionals, together with bureaucrats from this 
region, proved to be the biggest sympathizers for the PSUM 
throughout the country (8.3 percent). On the other hand, they 
exhibited a relatively poor preference for the PRI: 45.8 percent, 
the lowest in the south and one of the lowest across all three 
regions. In addition, southern professionals' preferences for the 
PAN were relatively scant: 4.2 percent, very inferior to those 
expressed by professionals in the center and in the north, although, 
it is worth emphasizing, in none of the three regions did 
professionals support the PAN to a great degree.
In the center, professionals' preferences for the PSUM repre­
sented 5.2 percent of the cases; certainly not a very high percent­
age but still one of the highest for this region. In the north, pro­
fessionals expressed a relatively high degree of support for the PRI 
(52.2 percent) which also was one of the highest within this stratum 
across the three regions. Conservatism among professionals was not 
reflected in party sympathies.
Regarding the other variables, professionals in the three re­
gions tended to be relatively more progressive than those of the 
other strata and were, once again, most progressive in the south. 
Southern professionals were the most enthusiastic defenders of the 
bank nationalization, behind southern public functionaries; they 
also held the highest percentage of positive opinions of the right 
to strike — higher even than that among workers themselves—  behind
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public functionaries; professionals were also the firmest opponents 
of church and military participation in politics (none of them ap­
proved such participation) and, although exceeded in this case by 
professionals in the center region, southern professionals were, in 
their region, the second most critical sector of church and military 
intervention.
Professionals proved to be particularly critical of the govern­
ment (those in the north more so than those in the center and south, 
as always) in comparison with the other strata; although they proved 
to be especially disposed to radical change, more so in the north 
and in the south, professionals expressed a prevalent disposition 
toward maintaining order as well — the lowest in the two regions. 
Preference among professionals for Excelsior was, in each region, 
second highest among all strata, exceeded only by that among public 
functionaries, but, in contrast with politicians, professionals also 
expressed a high preference for local newspapers.
Employees
Employees expressed considerable regional heterogeneity in 
their party sympathies. In the north, they were less inclined toward 
the PSUM (1.1 percent), but in the center were quite favorable (7.7 
percent). In the south, where sympathies for the PAN were very scant 
among the other middle strata, employees were the second most-in­
clined stratum toward this party, only surpassed by workers. In the 
three regions their level of preference for the PRI remained below 
regional averages.
In each of the regions, employees also were less supportive 
among the strata of the government, the bank nationalization and the 
right to strike, although regarding the first two themes they were 
not very critical either, tending instead toward indifference.
Regarding church participation in politics, employees expressed 
ambivalent attitudes. In the center and in the south they were the
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most tolerant among the middle strata and in the north they were 
less tolerant than bureaucrats and almost as intolerant as profes­
sionals. In the case of military intervention, employees in the 
south were much more tolerant than in the center and north and in 
fact employee backing of the military was the highest among all 
strata in the south except among campesinos. Regarding personal at­
titude toward change, employees were hardly inclined toward radical­
ism and more disposed to keeping things as they were. In the north, 
they were a little less conservative than bureaucrats.
Southern employees expressed a high preference for local news­
papers (38.9 percent), which was the highest in the region. In the 
center the preference for local periodicals was still very high 
(18.9 percent), only surpassed by that of the campesinos. In the 
north, employee interest for local dailies was relatively minor, 
contradicting once again the general tendency.
Bureaucrats
Bureaucrat affinity for the regime was clear in all regions and 
in almost all of the variables. In the north and in the center they 
were the group that sympathized most with the PRI and expressed the 
most favorable opinion of the government, with the exception of pub­
lic functionaries and political leaders. In the south they were sur­
passed by the campesinos, but maintained their positions. In the 
same sense, compared with the general increase of PAN sympathies in 
the north, northern bureaucrats were the group least-inclined toward 
the party (5.4 percent) and in fact were the only group in the north 
whose PAN preferences were less than those expressed in the center. 
However, bureaucrats are in the central states, the middle classes 
segment less enthusiastic about PAN and PSUM and in the south, in 
contrast with their scant preferences for PAN, expressed 
considerable backing for the PSUM (8.3 percent), the highest in the 
region together with professionals.
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Regarding the right to strike, bureaucrats expressed consider­
able support, which was greater even than that among workers in the 
northern region and among the highest in the other two regions.
Their backing of the bank nationalization was also very clear in 
each of the regions.
Southern bureaucrats were particularly averse to church partic­
ipation in politics, expressing the highest level of opposition in 
all regions (81.9 percent). In the center, only public functionaries 
and political leaders surpassed bureaucrats in this respect, but in 
the north their firmness dropped as bureaucrats expressed the most 
tolerance among the middle strata. The same disparity is observed 
regarding military intervention, contradicting the general tendency. 
Northern bureaucrats — and to a lesser degree those of the center—  
proved to be relatively disposed toward military participation in 
politics, expressing very moderate opposition and the second highest 
level of support in the region, behind workers.
Regarding personal attitude toward change, bureaucrats tended 
toward conservatism along with employees and their regional results 
were also very ambivalent, as in the case of employees. In the 
north, they were less radical than employees and more radical in the 
center and in the south. In all cases, they were more conservative 
than the third middle stratum: professionals. Bureaucrats also were 
not too fond of national newspapers and in fact were very faithful 
readers of local dailies in the north (53.8 percent), with high mar­
gins in the center and south as well.
From the previous analysis important differences among the mid­
dle strata are pointed out. Professionals proved to be the most pro­
gressive of them, although this does not mean professionals were 
fond of the regime. Southern professionals proved to be particularly 
critical of the regime and were slightly inclined toward the left. 
Employees also were not very supportive of the regime, but in this 
case the differences with the regime tended to place employees on 
the political right. In any case, employees proved to be the most
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atypical of the middle strata, tending toward the right in the north 
and in the south, while tending toward the left in the center. 
Bureaucrats were the stratum most closely tied to the PRI and the 
government in all regions, but did not have a clearly defined atti­
tude toward military participation in politics and their greater 
conservatism and inclination toward local dailies distanced them a 
little from the stratum of public functionaries and political lead­
ers, with whom, despite this, bureaucrats maintained the most simi­
larities .
The most unpredictable and variable strata in the social pyra­
mid were the middle sectors, among whom great regional contrasts 
were perceived and the most heterogeneous influence of political 
parties was expressed. Among the middle strata, the left has been 
able to consolidate its greatest gains.
THE POPULAR BASE OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID
Workers
The labor stratum proved to be the most skeptical of the regime 
and its political traditions and social conquests. As much in the 
north as in the south labor expressed less sympathy for the PRI and 
in both regions was the group most frequently in favor of the PAN. 
Even in the center, where labor backed the PRI at higher levels than 
in the other two regions, it proved to be the stratum with the sec­
ond highest approval of the PAN and remained above the national av­
erage concerning preferences for this party. In fact, it can be af­
firmed that there was no stratum more inclined toward the PAN 
throughout the nation than labor. In contrast, labor support for the 
PSUM was much lower, hitting 5.1 percent in the center, the third 
highest level behind employees and professionals.
The government approval results among workers were not better 
than those for the PRI. In the three regions labor expressed little
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approval of the national government and in the center it most com­
monly expressed frankly negative opinions.
In the north it was the stratum with least enthusiasm for the 
bank nationalization, less even than that among businessmen who were 
most directly affected by the measure. Labor was not favorable to­
ward the bank nationalization in the center or the south, coming in 
among the sectors with the least positive opinions — nonetheless, 
workers were not among the sectors most critical of the bank nation­
alization, which leads to the conclusion that the act was, for them,
far removed from their immediate interests.
It cannot be said that labor support for the right to strike
was low, but it is notable that such support was not high in any re­
gion. As in the case of the middle and elite strata, the popularity 
of the right to strike among workers was greater in the south, mod­
erate in the center, and less in the north. Regarding church partic­
ipation in politics, campesinos proved to be more tolerant than la­
bor. Northern workers were more tolerant than those in the center, 
although less tolerant than those in the south. Northern workers 
were those who backed church participation most, surpassing even 
southern workers on this issue.
The tendency was the same regarding military participation in 
politics: more-tolerance in the north, moderate in the center and 
less in the south. In fact, northern workers expressed the least op­
position .
Workers were distinguished as well by their scant inclination 
toward radical change. It is necessary to not lose sight of the fact 
that in the Mexican social pyramid labor belongs to the upper 50 
percent of the population above peasants and marginals. In the north 
labor proved to be the least radical stratum (21.1 percent) and the 
most conservative (15.8 percent), and in the center labor also was 
most conservative (21.5 percent). Only in the south did labor 
express more interest in radical change. Regarding periodical
212
preference, no norther workers picked Excelsior and only 7 percent 
named Novedades. On the other hand, 51.3 percent preferred local 
dailies, a percentage only surpassed by bureaucrats. Labor 
preferences for the national dailies mentioned remained low in the 
center and south, although not as low as among the other popular 
strata.
Campesinos
After public functionaries and bureaucrats, campesinos proved 
to be the sector most identified with the PRI. They also were rela­
tively supportive of the government, above all through the marked 
lack of negative opinions which were the lowest among all strata. On 
the other hand, campesinos were far removed from the positions of 
the other strata associated with the government concerning the other 
themes examined here.
In the south campesinos surpassed even the bureaucrats in their 
preferences for the PRI. In contrast, their preferences for the PAN 
and the PSUM (1.4 percent for each) were the lowest among all strata 
in this region. In the center, campesino preferences for the PSUM 
(3.0 percent) were also the lowest among all strata, but for the PAN 
reached a not inconsiderable 8.0 percent. Finally, in the north cam­
pesino preferences for the PSUM were relatively higher, while those 
for the PAN were the lowest in the region, with the exception of the 
bureaucrats. The general tendency in party sympathies across regions 
was similar to that in all cases: less sympathy for the PRI and more 
for the opposition in the north, intermediate levels in the center, 
and more preference for the PRI and less for the opposition in the 
south.
Concerning the government, campesinos were very moderate. Their 
level of favorable opinions was not always counted among the high­
est, but the negatives were always among the lowest. In the north, 
campesinos were the third most favorable sector to the government, 
behind bureaucrats and public functionaries. In the center cam-
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pesinos lost this position, falling in behind bureaucrats and public 
functionaries as well as employees and professionals who all ex­
pressed higher government approval ratings. In the south, the groups 
more favorable to the government included business. In this sense, 
campesinos contradicted the general tendency of more popularity for 
the government in the south, moderate amounts in the center and less 
in the north.
Regarding the bank nationalization, campesinos were the only 
strata that did not express as much opposition in the north as in 
the south, but the positive opinions were not noted for their abun­
dance. As in the case of labor, campesinos tended rather toward in­
difference, confirming that the measure stirred a minor amount of 
interest among the popular strata.
Something similar occurred with the right to strike. In the 
center and in the south campesinos supported it less and in the 
north only business surpassed them in this respect. However, it 
would be erroneous to infer from this fact that campesinos were op­
posed to this right. In the north and in the south for example they 
were the least critical strata, as a result of which it must be con­
cluded — as in the case of the bank nationalization—  that 
campesinos were not much interested in a right that does not 
directly benefit them and that they probably do not have a 
fundamental knowledge of.
Regarding church participation in politics, campesinos were the 
most tolerant stratum, given the low frequency with which they 
openly opposed it. But important regional differences were expressed 
here. In the north campesinos were least inclined to support church 
participation, for which the conclusion would be similar to that in 
the previous two points. However, in the center, campesinos tended 
to support church participation with more frequency and in this re­
gion campesinos were only surpassed by marginals in this sense. 
Finally, in the south campesinos were the sector that most backed 
political activity by the church, for which it is necessary to out-
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line a new tendency: a growing identification of campesinos with the 
clergy from north to south.
Military participation in politics definitely marks a point of 
departure^with the other sectors most tied to the regime. Campesinos 
not only were the least critical stratum but also most frequently 
openly backed military intervention. This was particularly apparent 
in the center and more so in the south; regions where campesinos who 
supported military participation were more numerous than those who 
opposed it. Only in the north did campesinos approach the general 
tendency, supporting military participation to a very low degree, 
although their rejection rate remained among the lowest.
Regarding attitude toward change, campesinos tended to polar­
ize, being among the strata that most frequently demanded radical 
change — in the center they were the extreme—  but also among the 
most conservative sectors as well. Among the popular strata, 
campesinos tended to be the most radical, but more conservative than 
the marginals and almost as conservative as labor. Regarding 
periodical preference, it is notable that in the north campesinos 
did not read Novedades and rarely read Excelsior (4.8 percent); on 
the other hand, their preference for local dailies hit 33.9 percent. 
In the center and in the south campesinos also read Excelsior and 
Novedades very infrequently, being inclined more toward local 
newspapers. It-is interesting to note that, among national dailies, 
northern campesinos mentioned only two: Excelsior and el Heraldo 
(4.8 percent for each). In the center their top national newspapers 
were la Prensa (12.8 percent) and el Sol de Mexico (10.4 percent); 
on the other hand, only 3.0 percent read Novedades and 5.3 percent 
Excelsior. In the south as in the north, the catalog of morning na­
tional dailies that campesinos read was very limited.
The marginals
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Marginals sympathized least with the PRI among all strata. This 
was particularly notable in the north, where only 32.4 percent of
them expressed a preference for this party. On the other hand,
northern marginals were most favorable to the PSUM (7.4 percent) and 
the third most favorable to the PAN (16.2 percent), surpassed only
by workers and business. In the center marginals were also the stra­
tum least inclined toward the PRI (44.9 percent) and once again the 
third most tied to the PAN (10.8 percent), surpassed again by labor 
and business. On the other hand, their preferences for the PSUM were 
relatively low in this region, remaining behind those expressed by 
the middle strata. In the south the PRI position among marginals was 
a little better, but it seems to be owing, above all, to the limited 
amount of support other parties have generated among marginals. 
Together with labor, marginals were the strata furthest from the 
party in power.
Regarding government approval, marginals proved to be less 
averse than to the PRI, although they remained very far from identi­
fying with the government. In the three regions, marginals placed 
among the most negative strata, while marginal supporters never fig­
ured among the top groups. However, from one sense to the other, 
marginals were among the most radical strata in each region.
As was common among the popular strata, the bank nationaliza­
tion did not generate much enthusiasm among the marginals, with 
their results being poor in both directions. Regarding the right to 
strike, marginals were not favorable. In the center as well as in 
the south they expressed the highest indices of contrary opinions to 
the right to strike and in the center only campesinos backed the 
right with less frequency.
Among the popular strata marginals were the most critical of 
church participation in politics, but continued being more tolerant 
than the middle and elite strata. Regarding open support, however, 
the marginals surpassed even workers and campesinos. Regarding mili­
216
tary participation, the position of the marginals was similar: they 
were the most critical of the base strata but still more tolerant 
than the other strata. Nonetheless, in the south marginals were the 
most tolerant, even more than campesinos. In sum, in neither issue 
did marginals contradict the general tendency: more support at the 
base for church and military participation in politics. As always, 
tolerance among marginals tended to increase from north to south.
In the same sense, opposition to change among marginals 
tended to increase from north to south: less in the north than in 
the center and in both than in the south. However, southern 
marginals proved more radical than those in the center and as much 
as those in the north. In the north, marginals were the most radical 
stratum at the base. As in the case of labor and campesinos, 
marginals had scant affection for national newspapers (especially in 
the north and center) and much for local dailies. In the north the 
preferred national was neither Excelsior nor Novedades but el 
Heraldo de Mexico (8.8 percent). In the center marginals preferred 
la Prensa (13.5 percent) and el Sol de Mexico (8.7 percent) to the 
other two already mentioned, although in the south marginals opted 
for Novedades (24.7 percent) and Excelsior (6.8 percent).
The major contrast at the base of the social pyramid was the 
difference between campesinos on one hand and labor and marginals on 
the other regarding the PRI and the government. The erosion of gov­
ernment legitimacy among the latter two strata is clear, to such a 
degree that both proved to the the most critical among all sectors. 
In particular, the high degree of influence of the PAN among labor 
and to a lesser degree among marginals was surprising. The study re­
veals that labor sympathy for the PAN was not restricted to the 
northern region but extended throughout the nation.
Regarding the other topics, the three popular sectors showed 
great similarities: low levels of interest in issues such as the 
bank nationalization; significantly great tolerance — and at times 
frank support—  of military and church participation in politics;
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little affinity for the national dailies preferred by elite and mid­
dle strata and preference for others, such as la Prensa, el Sol de 
Mexico and el Heraldo de Mexico.
General observations
After comparing the regional results for the eight variables 
considered, it is possible to recognize an ideological and political 
difference among the three regions under analysis. It can be af­
firmed that the north is, taken together, more conservative than the 
center and the south, while the south is more progressive — and, it 
seems, more tied to the regime—  than the other two regions. These 
affirmations are supported by several characteristics. The backing 
of the government and the PRI and the consensus over the govern­
ment's conquests and historic traditions, such as the right to 
strike or the exclusion of the church and military from politics, 
were definitely less in the north than in the center and the south. 
Among the latter two regions, the differences, although less sharp, 
were reflected in the fact that the government and the right to 
strike were more popular in the south, which suggests a major iden­
tification with the regime and the official ideology, but support 
for military and church intervention was also greater in the south 
than in the center.
The essentially rightist bias in the north was seen in the ma­
jor influence the PAN has had there and the scant — and in some 
cases virtually null-- influence of leftist parties. In this sense, 
the center was distinguished by its greater political plurality, 
having as much influence from the right as from the left. In the 
south the right seemed to have a minor impact and the left much more 
influence than in the north, although far from what it had in the 
center.
It is a very interesting finding that the desire to introduce 
radical change was also greater in the north than in the other two 
regions. In this case, of course, radicalism is not synonymous with
218
the left, such that the changes that seem to be demanded in the 
north would mainly be to the right. As with radicalism, the north 
exhibits a greater degree of localism or regionalism than the other 
two regions, as is suggested by its greater preference for local 
newspapers — an indicator that would show a major indifference to 
the culture and ideology of the center and something closer to a 
cultural tradition of its own.
The analysis of the responses by the eight strata to the vari­
ables used here leads to the conclusion that a considerable politi­
cal and ideological heterogeneity exists in the social pyramid, to 
which is necessary to add the before-mentioned regional heterogene­
ity. The popularity of the PRI and the government drops from top to 
bottom of the social pyramid, although in each of the three levels 
considered the regime maintains a strong base of legitimacy: with 
public functionaries and political leaders among elites; bureaucrats 
among middle strata and campesinos at the base. Outside of these 
three strata, opinions of the PRI and the federal government tend to 
be comparatively poor, especially among the two other popular 
strata: labor and marginals. Marginals were the most skeptical of 
all strata of the PRI, while workers proved to be the most skeptical 
of the government. At any rate, backing for the PRI and the govern­
ment were appreciably low --above all in the second case—  among 
business, private employees and professionals.
If the PRI achieved its best results among elites, thanks to 
the enormous backing from public functionaries, the PSUM achieved 
its best from the middle strata and the PAN, surprisingly, from the 
popular strata which, it should not be forgotten, constitute the 
popular majority. These results contradict certain common preconcep­
tions about the political sociology of modern Mexico, such as the 
presumption that the middle classes would be the most politically 
conservative and that the popular classes would be the most radical. 
This can be affirmed not only because of their relative preferences 
for the different political parties, more for the right at the base
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and for the left among the middle strata, but also because of the 
responses to other variables.
The affirmations in the previous paragraph are supported by the 
responses^ to questions about the right to strike and political par­
ticipation by the church and military, because the results point in­
variably to a greater conservatism at the base than among the middle 
and elite strata or, at least, a smaller degree of identification by 
the popular strata with the government's conquests and historic tra­
ditions. Labor certainly revealed scant consciousness of its own 
particular interests by opposing the right to strike in higher per­
centages than other strata and the campesinos proved to be frankly 
inclined — in contrast with the other strata—  toward military 
intervention in politics.
No less suggestive is the apparent antagonism among the elite 
strata. If the political leadership was the most enthusiastic sup­
porter of the PRI and the government, the business leadership, on 
the other hand, was particularly averse to the PRI and expressed a 
very poor opinion about the government. Public functionaries and po­
litical leaders were most pleased with the bank nationalization and 
entrepreneurs most unhappy.
The right to strike achieved its greatest backing among the 
business leadership and one of the lowest among the political lead­
ership. Although in a less clear way, the same differences persisted 
concerning the issues of church and military participation in poli­
tics, newspaper preferences and personal attitude toward change. In 
this last case, public functionaries and political leaders were sig­
nificantly for moderate change, while business came out at both ex­
tremes: for keeping everything as it was and for radical changes.
If we begin from the assumption that one of the fundamental 
pillars of political stability is elite consensus, we should look 
carefully at the different positions taken by the political and eco­
nomic elites regarding the questions that are under analysis.
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Although the 1983 poll is nothing more than a snapshot in time,
probable evolution of the 9 'vCva differences. 
If these have tended to decline in recent years, then the probabil­
ity of a split at the top would be less now than then, although the 
contrary could have occurred. In this context, the comparison with 
the 1987 poll becomes crucial.
From the preceding one conclusion seems clear: The current so­
cial consensus is markedly less in the popular strata than in the 
middle and than in both than at the top. It is reasonable to suppose 
that such a fact could be due to the relatively greater impact of 
the last crises and the difficult economic situation that has per­
sisted at least since 1982. Labor, campesinos and marginals have 
seen their standards of living drop to a greater degree than those 
among the middle and elite strata — without a doubt. The difficult 
economic situation, which for a professional could mean a reduction 
in his level of consumption, or for a businessman a drop in profits, 
has meant unemployment for workers with subsequent marginalization 
and economic and social insecurity.
Less easy to explain is why the popular strata — workers and 
marginals—  tend, in what seems an increasing degree, to look to the 
political right instead of the left. It could be affirmed that the
reason is a historic lack of class consciousness of material inter­
ests, but such*an affirmation would be superficial and reductionist. 
It is not easy to take as fact that worker consciousness is more 
backward^ than that of the campesinos — whose living standards are 
lower than those of the working class—  who have not shifted to the
right but have remained faithful to the party of the
"institutionalized revolution". The probable explanation would have 
to be sought in the area of the dominant ideology, which among other 
things tends to view the current state of affairs as a result of bad 
government administration and corruption. The discrediting of the 
government seems to translate into a shift to the left, whose posi­
tions maintain some similarities with the official ideology of the 
Mexican Revolution. At any rate, to the probable effects of the dom-
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inant ideology in labor class consciousness should be added the his­
toric disarticulation of leftist political organizations, whose 
fragmentation and absence of viable strategies have impeded until 
very recently any real inroads into national affairs.
Nor is it easy to explain the shift to the right in the north 
region in comparison with the rest of the country. Such a shift is 
particularly acute in the two key strata in the formation of Mexican 
society: labor and business. Once again, to establish the basis of 
an explanation it is necessary to return to the considerable socio­
cultural influence of the neighboring nation to all of the border 
states. It also should not be forgotten that the northern business­
man — especially from Monterrey-- has always had a much smaller 
affinity for the post-revolutionary governments than the private 
sector in the center and the south has had. Northern businessmen de­
veloped into a special interest prior to the Revolution and never 
were — nor have been up to the present-- fully integrated into the 
governing bloc. The great distance between northern business and the 
current regime, whose weaknesses due to centralism are well-known, 
seem to have tended to be reproduced among workers who labor in 
northern factories, commonly operating in a model of syndicalism 
that has little or nothing in common with the official model incor­
porated into the PRI.
Finally, the shift to the right among business and labor, as 
well as the lower degree of identification with the central govern­
ment, seems to have permeated all of northern society, including the 
middle classes and the political elite. In the north, the whole pop­
ulation is proportionally more identified with the PAN and more 
critical of the government, including the regime's own functionar­
ies .
The study identifies a fundamental heterogeneity among the po­
litical and ideological positions that affect not only the social 
stratification but the human geography of the nation as well. We can 
take as fact that the social perception of the crisis has been mod­
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eled after this heterogeneous base. As a result, it seems clear that 
all strategies designed to confront the economic difficulties and 
their political repercussions, will not be successful if social and 
regional differences are disregarded when defining and implementing 
policy.
10. PUBLIC OPINION IN 1987
As in the previous chapter, the responses given by each stratum 
in each region to the eight central questions are analyzed and from 
them profiles are drawn for each of the 27 regional strata in 
Mexico. In addition, the evolution of the tendencies for the four- 
year period between polls is reviewed.
Regarding party sympathies, the most profound setback for the 
regime was observed in the center region, which is the largest and 
most populous of the three. It was in the center where the PRI 
achieved its best results in 1983 and its worst in 1987. On the 
other hand, the same distribution of PRI sympathies throughout the 
society re-emerged: more at the top, moderate among middle strata 
and less at the base. Something similar occurred with favorable 
opinions, supporting the idea that a direct relationship exists be­
tween socio-economic position and affinity for the regime. It should 
be noted that favorable responses for the PRI and the government 
dropped considerably in all cases. The PRI ceased to be the majority 
party that it was even in 1983, with a drop in sympathies to less 
than 30 percent.
In fact the drop in PRI sympathies was proportionally greater 
at the base, where PRI supporters only represented 25 percent of the 
total. The base strata in the center as well as those in the north 
were the two sectors least favorable to the PRI: only 22.8 percent 
identified with this party. The base strata in the north came out in 
favor of the PAN in 21.2 percent of the cases, a percentage very 
similar to that for the PRI.
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Party Sympathy 
PRI PAN PSUM
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 62.8 46.4 51.5 52.1 19.8 4.4 4.9 4.0 0.0 3.7 2.9 3.0
Business 40.3 27.6 40.4 31.7 15.1 9.8 12.2 11.0 1.4 3.6 1.7 2.9
'Intellectual 32.1 19.3 31.1 23.3 19.8 6.9 10.7 9.6 1.9 9.2 4.9 7.3
Average 49.5 31.1 41.0 35.7 12.2 7.0 9.2 8.2 1.1 5.5 3.1 4.4
Professional 45.3 22.5 29.9 27.4 10.4 7.4 14.0 9.0 0.0 6.7 0.9 4.7
White Collar 31.1 24.4 42.5 28.5 26.4 9.4 5.7 11.6 0.9 2.8 4.7 2.8
Civil Servant 52.1 28.5 36.2 33.6 6.7 7.5 4.8 6.9 1.0 5.3 6.7 4.8
Average 42.8 25.1 36.2 29.8 14.5 8.1 8.1 9.1 0.6 4.9 4.1 4.1
Blue Collar 19.4 20.0 32.4 21.9 29.6 10.8 15.2 14.7 0.9 6.9 9.5 6.3
Farmer 31.7 26.0 42.3 29.5 18.8 7.4 8.7 9.4 3.0 2.8 1.9 2.7
Marginal 17.5 22.4 34.9 23.6 30.1 7.8 14.2 12.4 0.0 3.2 0.0 2.2
Average 22.8 22.8 36.5 25.0 21.1 8.6 12.7 12.1 1.3 4.3 3.8 3.7
It would be difficult to continue considering bureaucrats and 
campesinos as bastions of legitimacy for the PRI in 1987. Although 
both groups remained the most favorable strata, there was such an 
erosion of positive responses among them that they practically lined 
up with their neighbors. Only politicians continued to clearly 
identify with the regime, although the setback in their approval 
rating was very marked: Only 52 percent of them said they identified 
with the PRI compared with 75 percent in 1983.
Regarding other parties, the pronounced advances by the PAN 
among all northern strata and the majority of southern strata should 
be emphasizedIn the north, some advances were spectacular, as in 
the case of politicians, whose PAN sympathies grew from 4 to 20 per­
cent. Northern labor continued being one of the the most favorable 
regional strata to the PAN: 29.6 percent, equal to the national av­
erage of sympathies for the PRI. But in 1987, northern labor was 
surpassed by northern marginals on the issue of PAN sympathies: 30.1 
percent of marginals expressed preferences for the PAN. However, the 
PAN declined considerably in the center, where it lost ground among 
all strata except among bureaucrats. The greater relative weight of 
the center region meant that the PAN’s national approval rating 
dropped slightly.
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The PMS experienced a general setback in the north, where it 
was excluded in the preferences of politicians, professionals, and 
marginals and almost completely excluded in those of labor and em­
ployees. The party also declined among the middle strata in the cen­
ter and south, where it had made clear gains in 1983. However, it 
achieved important advances among elites in the center and south —  
above all thanks to the inclusion of intellectuals in the 1987 poll- 
- and at the base in the south. Intellectuals in the center became 
the most favorable strata to the PSUM expressing preferences for the 
party in 9.2 percent of the cases.
Another result of the 1987 poll that was as notable as the drop 
in PRI sympathies, was the increase in the number of people who 
identified with no party, owing to the different times in the sexe- 
nial calendars of the two polls: the first was taken just after the 
1982 presidential election and the second a year before the 1988 
election. In this sense the central region was illustrative, going 
from the area with the most clearly defined party preferences to the 
one with the most undefined sympathies of the three regions. Half of 
those interviewed in the center (50.1 percent) refused to identify 
with any party, when just four years earlier the same response had 
been 24.6 percent.
In conclusion, the salient tendencies were the PAN's advance in 
the north and in the south especially among the middle and base 
strata, the relatively high identification of intellectuals with the 
PMS and the general drop — particularly accented in the center—  of 
PRI sympathies, together with the increase in the percentage of peo­
ple who identified with no party in the center region.
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Government Opinion -
G O O D  REGULAR BAD
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 62.8 59.5 60.2 60.2 26.7 19.1 31.1 22.2 8.6 17.0 7.8 14.1
Business 34.9 28.8 38.0 31.2 31.4 34.3 34.7 33.8 32.7 30.6 19.1 29.0
' Intellectual 42.4 25.3 36.9 30.2 26.4 31.3 48.5 33.2 25.5 35.2 11.6 28.8
Average 46.7 37.8 45.0 40.6 28.1 28.2 38.1 29.7 22.2 27.6 12.8 24.3
Professional 35.9 26.0 28.9 28.1 36.8 32.9 40.2 34.7 22.7 35.0 26.2 31.5
White Collar 33.0 23.7 29.2 26.1 34.9 38.5 45.3 39.0 26.4 30.2 22.6 28.4
Civil Servant 22.8 37.6 37.3 34.7 41.9 30.1 29.5 31.9 30.5 25.8 29.5 27.1
Average 30.5 29.1 31.8 29.6 37.8 33.8 38.3 35.2 26.5 30.3 26.1 29.0
Blue Collar 37.0 18.7 31.5 23.8 37.0 43.3 26.7 39.6 21.3 33.2 35.2 31.5
Farmer 23.8 19.8 24.1 21.1 49.5 40.0 30.8 40.0 22.8 33.1 28.9 30.8
Marginal 21.4 17.7 25.4 19.6 41.7 32.7 37.7 35.0 33.0 14.8 27.4 33.3
Average 36.9 18.7 27.0 21.5 42.7 38.6 31.7 38.2 28.3 27.0 30.5 31.8
As in the case of PRI sympathies, the center became the most 
critical region of the government, replacing the north. Favorable 
opinions in the center became reached their lowest levels and nega­
tives their highest. The three base strata in the center were among 
the most critical of the government; in no case did their favorable 
opinions reach 20 percent, surpassing by a longshot those of the 
north. In fact and in a notable manner, favorable opinions of the 
government rose in the north among politicians and businessmen, pro­
fessionals and employees and among workers.
On the other hand, in terms of the entire social scale, the 
1987 results fully reinforced those of 1983. Positive opinions of 
the federal government were higher at the top, moderate in the mid­
dle and lower at the base, with negative opinions falling in inverse 
order.
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Church Participation -
GOOD REGULAR BAD
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 1.9 10.4 26.2 11.5 12.4 8.3 9.7 9.2 81.9 76.0 59.3 74.4
Business 21.2 11.5 11.8 13.1 9.6 8.4 7.3 8.4 63.0 70.6 67.7 68.9
• Intellectual 12.3 7.6 12.6 9.1 7.5 6.0 17.5 8.1 73.6 81.2 61.2 76.7
Average 11.8 9.8 16.8 11.2 9.8 7.5 11.5 8.5 72.8 75.9 62.7 73.3
Professional 16.1 10.4 18.7 12.7 12.3 6.0 8.4 7.4 66.0 76.4 68.2 73.4
White Collar 22.7 12.0 11.3 13.7 18.9 12.4 9.4 13.0 50.0 67.1 70.7 64.8
Civil Servant 18.1 7.8 14.3 10.4 11.4 7.1 11.4 8.5 53.8 74.4 62.8 70.8
Average 18.9 10.0 14.7 12.2 14.2 8.5 9.7 9.6 56.6 72.6 67.2 69.6
Blue Collar 23.1 13.1 24.8 16.6 17.6 7.6 11.4 9.9 49.0 66.6 52.4 61.3
Farmer 18.8 15.2 17.3 16.1 13.9 9.7 9.6 10.3 53.5 54.0 52.9 53.8
Marginal 20.4 13.1 17.9 15.1 19.4 12.2 19.8 14.6 50.5 58.3 54.8 56.4
Average 20.7 13.8 20.0 15.9 16.9 9.8 13.6 11.6 51.1 59.6 53.3 57.1
The center region also was distinguished by an increase in op­
position to church and military participation in politics. We al­
ready have mentioned that because of a restructuring of responses on 
the 1987 questionnaire there was a general increase in favorable re­
sponses regarding church participation in politics, but such an in­
crease was much less marked in the center than in the north and 
south. Regarding negative opinions, the center was the only region 
where they went up, to such a degree that the national average also 
went up even though negative responses decreased in the north and 
south.
The same pattern emerged in the case of the military. While fa­
vorable opinions of intervention rose in the north and south, they 
dropped in the center to such an extent that the national average 
dropped as well.
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Military Participation -
GOOD REGULAR BAD
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 15.2 16.8 37.9 20.0 15.2 11.3 20.4 13.4 66.7 65.5 35.9 61.0
Business 22.8 14.1 25.0 17.3 16.8 13.7 15.5 14.5 51.3 59.8 43.8 55.8
' Intellectual 21.7 15.6 20.4 17.4 14.2 10.6 18.4 12.4 54.3 66.9 55.3 63.1
Average 19.9 15.5 27.7 18.2 15.4 11.8 18.0 13.4 57.4 64.0 44.9 59.9
Professional 24.5 17.1 35.5 21.4 17.9 15.3 15.0 15.7 47.2 67.1 37.3 52.3
White Collar 33.0 17.6 29.3 22.0 15.1 11.3 14.2 12.4 30.2 53.7 42.4 48.0
Civil Servant 14.3 14.6 24.7 16.2 23.8 12.8 14.3 14.8 50.5 57.6 48.5 54.9
Average 23.9 16.4 29.8 19.8 18.9 13.1 14.5 14.3 42.6 56.1 42.7 51.7
Blue Collar 30.6 17.3 33.3 22.1 16.7 10.8 19.0 13.1 40.8 56.0 28.6 49.0
Farmer 20.8 18.6 21.1 19.4 22.8 12.0 11.5 13.6 34.6 43.4 40.4 41.6
Marginal 28.1 18.7 19.8 20.3 16.5 9.7 20.8 12.6 42.8 49.8 48.1 48.4
Average 26.5 18.2 24.6 20.6 18.6 10.8 17.1 13.1 39.4 49.7 38.9 46.3
Unfavorable opinions rose in the center by more than 10 points, 
although in this case the north followed the same trend. The south 
confirmed its inclination toward church and military participation 
in politics, evident in 1983, but the overall geographic tendency 
changed because of variations in the center. This region became the 
biggest opponent of such participation, replacing the north, in the 
same way that it replaced the north on the issues of government ap­
proval and PRI preferences.
The analysis of the results by strata confirmed the regional 
results. The decrease in favorable opinions toward participation by 
the military ahd church in politics was general in the center, being 
particularly pronounced among elites but notable as well among the 
middle and base strata.
In the same sense, the increase in negative opinions was also 
general in the center, as much in the case of the church as with the 
military. Elites in the three regions confirmed their great aversion 
to political activity by the clergy and military and the base, also 
throughout the three regions, confirmed its greater tolerance, reaf­
firming the tendency observed in 1983: the acceptance of political
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participation by the church and military increased from top to bot­
tom of the social scale.
Right to Strike 
GOOD REGULAR BAD
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 57.2 61.9 68.0 62.0 21.0 9.7 23.3 13.7 18.1 23.2 6.8 19.8
Business 60.9 54.8 60.0 56.7 204 18.4 18.7 18.8 14.4 16.3 8.7 14.8
Intellectual 62.2 70.1 57.3 66.8 21.7 14.3 16.5 15.8 13.2 10.1 21.4 12.4
Average 60.1 62.2 61.7 61.8 21.0 14.1 19.5 16.1 15.2 16.5 12.3 15.6
Professional 65.1 67.1 61.7 65.9 17.9 18.3 24.3 19.2 10.4 7.4 6.5 7.8
White Collar 54.7 58.7 66.1 59.3 26.4 21.0 17.9 21.4 8.5 10.8 9.5 103
Civil Servant 63.8 72.4 60.0 69.0 11.4 13.0 17.1 13.4 12.4 8.5 11.5 9.6
Average 61.2 68.8 62.6 64.7 18.5 16.5 19.7 18.0 10.4 7.7 9.1 9.2
Blue Collar 52.8 55.0 64.8 56.2 18.5 22.6 12.4 20.2 24.1 13.4 13.4 15.1
Farmer 39.6 42.3 54.8 44.0 32.7 22.5 15.4 23.0 7.9 11.7 15.4 11.8
Marginal 57.2 50.4 60.4 53.2 23.3 18.0 11.3 17.7 13.6 13.6 10.3 13.0
Average 49.8 49.2 60.0 51.1 24.8 21.0 13.0 20.3 15.2 12.9 13.0 133
The 1987 results confirmed in general the high degree of accep­
tance of the right to strike among all strata. The regional results 
were practically the same in both polls, with only slight variations 
within the range of two percent. However, at the regional level 
there were some changes worthy of attention. The most notable was 
the general decline that the strike image suffered among workers. In
the three regions, favorable responses dropped and unfavorable ones
rose in this stratum, which is without a doubt most directly 
affected by the right to strike. The variations were particularly 
notable in the case of northern workers, whose favorable opinions 
dropped almost 10 points and whose negative ones rose 14. A 
pronounced decline was observed as well among workers in the center.
In the north, the right to strike lost ground not only among
workers but across the three strata at the base, which could indi­
cate that this region continues more on the path toward more conser­
vative positions than the majority of groups in the population. In 
fact, if the north did not experience a general hardening toward the 
right to strike, it was because of an increase of support among 
elites, thanks to the inclusion of intellectuals in the 1987 poll --
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who supported it—  although business also improved its position. It 
was notable that northern businessmen proved in 1987 to be more in­
clined toward the right to strike than the workers themselves. Only 
the campesinos were less favorable than the workers in the north.
Another result worthy of consideration was the pronounced in­
crease in favorable opinions to the right to strike among the middle 
strata in the center region: around 10 points, with special emphasis 
given in this sense to employees and bureaucrats. Unfavorable opin­
ions went down consistently across the three strata. If we consider 
the notable decline of sympathies for the PRI and government ap­
proval in this region, the similar setback of the PAN and the moder­
ate surge of the PMS, we could conclude that the center region 
(especially among the middle strata) was expressing a tendency to­
ward progressive change as would seem to be confirmed as well from 
its high identification with the right to strike.
Before continuing with the results to the question about per­
sonal attitude toward change in 1987, it should be taken into ac­
count that the responses do not know and no answer were not included 
in the 1983 poll. All of the strata expressed fewer responses in fa­
vor of change, but the variations in each substantive response were 
not constant across responses. The decline in the number of radicals 
among politicians in the north was very notable (from 35.1 to 7.6 
percent) and in general among all elites in this region. Northern 
intellectuals as well proved to be much less radical (10.4 percent) 
than their counterparts in the center (28.7 percent) and in the 
south (18.4 percent). On the other hand, the radical percentages 
rose among northern workers and campesinos, creating a greater po­
larization of personal attitudes in that region.
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Attitude Towards Change -
RADICAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Strata Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg Nth Ctr Sth Avrg
Government 7.6 18.6 25.2 17.9 63.8 54.9 55.3 56.5 10.5 15.6 15.5 14.8
Business 19.7 17.4 17.9 17.8 48.2 51.9 47.0 50.5 18.2 15.6 13.9 15.8
'Intellectual 10.4 28.7 18.4 24.1 60.4 51.3 55.3 53.4 17.0 11.7 12.6 12.7
Average 12.5 21.5 20.5 19.9 57.4 52.7 52.5 53.4 15.2 14.3 14.0 14.4
Professional 25.5 17.6 15.0 18.4 50.0 60.6 66.4 59.8 11.3 8.8 9.3 9.3
White Collar 34.0 20.5 18.9 22.4 37.7 56.7 53.8 53.1 9.4 10.4 7.5 9.8
Civil Servant 21.9 21.0 21.0 21.1 53.3 56.6 45.7 54.3 12.4 11.9 12.4 12.0
Average 27.1 19.7 18.3 20.6 47.0 57.9 55.3 55.7 11.0 10.3 9.7 10.3
Blue Collar 27.8 20.0 17.1 20.9 38.9 47.2 45.7 45.6 13.0 15.9 14.3 14.1
Fanner 40.6 21.1 19.2 23.9 27.7 34.7 40.4 34.5 14.9 14.9 16.3 15.2
Marginal 20.4 19.1 10.4 17.9 37.9 42.4 41.5 41.5 20.4 13.4 16.0 14.9
Average 29.6 20.0 15.5 20.9 34.8 41.4 42.5 40.5 16.1 14.7 15.5 15.0
Regarding conservative attitudes, there were shades of differ­
ences that should be noted. Among elites in the three regions, the 
percentage of conservatives rose, but at the base and among the mid­
dle strata in the center and south it declined. The north is set 
apart from the other two regions for its increase in the percentage 
of conservatives across all strata with the exception of workers.
The center, on the other hand, showed an acute drop in the percent­
age of conservatives in the middle and base strata, although not 
enough to offset the increase of conservatives among elites, for 
which, seen together, the center region also experienced a moderate 
increase in conservative positions. Finally, the south was the only 
region in which the percentage of conservatives went down thanks 
above all to changes at the base. It is possible, therefore, to con­
clude that in 1987 there was a greater polarization in the social 
pyramid on the issue of the need for change. Elites tended toward 
greater conservatism while the middle strata and mainly the base 
strata tended toward radicalism.
In conclusion, it can be affirmed that in the four-year period 
between 1983 and 1987 important changes in political-ideological po­
sitions arose in the national population. The most notable change 
was, of course, the profound erosion in 'the credibility of the gov­
ernment and the party in power during these years. It cannot be hid-
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den that the erosion was much more pronounced in the center, which 
is precisely where the decisions are made and where the regime’s 
presence is most immediately felt.
On the other hand, a direct relationship was established be­
tween socio-economic status and affinity for the PRI and the govern­
ment. Such an affinity tends to decline from top to bottom of the 
social pyramid or, in other words, from the least populous strata to 
the most populous. The north showed a bias toward the right, illus­
trated eloquently by the notable gains of the PAN in this region.
The center, on the other hand, seemed to tend toward the left, 
although much more notable was the surge in responses of abstention- 
ism or apathy. The south could be said to have maintained its posi­
tion as most closely tied to the regime, although with a drop big 
enough to place it close to the north. The south confirmed its posi­
tion as the region less identified with the values of the post­
revolutionary ideology: secularism in politics and diffusion of 
certain social conquests such as the right to strike.
THE TOP OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID 
The political elite
If in 1983 politicians in the center had been the most enthusi­
astic supporters of the PRI and those in the north the least, the 
situation changed in 1987. Politicians in the center came to be the
least tied to the PRI (46.4 percent), replacing those in the north
(62.8 percent in 1987 compared with 65.3 percent in 1983) who were 
relatively more priista along with those in the south. In reality, 
the drop in PRI popularity, although high in all regions, was par­
ticularly pronounced in the center, where the party lost its high
margin of sympathies in all strata.
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The sympathies lost by the PRI among politicians were not 
gained by any other party. On the contrary, the PAN as well as the 
PMS lost popularity — which already was slight—  among politicians 
in the three regions with only one important exception: in the north 
politicians who sympathized with the PAN went from 3.9 to 19.8 per­
cent, an advance offset, however, by the drop in PAN sympathies 
among politicians in the center (13.1 to 4.4 percent). As in the ma­
jority of the other strata, the choice that absorbed the most PRI 
defectors was none, which in the case of politicians jumped from 7,3 
in 1983 to 23.2 percent in 1987, for the reasons mentioned in the 
previous chapter.
The same tendency was observed in the case of government ap­
proval. Politicians in the center became the most skeptical, with 
their positive responses dropping to their lowest levels and nega­
tives rising to the highest of the three regions, surpassing north­
ern politicians who four years earlier had been the most critical 
regional group within the stratum.
Another important change was registered by politicians on the 
issue of the right to strike. From being the most supportive in 1983 
they became the most critical in 1987, surpassing even business. 
Their positive opinions dropped in the three regions, especially in 
the center where they fell 13 points.
Regarding the participation of the church and military in poli­
tics, the most significant changes were registered by politicians in 
the south: Their favorable opinions of church participation rose 
from 8.6 to 26.2 percent and for military participation from 20.9 to
37.9 percent. In fact, southern politicians became the most enthusi­
astic supporters of both types of participation among all strata in 
the region. By contrast, church and military participation lost 
ground among politicians in the north, who came to be one of the 
most averse regional strata to such intervention. In the center, 
there were no significant changes, except an apparent polarization
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of opinions regarding the church, with the positive opinions rising 
as much as the negatives.
Regarding personal attitudes to change, the 1983 tendency was 
inverted when radicalism had been higher in the north, moderate in 
the center and lower in the south. In 1987 it was exactly the oppo­
site. Politicians in the three regions adjusted nonetheless to the 
general pattern: by increasing the percentage of responses against 
change and decreasing (except in the south) responses for change. As 
in the rest of the social pyramid, the politicians stratum proved to 
be more conservative than before.
The business elite
As in the case of politicians, businessmen in the central re­
gion lost the great margin of sympathies for the PRI: from 51.2 per­
cent in 1983 to only 27.6 percent in 1987. In the north, on the 
other hand, the setback was only 5 points (45.5 to 40.3 percent) and 
in the south 16 points (56.4 to 40.4 percent). Businessmen in the 
center came to be the least priista of all, much less than those in 
the north who, on the other hand, stayed at the same level as those 
in the south.
Once again as in the case of politicians, business did not 
throw their sympathies to other parties — at least not toward the 
PAN and the PMS—  while in the case of the PAN preferences dropped 
from 13.5 to 11 percent and those for the PMS remained almost the 
same: 2.8 percent in 1983 and 2.9 in 1987. The PAN made some gains 
among businessmen in the north and south which were offset by the 
decline in the center. The PMS lost ground among northern 
businessmen and gained some among them in the center and south. On 
the other hand, business sympathies for other parties went from less 
than 1 percent in 1983 to 11 percent in 1987 and their level of 
identification with no party reached 35.4 percent compared with 22,2 
in 1983. As with politicians, businessmen who stopped sympathizing 
with the PRI did not switch in general to another party.
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The major setback in government approval among businessmen was 
also registered in the center, where it fell more than 11 points. In 
the south, government approval dropped 7 points and in the north it 
rose, surprisingly, from 32.3 to 34.9 percent. Nonetheless, business 
came to be one of the most critical strata of the government because 
the setback in favorable opinions was, as we will detail later, much 
more pronounced in the middle strata and above all at the base. 
Regarding negative opinions, the biggest relative increase was reg­
istered in the south, where businessmen who expressed disapproval 
rose from 7.4 to 19.1 percent; in the center negative opinions dou­
bled, from 15.4 to 30.8 percent; and in the north they gained 11 
points, going from 21.2 to 32.7 percent. It should be observed that, 
in absolute terms, northern businessmen were those who continued ex­
pressing the poorest opinion of the government.
Regarding the right to strike, it was notable that businessmen 
in the three regions increased their positive opinions, although the 
most pronounced increase --which was notable as well—  came in the 
north: from 40.1 to 60.9 percent, making northern businessmen more 
enthusiastic about the right to strike than those in the center and 
in the south. Negative opinions dropped, but only in the north and 
in the south. In the center, the number of businessmen opposed to 
the right rose, although very slightly.
Support for military and church participation in politics lost 
ground among businessmen, although with marked regional differences. 
Negative opinions grew in the north and in the center but dropped in 
the south, as much in the case of the military as the church. 
Favorable opinions in the case of the church grew in all three re­
gions, but the restructuring of responses that led to such an in­
crease in all strata should be remembered. Finally, favorable opin­
ions to military participation increased in the north and in the 
south, although not enough to offset the proportionally more signif­
icant decline in the center.
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Businessmen who opted for radical change reduced ranks in all 
three regions, although the most marked drop was in the north (from 
38.6 to 19.7 percent). The same happened in the case of moderate re­
sponses, while conservative responses gained ground except in the 
south. In^the north, conservative responses went from 7.7 to 18.2 
percent and in the center from 12 to 15.6 percent. In the south, on 
the other hand, they dropped from 16.5 to 13.9 percent.
Intellectuals
Intellectuals distinguished themselves are one of the strata 
least tied to the PRI, surpassed in this sense only by labor. 
Intellectual preferences for this party were particularly low in the 
center, where they barely reached 19.3 percent and were the lowest 
in the region. In the north and in the south the results were simi­
lar: a little more than 30 percent in both regions.
Northern intellectuals showed relatively high preferences for 
the PAN (19.8 percent), but not those in the center (6.9 percent) 
and in the south (10.7 percent). Together, however, intellectuals 
did not exceed the national average in preferences for a party. On 
the other hand, intellectuals in the center proved to be the 
regional stratum most tied to the PMS: 9.2 percent, which was the 
best result for this party. Also in the north intellectuals were the 
strata most favorable toward the PMS, but only because the results 
were almost nil among the other strata for this party. In the south
4.9 percent of intellectuals picked PSUM, falling in an intermediate 
range among all strata. It should be mentioned that 43.9 percent of 
intellectuals did not sympathize with any party, the second highest 
percentage of abstention only behind the marginals.
Government approval among intellectuals was the lowest among 
all elite strata, but still higher than the approval ratings among 
the middle strata, confirming the direct relationship that exists 
between socio-economic status and opinion of the government. Once 
again, intellectuals in the center were distinguished by their minor
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inclination toward the government: 25.3 percent favorable opinions 
compared with 42.4 percent in the north and 36.9 percent in the 
south. Both tendencies were confirmed by the negative responses as 
well. In the center, intellectuals who spoke poorly of the govern­
ment reached 35.2 percent of those interviewed; the highest percent­
age in the region. In the north and in the south, the respective 
percentages were 25.5 and 11.6; both falling in an intermediate 
range.
Regarding the right to strike intellectuals were favorable, be­
ing the most enthusiastic stratum behind bureaucrats. Intellectuals 
in the center were the biggest supporters of the right: 70.1 percent 
(compared with 62.2 in the north and 57.3 in the south), confirming 
the great bias of the center intelligentsia toward progressive posi­
tions .
Intellectuals were the most opposed among the strata to church 
and military participation in politics. Regarding the church, their 
favorable opinions reached only 9.1 percent, the lowest in the so­
cial pyramid and regarding the military positive responses were 17.4 
percent --one of the lowest. Negative opinions hit 7 6.7 percent in 
the case of the church and 63.1 percent concerning the military, the 
highest in both cases. Once again the intellectuals in the center 
demonstrated their great radicalism: They were the most fervent op­
ponents of church and military participation in politics.
Intellectuals were the most radical on the social scale: 24.1 
percent of them came out for radical change, and those in the center 
were even more definite: 28.7 percent compared with 10.4 percent in 
the north and 18.4 percent in the south. Nonetheless, regarding 
preferences for no change, intellectuals were more conservative than 
the three middle strata, although less than the other strata at the 
top. Intellectuals in the center were, once again, the least 
conservative (11.7 percent) of their strata.
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The periodical preferred by intellectuals was Excelsior. In 
fact, no other strata expressed as much affinity for this newspaper- 
- 18.2 percent. In this case, the intellectuals of the south were 
the most inclined: 33 percent opted for Excelsior, compared with 
15.1 percent in the north and 15.4 percent in the center. On the 
other hand, Novedades did not make many inroads among intellectuals 
(4.7 percent), who preferred other periodicals such as La Jornada 
(9.8 percent) and Unomasuno (5.4 percent). Intellectual preferences 
for local dailies were lowest among elites and throughout the entire 
social pyramid, with the exception of campesinos and marginals, re­
vealing the great integration of intellectuals into the dominant 
currents of national thought.
THE MIDDLE CLASSES
Professionals
In 1987 professionals came to be the least sympathetic toward 
the PRI among the middle strata, a position that was occupied by em­
ployees four years earlier. Although sympathies for the PRI fell 
among professionals in all regions, the most drastic drop came in 
the center: from 55.6 to 22.5 percent, a reduction of more than half 
as can be seen. In the north, as with the other strata, the reduc­
tion was substantially less: from 52.2 to 45.3 percent; in the south 
the same thing-happened.
Professional sympathies for the PAN increased slightly at the 
national level (from 8.5 to 9 percent), but the results were uneven 
at the regional level: in the north a moderate advance was regis­
tered (8.4 to 10.4 percent) with a more pronounced increase in the 
south (4.2 to 14 percent); on the other hand, PAN sympathies dropped 
from 12 to 7.4 percent in the center. The opposite occurred with the 
PMS, but it should be remembered that when in a poll the proportions 
are more reduced, as in the case of the PMS, the margins of devia­
tion increase. Sympathies among professionals for this party rose in 
the center (from 5.2 to 6.7 percent) and fell in the north and the
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south. In the north, preferences dropped from 2.2 percent in 1983 to 
0 in 1987; in the south they fell from 8.3 to only 0.9 percent dur­
ing the four years.
Regarding government approval, it was notable that northern 
professionals increased their positive opinions and reduced the neg­
atives, in acute contrast with what happened in the center and in 
the south. In the center, positive responses fell from 45.7 to 26 
percent and negatives grew from 15.9 to 35 percent. In the south, 
the drop in government credibility was important as well, although 
something less than in the center. The professionals constituted the 
middle stratum that most frequently opposed the government: 31.5 
percent.
Professionals continued being one of the strata most partial to 
the right to strike and in fact the most partial in the northern re­
gion. At the national level only the intellectuals expressed a 
greater degree of positive opinion. Nonetheless, unfavorable opin­
ions among professionals reached their lowest levels, lower even 
than among intellectuals. In the south, positive opinions of the 
right to strike among professionals declined from 73.6 to 61.7 per­
cent, making professionals the least partial to this right in the 
middle strata, although four years earlier they were the most par­
tial. However, regarding negative opinions, southern professionals 
continued being the most critical within their strata (6.5 percent).
Regarding participation by the church and military in politics, 
the position among professionals did not change considerably. In the 
case of the military, favorable opinions rose from 18.5 to 21.4 per­
cent and negatives dropped from 53.3 to 52.3 percent, which indi­
cates an almost imperceptible shift in opposition. It should be 
noted, however, that the acceptance of political activity by the 
military grew in the north and above all in the south but dropped, 
on the other hand, in the center. Something similar happened with 
the church. Professionals in the north and south proved to be more 
tolerant of church participation (above all in the south), although
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not enough to offset the lower level of tolerance in the center. In 
fact, the percentage of professionals opposed to church participa­
tion rose from 71 to 73.4 percent.
As much in the north as in the south, professionals had been 
the most radical strata in 1983 and the second most radical at the 
national level, only behind campesinos. In 1987, professionals lost 
this position, becoming the least radical of the middle strata and 
one of the least radical on the social scale. The drop in the per­
centage of radical professionals was particularly large in the south 
(from 40.3 to 15 percent) and also in the center (from 31.3 to 17.6 
percent) and a little less in the north (from 41.3 to 25.5 percent). 
Regarding conservative attitudes, the marked rises in the north and 
south contrasted with the reduction — albeit slight—  in the center. 
Although conservative professionals increased from 7.8 to 9.3 per­
cent, the stratum remained the least openly conservative in the so­
cial pyramid.
Excelsior continued being the preferred periodical among pro­
fessionals, although to a lesser degree than in 1983, when they con­
stituted stratum with the second highest affinity for this newspa­
per, behind politicians. Professionals were the most most frequent 
readers of Novedades (7.4 percent) with those in the south being the 
most faithful readers of this newspaper among all strata in the re­
gion (17.8 percent). Half of the southern professionals read local 
newspapers, compared with only 21.5 percent in the center and 45.3 
percent in the north. Nonetheless, professionals were the most fre­
quent readers of national newspapers among the middle strata, 
although not as frequent as those in the elite strata. Other period­
icals read by professionals in relatively high degrees were el 
Universal and La Jornada (5.4 percent each).
Employees
Employees ceased to be the least sympathetic with the PRI among 
the middle strata, having been surpassed by professionals.
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Nonetheless, the PRI registered a marked setback among employees 
which was greater, as happened in general, in the center region. 
Employees in the center came to be least tied to the PRI within 
their stratum, surpassing those in the north. Overall, employees re­
mained in^an intermediate range regarding PRI support.
Northern employees were set apart, on the other hand, by the 
marked increase in their sympathies for the PAN: from 8.4 in 1983 to
26.4 percent in 1987, a percentage that almost equaled northern em­
ployee preferences for the PRI (31.1 percent). However, the PAN lost 
ground among southern employees, which meant the party increased its 
overall national level of sympathies by 2 points (from 9.4 to 11.6 
percent). The PMS did not lose as much ground among any other stra­
tum as it lost among employees. In the center employees had regis­
tered the highest margin of preference for the party in 1983 (7.8 
percent), which four years later dropped to 2.8 percent. The PMS 
also lost ground among northern employees, but made gains among 
those in the south: from 2.8 to 4.7 percent. At any rate, the pro­
nounced setback in the center meant that national level sympathies 
for the PMS fell from 5.8 to 2.8 percent. In addition, employees 
picked the option none 38.7 percent of the time, which became their 
favorite choice.
As in the cases of the professional and elite strata, northern 
employees increased their government favorability rating from 30.8 
to 33 percent. In contrast, southern employees and above all those 
in the center substantially reduced their positive responses: from
37.5 to 29.2 percent in the south and from 42.5 to 23.7 percent in 
the center. As a result, employees continued being the least tied to 
the government among the middle strata. Regarding negative opinions, 
northern employees fell into line with their southern and center 
counterparts: The percentages went up in all three regions.
The image of the right to strike improved among employees. 
Negative opinions fell in all three regions and positives rose in
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the center and south. At any rate, employees remained the least par­
tial to this right among the middle strata.
Employees came to be the most inclined toward the political 
participant ion of the church and military among the middle strata. 
Regarding the church, positive opinions grew from 3.2 to 13.7 per­
cent, registering the most significant advance in the north: from
3.2 to 22.7 percent; in the same sense, employee opposition to the 
political activity of the church dropped in general and most drasti­
cally in the north, from 69.1 to 50 percent. It should be noted that 
employees in the center and south increased their opposition 
slightly, but not enough to offset the changes among norther employ­
ees .
Employees also improved their position on military participa­
tion in politics. Such a change came primarily once again in the 
north, where favorable opinions rose from 12.7 to 33 percent; as in 
the case of the church, employees in the center and the south went 
in the opposite direction: favorable opinions dropped 2 points in 
the center and 7 in the south, but the increase of approval in the 
north increased the national average. Something similar happened re­
garding disapproval: negative responses rose in the center and in 
the south but not enough to offset the reduction in the north from
41.4 to 30.2 percent. At any rate, the discrepancy between northern 
employees on one hand and those in the center and south on the other 
should be noted. Northern employees took a marked turn toward the 
PAN and, as can be seen, toward church and military intervention in 
politics.
Employees were not set apart from the other strata in the sense 
that their attitudes in favor of radical change did drop, but on the 
other hand they were one of few strata — the only among the middle 
strata—  whose conservative responses did not increase but 
decreased. Northern employees once again remained apart from those 
in the center and south, in that those in the north increased their 
conservative responses (from 5.4 to 9.4 percent), but on this
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occasion those in the center and south reduced their conservative 
responses enough to offset the shift to the right among their 
northern counterparts: from 17.7 to 10.4 percent in the center and 
from 16.7 to 7.5 percent in the south. It can be affirmed that, 
despite the reduction in preferences for change, employees were, 
together with the base, the only stratum that did not show a clear 
shift toward conservatism.
Excelsior and Novedades continued being the preferred periodi­
cals among employees, although both lost ground in the north and in 
the center but gained some in the south. Employees proved to be, 
along with politicians, the most partial to local newspapers.
Bureaucrats
Bureaucrats remained the second most partial stratum to the 
PRI, behind politicians, but the drop in bureaucrat preferences for 
this party was extraordinary, above all in the center region where 
they went from 70.3 in 1983 to 28.5 percent in 1987. In the north, 
as in the majority of the cases, PRI sympathies fell a little among 
bureaucrats in that region: from 57 to 52.1 percent. In the south 
the drop was high, although not as high as in the center: 65.3 to
36.2 percent.
In contrast, the PAN gained ground among bureaucrats in all 
three regions, demonstrating the shift of the middle strata to this 
party. In the center, bureaucrats exceeded even professionals in 
their sympathies for the PAN (7.5 percent), changing the intra­
strata relationship that existed four years previous. On the other 
hand, the PMS went backwards to the point of almost losing any sym­
pathy among northern bureaucrats (5.4 to 1 percent), and also lost 
ground in the south, where bureaucrats had been the most partial 
stratum to this party in 1983: (from 8.3 to 6.7 percent); on the
other hand, PMS sympathies among bureaucrats in the center rose from
4.7 to 5.3 percent. As a result the overall drop ' in PMS sympathies
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was not so sharp: from 5.3 to 4.8 percent. Bureaucrats opting for no 
party doubled their percentage: from 15.6 to 34 percent.
If the drop in PRI sympathies among northern bureaucrats was 
not so marked, the opposite happened regarding government approval: 
Positive opinions fell from 46.3 to 22.8 percent, which meant north­
ern bureaucrats went from being the most partial of the middle 
strata to the government in 1983 to the least partial in 1987. 
Positive opinions among bureaucrats dropped in the center and south 
regions as well, although to a lesser degree. As a result bureau­
crats in both regions (and nationwide) came to be the second most 
favorable stratum of the government, behind politicians. Negative 
opinions among bureaucrats rose in the three regions and in fact 
were the highest (30.5 percent) in the north behind business. 
Negative opinions were also the second highest in the south, behind 
labor in this case. In sum, bureaucrats ceased to be one of the bas­
tions of government legitimacy in the political system.
The popularity of the right to strike among northern and south­
ern bureaucrats dropped slightly, with favorable opinions dropping 
from 64.5 to 63.8 percent in the north and from 66.7 to 60 percent 
in the south, but in the center they grew from 64.1 to 72.4. As a 
result, the national average grew from 64.6 to 69 percent. Regarding 
negative opinions, the tendency re-emerged: growth in the north and 
south and decline in the center, although the national average of 
bureaucrats opposed to the right to strike grew from 8.3 to 9.6 per­
cent .
In contrast with the other strata considered, bureaucrats ex­
pressed different attitudes regarding political participation by the 
church and military. In the case of the church, tolerance increased 
and in the case of the military it decreased. In both cases, how­
ever, the regional differences were significant. Negative opinions 
among bureaucrats toward church participation in politics rose in 
the center (from 71.6 to 74.4 percent) but fell in the north and in
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the south, in such a way that opposition nationwide among bureau­
crats went down.
Regarding the military, favorable opinions to its participation 
in politics fell among northern and center bureaucrats but rose in 
the south. At any rate, the national percentage decreased from 25,1 
to 16.2 percent. Negative opinions evolved in the same way as they 
did in the church's case: increase in the center but decline in the 
other two regions, although in this case the increase in the center 
was enough to raise the overall national average of opposition to 
military intervention in political life.
Bureaucrats came to be the most conservative of the middle 
strata (it had been employees in 1983) thanks to the increase in 
conservative attitudes in north and in the south; in the center they 
barely modified their position. Radical attitudes dropped, as al­
ways, in the three regions in very similar percentages (about 11 
points in each case).
The periodical preferred among bureaucrats continued being 
Excelsiorr but to a lesser degree: 9 percent. Second place went not 
to Novedades (5.1 percent) but to La Jornada (6.6 percent), followed 
by el Heraldo de Mexico (5.6 percent). Local newspapers gained 
points among bureaucrats, particularly in the center region, where 
preferences for them went from 17.1 to 28.3 percent. In the north, 
on the other hand, local periodicals declined 10 points among bu­
reaucrats .
THE POPULAR BASE OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID 
Labor
Labor became the stratum least partial to the PRI: 21.9 percent 
(52.7 in 1983). The setback was, once again, much more marked in the 
center, where sympathies for this party dropped from 57.2 to only 20 
percent. In the north, the drop was also very marked: from 38.2 to
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19.4 percent and a little less in the south: from 47.6 to 32.4 per­
cent. The PAN, on the other hand, continued gaining ground among 
workers in the north: 22.4 to 29.6 percent. It should be noted that, 
according to these results, northern labor sympathized much more 
with the PAN than with the PRI.
However, the PAN's advances among workers were not uniform. In 
the center and south there were declines in labor support for the 
PAN: from 12.5 to 10.8 percent in the center and 17.5 to 15.2 in the 
south. As a result, sympathies for the PAN nationwide dropped from
14.9 in 1983 to 14.7 percent in 1987, although the percentage was 
high enough so that workers kept their place as the stratum most 
partial to the PAN throughout the social pyramid.
The shift to the right among northern workers was confirmed by 
the notable drop in labor support for the PMS: from 3.9 to only 0.9 
percent, making almost imperceptible the influence of the most im­
portant party on the left among northern labor. In contrast --and in 
accordance with the PAN results-- the PMS gained ground in the 
center and in the south, going from 5.1 to 6.9 percent in the center 
and from 3.2 to 9.5 percent in the south. In the south, labor became 
the stratum most partial to the PMS and in the center the second 
most partial, only behind intellectuals. At the national level PMS 
preferences among workers rose from 4.7 to 6.3 percent, which was 
only surpassed-by intellectuals.
As in all strata except that of the politicians, the government 
favorability rating among workers went down: from 32.7 (the lowest 
in 1983) to 23.8 percent. This variation was due to a decrease of 15 
points in the center with increases in the north and south. On the 
other hand, the growth of negative opinions was constant across the 
three regions, although much more marked in the center and south, 
Workers continued being the most critical stratum of the government 
behind the marginals.
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The right to strike, surprisingly, became less popular among 
workers, probably as a result of fruitless strikes during the four- 
year period. In the three regions, the percentage of favorable opin­
ions dropped and negatives rose, making labor one of the most criti­
cal strata of this right. In the north, positive responses dropped 9 
points, in the center 11 and in the south 2. Negative responses rose 
14 points in the north, 6 points in the center and 5 in the south.
In fact, only politicians in general were less favorable than labor 
to the right to strike.
Regarding political participation by the church and military, 
labor tended to polarize and were the most critical of military par­
ticipation. It should be noted that labor became the stratum with 
the highest percentage of favorable responses to church participa­
tion: 16.6 percent, putting labor in first place in this regard in 
the north and center and in second place in the south. Nonetheless, 
negative opinions also rose at the national level: from 54.2 to 61.3 
percent, but the increase is due only to a rise in the center as 
negative opinions in the north and south dropped. Overall, workers 
became at the same time more inclined and more critical of the 
church's participation in politics, which makes it possible to speak 
of a polarization process.
Regarding military participation, workers became more critical, 
although with some important regional differences. In the north and 
south, favorable opinions rose but not enough to offset the decline 
in the center (from 31.2 to 17.3 percent); negative opinions rose in 
the north and center and also at the national level, but dropped in 
the south from 42.8 to 28.6 percent. Overall, it can be said that 
southern labor became much more inclined to the political participa­
tion of the clergy and military, in contrast with northern labor.
Workers were not set apart by their attitudes toward radical 
change --which in all cases dropped—  but it was notable that 
conservative responses dropped as well as those for radical change. 
As in all base strata, the general discourse of significant
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responses among workers was due to the abundance of do not know and 
no answer responses (18.2 percent overall). At the regional level, 
the exception was northern workers, whose attitudes in favor of 
radical change rose from 21.1 to 27.8 percent.
The popularity of Excelsior among northern workers, which 
had been nil in 1983, rose to 9.3 percent in 1987 (the highest 
across the three regions), and also rose in the south, but in spite 
of this the newspaper overall was less popular among workers, drop­
ping from 11.6 to 7.8 percent in the center and nationwide from 8.9 
to 7.9 percent. Novedades remained a periodical of scant interest 
among workers and in fact lost ground in the three regions, espe­
cially in the center where its readership fell to 0 and in the north 
where it fell to 0.9 percent. Worker preferences for other national 
newspapers rose across the three regions in favor of the sports 
daily Esto and la Prensa, according to the national results. Labor 
cannot be counted among the strata most partial to local newspapers 
(only 26.9 percent of workers preferred local dailies).
Campesinos
The campesino stratum continued being the most partial to the 
PRI at the base, but in margins so reduced that it would be diffi­
cult to keep considering campesinos as one of the bastions of legit­
imacy for the regime. Four years earlier only politicians and bu­
reaucrats sympathized more than the campesinos with the PRI, but in 
1987 they were surpassed as well by business, intellectuals and pro­
fessionals in the north, business in the center and employees in the 
south. The drop in campesino sympathies for the PRI in the center 
was, according the the general trend, from 65.9 to 26 percent.
The PAN gained ground among campesinos: 7.3 in 1983 to 9.4 per­
cent in 1987, but at the regional level the advance of the PAN only 
came in the north (8 to 18.8 percent) and in the south (1.4 to 8.7 
percent), with a setback in the center from 9.7 to 7.4 percent. 
Despite the notable increase in campesino sympathies in the north
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and south, this stratum continued being the least partial to the PAN 
among the three at the base. The PMS, on the other hand, lost ground 
among campesinos: from 3.2 to 3 percent in the north and from 3 to
2.8 percent in the center; in the south, the opposite happened with 
the PMS increasing from 1.4 to 1.9 percent. Campesinos were included 
among the most abstentionist strata, picking no party 42.8 percent 
of the time compared with only 12.6 percent in 1983. They were only 
surpassed in this sense by intellectuals and marginals.
Campesino opinion of the government, relatively good in 1983, 
became negative in 1987, with unfavorable responses (30.8 percent) 
exceeding favorable ones (21.1 percent). The drop in positive re­
sponses among campesinos was, once again, particularly accentuated 
in the center (from 41.3 to 19.8 percent), although also high in the 
north (40.3 to 23.8 percent) and in the south (36.1 to 24.1 per­
cent) . Part of the setback in positive responses was channeled to 
the fair option (30.6 to 50 percent), and the rest — the majority-- 
to the negatives. The growth of negative opinions was constant 
across the three regions, despite the fact that campesinos remained 
the least critical of the government among the base strata.
The image of the right to strike improved among campesinos in 
the center and in the south, but dropped in the north (from 4 6.8 to
39.6 percent). Although at the national level favorable opinions 
rose, campesinos continued being the stratum least identified with 
the right to strike at the base. Negative opinions fell in the north 
and in the center, but rose notably in the south (from 1.4 to 15.4 
percent) which increased the national average as well: from 10.7 to
11.8 percent of campesinos opposed to the right to strike.
Campesinos increased their level of opposition to political 
participation by the church and military. In both cases, negative 
opinions increased in each region, although in both cases as well 
campesinos kept their place as the base stratum least opposed to 
such participation. Favorable opinions on the other hand evolved 
irregularly. Regarding the military, favorable responses dropped in
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the center (from 31.2 to 17.3 percent) but grew in the north and in 
the south; regarding the church, favorable opinions rose, as in all 
strata, but to a less significant degree than among workers and 
marginals.
In contrast with the vast majority of regional strata, cam­
pesinos in the north increased their percent of responses in favor 
of radical change: from 33.9 to 40.6 percent, but in the center and 
in the south, they followed the general tendency and as a result the 
percentage of radical attitudes nationwide dropped from 34.2 to 23.9 
percent. In spite of this, campesinos became the most radical stra­
tum at the base. Campesinos partial to moderate change became the 
smallest group across the three regions, while those partial to con­
servatism also diminished in the center and south. Campesinos in the 
north expressed a great polarization regarding change, such that 
those inclined toward conservatism grew from 13 to 14.9 percent 
while those inclined toward radicalism increased their ranks as well 
in this region.
In contrast with the other strata considered, neither Excelsior 
nor Novedades were preferred by campesinos. Excelsior was already 
barely read by campesinos in 1983 and dropped even further in popu­
larity in the north and center --and nationwide—  but increased a 
little among campesinos in the south. Novedades, for its part, 
dropped to an almost insignificant 1.1 percent, thanks to a setback 
from 3 to 1.1 percent in the center and 5.8 to 1 percent in the 
south, which were not offset by the 0 to 1 percent advance in the 
north. On the other hand, the rest of the other national dailies 
increased their readership from 24.5 to 40.1 percent among 
campesinos; local newspapers lost ground, dropping from 22 to 19.2 
percent. It should be noted that above Excelsior and Novedades, 
campesinos preferred la Prensa (9.4 percent) and el Esto (5 
percent). It was notable that 34.1 percent of campesinos did not 
pick any newspaper, compared with only 17.5 percent in 1983. . 
Campesinos continued being the stratum least likely to read 
newspapers throughout the entire social pyramid.
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Marginals
In 1983 the marginals had been the stratum least partial to the 
PRI throughout the social pyramid, but ceded the position in 1987 to 
labor. At any rate, the national average of marginal preferences for 
this party (23.6 percent) continued being one of the lowest. The 
setback in PRI sympathies among marginals was more pronounced in the 
center (44.9 to 22.4 percent) and in the north (32.4 to 17.5 per­
cent) but rose in the south. In the north marginals continued being 
the stratum least tied to the PRI among all strata.
PAN popularity jumped among marginals in the north, from 10.8 
to 30.1 percent and also gained in the south, from 6.8 to 14.2 per­
cent . On the other hand, there was a considerable setback in the 
center from 16.2 to 7.8 percent, as a result of which the national 
average only grew 1.5 points (from 10.9 to 12.4 percent). In the 
north marginals exceeded even workers in PAN sympathies.
In consonance with the growth of PAN sympathies in the north 
and south, sympathies among marginals for the PMS fell to 0 in both 
regions and also dropped from 4.8 to 3.2 percent in the center. The 
influence of the PMS among marginals became, according to these re­
sults, almost non-existent. In addition, the other parties suffered 
a setback among marginals from 7.9 to 6.5 percent, while it was 
marginals who most frequently picked no party: 45.9 percent. 
Marginals continued being the stratum least identified with the 
party system and, therefore, potentially the most unstable.
Marginals also were the stratum with the poorest opinion of the 
government. Their favorable opinions were the lowest (19.6 percent) 
and their negative opinions were the highest (33.3 percent). The 
center became the region where marginals expressed their lowest mar­
gin of favorable opinions (17.7 percent, compared with 35.3 in 
1983), followed by the north (21.4 compared with 35.3 in 1983).
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Marginals slightly increased their favorable opinions of the 
right to strike. Approvals rose from 4 9 to 53.2 percent (greater 
than that among campesinos and almost as high as that among work- 
ers), although in the north approvals dropped 6 points. Negative 
opinions reached their lowest level going from 14.7 to 13 percent; 
marginals in the north affirmed their low affinity for this right, 
as unfavorable opinions rose 3 points among them.
Tolerance of church participation in politics rose among 
marginals, but declined in the case of the military. In the three 
regions favorable opinions of church participation rose and 
unfavorable declined, placing marginals as the least opposed stratum 
to such activity, behind campesinos. Regarding the military, 
however, there were regional differences: in the north, favorable 
opinions rose from 16 to 28 points, but dropped in the center and in 
the south and nationwide as well. Negative responses, on the other 
hand, rose across the three regions, and especially in the south.
Responses in favor of radical change fell among marginals to
17.9 percent, the most reduced percentage at the base and only com­
parable to those among elites. The drop was general across the three 
regions, although much more pronounced in the south than in the cen­
ter and in both than in the north. Regarding preferences for keeping 
everything as it was, marginals in the center and especially in the 
north showed increases, in contrast with those in the south, where 
the conservative ranks diminished. At the national level, conserva­
tive responses grew, which reduced the level of radical responses 
and would indicate a shift toward conservatism among marginals, de­
spite their precarious socio-economic conditions. A possible expla­
nation would have to be sought in the expansion of the underground 
economy during this period.
Preferred periodicals among marginals were, as in the case of 
the other base strata, el Esto (6.8 percent) and la Prensa (5.9 per­
cent) along with Excelsior at the same percent. At the regional 
level, Excelsior slightly increased its readership among marginals
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in the north and center but lost some in the south. Novedades lost 
almost all of its marginal readers, dropping to 0 in the north and 
south and from 5.4 to 3 percent in the center. The rest of the na­
tional newspapers gained ground (34.1 to 43 percent) while local 
newspapers declined in popularity, although slightly. After cam­
pesinos, marginals proved to be the stratum least likely to read 
newspapers.
C O N C L U S I O N S
In the introduction it was said that this investigation at­
tempted to test four central hypotheses. First, that the response to 
each one of the three crises of the last 20 years has created the 
following crisis, because the responses have mainly attacked the ap­
parent effects and not the fundamental causes, producing a perni­
cious historical chain reaction, particularly through the institu­
tional presidency, which has deepened Mexico's problems. Second, 
that notwithstanding the previous, the country has improved slightly 
in an accidental way beginning with the 1940s, thanks to a relative 
autonomy in the behavior of the political, social and economic 
spheres which has allowed each one to neutralize and offset the ex­
cesses of the others. Third, that the crises have made evident the 
existence of a great structural heterogeneity in the society that 
provides an important capacity to resist adverse situations through 
the diversity of perceptions of the same reality. And fourth, that 
this superstructural sphere (perceptions, values, mass communica­
tion, culture) is what ties, transmits and propagates the phenomena 
discussed in the first three hypotheses and, therefore, perception 
is as important as reality.
The first hypothesis seems to be supported by finding in Mexico 
in the last 20 years a chain of causes and effects, of preconditions 
and over-determinations that is present from sexenio to sexenio pre­
cisely through the force of presidentialism. The enormous political 
and economic power that presidents of the republic traditionally 
have had over a weak civil society, although not enough to transform 
society, has granted a capacity to contain national events, at least 
from Diaz Ordaz to De la Madrid. The centralist presidency seems to 
have inhibited and obscured the emergence and action of other social 
institutions.
The pressures of the mid-1960s, stemming from economic inequal­
ity and political authoritarianism, for an increasingly robust mid­
dle class, seem to have produced the student conflict of 1968 as an
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expression of rebellion and protest heightened by the spirit of the 
times throughout the world. The repression of Tlatelolco on October 
2, 1968, constitutes the first crisis under analysis, which created 
a delegitimizing effect for the State in the eyes of part of the 
middle class and determined the leading thread of the Echeverria 
sexenio: regain the support of these middle class groups, particu­
larly through young people.
Echeverria adopted the language of the students, incorporated 
many young people into his government, helped the intellectuals and 
universities and slowly made advances toward relegitimacy. There 
were not in reality fundamental changes, as the systems' benefits 
continued flowing to the top of the social pyramid, but there were 
disquieting formal changes that gave rise to a confrontation that, 
though seeming to be sterile, was unsettling.
The United States government was bothered by the third world 
rhetoric and actions of Echeverria. Perhaps as well the U.S. be­
lieved they were seeing international communism on the rise in 
Mexico and felt obliged to detain it. The ignorance of the the Nixon 
administration about the Mexican political system became very evi­
dent to the Echeverria government. There was no conflict in the 
first half of the sexenio, despite the North American concern, be­
cause of the central role played by Eugenio Garza Sada from 
Monterrey, who-understood the rules and helped maintain calm among 
the younger and more irritated youth.
The death of Garza Sada led to a growing lack of confidence in 
the government among the business elite, which would culminate in a 
second moment of crisis: the currency devaluation of August 31,
1976. This constitutes the leading thread of the oil sexenio: re­
gaining the confidence of business. Lopez Portillo captivated and 
enthused the country with the presidential magic in his inauguration 
speech.
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This leading thread explains the alliance for production, the 
solution for everyone and the enormous confidence this administra­
tion generated for half of the sexenio through oil exploitation. But 
the party did not last very long. The unfavorable combination of an 
overheated economy with an abrupt drop of 2 dollars in the interna­
tional price of oil precipitated the events of the end of this sexe­
nio, which did not create open confrontation but an acceleration of 
capital flight — already at important levels—  and which were not 
checked either by a currency devaluation or by exchange controls and 
finally ended in the bank nationalization, the third crisis under 
analysis in this investigation.
For this study it is of some importance to explore the consid­
erations that led to the decision that constitutes the third moment 
of crisis — the bank nationalization—  on September 1, 1982. For the 
hegemonic faction of the new governing group that was three months 
from taking power, the bank nationalization constituted an unjusti­
fied, unanticipated and abrupt split that could have caused more se­
rious injuries to the country than those the government was trying 
to avoid. They put on the table new considerations about the confi­
dence of international strategic security agencies and international 
financial centers and demonstrated the will to comply scrupulously 
with Mexico's foreign agreements. This presidential will of Miguel 
de la Madrid constitutes the leading thread of his administration 
and explains the events of recent years and corroborates the postu­
lated causal chain of events of the last 20 years precisely through 
the above-mentioned presidential will.
Miguel de la Madrid proposed an immediate economic reordering 
(PIRE); initiated an intense restructuring of the Mexican debt; 
strengthened ties with foreign bankers and promoted entrance into 
the GATT and foreign investment as well as the orientation of pro­
duction toward exports; arranged for the slow liberation of prices; 
the elimination of subsidies; the sale of state businesses; the con­
trol of salaries and reduction of the fiscal deficit. In sum he com­
plied scrupulously with the conditions demanded by our creditors and
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advanced solidly toward the stated purposes of his administration. 
But this sexenial commitment had, as well as the previous commit­
ments of Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, a high price — the 
discontent of the middle and popular strata because of the internal 
economic difficulties generated by compliance with the exterior.
Reiterating, Echeverria sought and regained support from the 
middle classes, but the price he paid was lack of business confi­
dence. Lopez Portillo sought and gained business confidence, only to 
lose it again. And additionally, according to some, he lost the con­
fidence of the international strategic security agencies through the 
bank nationalization, although the measure had popular support. De 
la Madrid sought and gained compliance with the international commu­
nity, but the price he paid was skepticism among the masses.
The next sexenio, following this logic, should seek to regain 
mass support, but such a strategy would create conflict with the 
middle classes, at least. What is not so clear is whether the condi­
tions exist to allow the system of alliances to continue operating 
as it has in the last 60 years and whether the traditional consensus 
will respond to the new circumstances. It should not be forgotten, 
first, that the economic consensus was blown to pieces when the Bank 
of Mexico changed its legal constitution from a private to a decen­
tralized public organization in November of 1982 and excluded pri­
vate elites who had constituted its board of directors since its 
creation in 1925. Second, that the ideological consensus with UNAM 
was wrecked, as was illustrated in the rector's speech to the uni­
versity council.1 And third, that the traditional political consen­
sus frayed in the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution, as 
Garrido has suggested in his book of the same title, as seen in the 
movement headed by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and Porfirio Munoz Ledo, the 
democratic current, which took off with great velocity beginning in 
August of 1986. It seems that both the national agreement as well as 
the constituent parts are fading.
1 Fortaleza y Debilidad de la UNAM, April 16, 1986.
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It was postulated in the second hypothesis that despite the 
pernicious chain of events from 1968, 1976, 1982 and 1987, the coun­
try has improved slightly beginning with the decade of the 1940s, 
After reviewing the statistical results in the second part, it is 
possible to affirm that the improvement was sustained between 1940 
and 1968 — the year with the highest value of the period—  but from 
then on there was a stagnant period that only improved temporarily 
from 1983 to 1985 but included a jump above 1968 levels.
The third hypothesis postulates that the existence of a great 
structural heterogeneity has been made evident during the last three 
crises that gives the society a capacity to resist adverse circum­
stances through the diversity of perceptions of the same reality.
After comparing the regional results for the eight variables 
considered it was possible to recognize ideological and political 
differences among the three regions under analysis. The north is, 
overall, more right wing than the center or south. The south is a 
little more left wing and also more partial to the regime. Support 
for the government and the PRI and the consensus on the state’s con­
quests and historic traditions, such as the right to strike and the 
exclusion of the military from politics, are definitely lower in the 
north. Support of military and church intervention in politics is 
greater in the-south than in the center.
To the regional heterogeneity already discussed it is necessary 
to add that a considerable political and ideological heterogeneity 
underlies the social pyramid. The results of the analysis yield the 
conclusion that the current social consensus is markedly less in the 
popular strata than in the middle strata and in both than at the 
top. It is reasonable to suppose that such a fact could be due to 
the relatively great impact in recent years of the difficult eco­
nomic situation, which has been constant at least since 1982. Labor, 
campesinos and marginals have seen their standards of living drop 
without a doubt in greater percentages than standards among the mid-
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die and upper strata. The difficult economic situation, which for a 
professional could mean a reduction in consumption or for a busi­
nessman a drop in profits, has represented unemployment with subse­
quent marginalization and economic and social insecurity for an im­
portant nucleus of workers, although it has expanded the universe of 
the informal economy.
The identification of clear political and socio-cultural dif­
ferences across regions and strata would lead to the inference that 
cross tabulations of both series would yield significant results, In 
effect, the cross tabulations revealed notable variations in the 
scores of each strata with their counterparts in other regions. In 
addition, it was shown that the differences within distinct strata 
were not uniform in each of the regions, tending on occasion to at­
tenuate and on others to polarize.
In sum, the results of part three support the postulated hy­
pothesis. The clear differences among the nine population strata and 
three national regions lead to the conclusion that the impact of the 
crises was differential concerning depth and magnitude along the so­
cial scale and across regions.
It can be affirmed that the popular strata were absent as au­
thors and actors in the crises --though not as receptors—  in such a 
way that there-was a great concentration in the participation and 
perception of the crises among elites, with the exception of 1968 
and the high involvement of the middle classes. In the three cases 
also, initially at least, the authors and actors have been concen­
trated in the center of the country and especially in the Federal 
District with a great absence of spectators in the rest of the coun­
try. On the other hand, in countries with relatively more homoge­
neous societies than Mexico and where the impact of crises and the 
processes of mass communication are more rapid, it would seem that 
the capacity to resist adverse circumstances would be less and vul­
nerability would be greater.
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However, social and political authors and actors have progres­
sively emphasized the need to broaden and deepen Mexican democracy; 
and not necessarily in defense of principles, but for practical rea­
sons: creative thought from the base of the social pyramid can en­
rich and improve situations distant from the elite. This is a new 
interpellation, urban and industrial, that is present in the current 
conditions of the country. The democratic interpellation is differ­
ent from the four traditional ones — land, unionism, education, and 
no re-election-- that arose from the Revolution. This real social 
impulse is what is behind phenomena such as the democratic current 
and the center-left Cardenista movement.
Final reflections
Two political currents of similar force and electoral weight 
appear with increasing clarity in the society, as was seen in the 
July 1988 election. One comes from economic modernization, so neces­
sary for the nation; the other from political democratization, also 
indispensable for Mexico. These forces have arisen within the PRI.
On one side are the technico-priistas who by ideology are center- 
right and by economic policy are moderate conservatives. They have 
electoral support among the middle and upper classes and economic 
support from business, while their ideas are mainly directed at eco­
nomic development. They can easily build alliances and establish 
ties with the PAN and the church. On the other side are the 
politico-priistas who by ideology are center-left and by economic 
policy are moderate progressives. They have electoral support among 
the popular urban and rural classes and economic support from labor, 
while their ideas are mainly directed toward social development.
They can easily build alliances and establish ties with those in the 
Cardenista movement.
Those who yearn for the old PRI monopoly or the arrival of a 
sweeping new force seem misled. Democracy will come rather in the 
articulation of a plural system and not in exclusion by a homoge­
neous force. But plural articulation does not mean that there will
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be some opposition aldermen in municipal government; nor that in 
state government there will be a handful of opposition officials; 
nor that in the local and federal congresses there will be dissident 
representatives. Plural articulation means, above all, respect for 
diversity^with all of the implications it carries: respect for the 
syndical vote, for the civic vote, for opposition governments and 
the alternation of parties in the presidency.
Cardenas brought electoral weight to the left from the first 
politico-priista split and the left brought its theoretical congru­
ence to his forces. Salinas is bringing to Mexican politics, with 
his actions, the clarity that had been lost in order to define the 
internal boundaries of the system. If the politico-priistas know 
their future, it is not with the technico-priistas, but what is 
possible and desirable is a gradual political articulation, state by 
state, that will permit them to regain their role and positions at 
the local level and eventually and alternately at the national 
level; as a result, their future is promising. If on the other hand 
there is an internal fight, their future looks bleak. In the 
electoral geography of Mexico it is more or less clear which states, 
given their respective histories and circumstances, would be on one 
side or the other.
In a larger context, Mexico’s future appears promising because 
the exhaustion'Of the national leadership that began in 1968 and 
that has deepened in the last 20 years, seems to be coming to an 
end. During this transition, the leadership has weakened, its series 
of projects has weakened, and the social cohesion has weakened.
The historic chain of the last 20 years seems to be explained 
also by the absence of powerful external global impulses in a long 
cycle. In 1891, the Porfirio Diaz regime put down an extensive stu­
dent movement that spawned the youth who would in the course of the 
next 20 years mature in their grievances and upon changing along 
with the conditions of the country would help bring about the 
Revolution of 1910. This along with World War I extended the inter­
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nal conflict until 1917, producing a broad revolutionary process 
that would mark the structure of the Mexican State.
It would seem that the historic impulse that drove the 
Revolution of 1910 and World War I lasted until the decade of the 
1930s, pushing domestic events along the same worldwide course. A 
second powerful wave was produced in the 1940s with World War II and 
its effects seem to have lasted until the 1970s, when a third im­
pulse was needed but never arrived.
The third impulse — powerful, historic, worldwide-- that 
might have given direction to internal events did not arise in the 
1970s or the 1980s. And so, the external guide was lost, which was 
associated with the biological exhaustion of the national leadership 
and put the country through a period of transition in the last two 
decades, in which the weakening of the leadership and the social 
pact led to the exacerbation of contradictions so long as civil so­
ciety matured and the false consciousness broken by 1968 continued 
to fall into pieces. In this sense the student movement had a double 
significance for the nation: on one side, as an awareness raiser of
the contradictory nature of the Mexican State and, on the other, as
2
a catalyst for the formation of a fundamental generation.
The rising production of ideas and profusion of studies about 
the transition- or the crises in their multiple aspects are tied to 
Ortega and Gasset's concept of generation.3 And so, a new generation 
seemed to emerge at the end of the 1960s, marked by the beginning of
2 Camp, Roderic, "Generaciones Politics en Mexico", Vuelta, No. 119, October
1986, P. 30.
3 "Among all of the generations that exist in any given moment, contemporaneous
generations more than contemporary generations, two stand out irt particular: 
young men from approximately 30 to 45 years of age, who struggle to build a 
new world and the generation of men between 45 and 60 who have been 
enthroned in power in the world they built and who have impressed their 
vision on the order of things. In general, before the age of 30, men are 
still projects in the making, without having taken or committed to any 
cause. After age 60, men only sporadically intervene in history". Ortega y 
Gasset, En torno a Galileo: Esquema de las Crisis.
263
the transition phase, who are now coming to leadership roles as they 
approach age 45.
The generation of intellectuals — concretely, of social scien­
tists—  who began to contribute to the development of theory in the 
1970s, have found one of their most recurring themes in the topic of 
transition. If transition defines our era, it was necessary to un­
dertake a fundamental study of it. It is not difficult to show that 
the crisis or crises — whatever the case—  have been the leading 
thread of the work of an entire generation of social scientists.
This is proved by the sheer number of social scientists who have fo­
cused their work on crisis.
And so, two historical tendencies persist at the close of the 
1980s: the traditional inertia of the authoritarian-corporative 
state and the emergence of the new modern, defiant, democratic soci­
ety. However, the future can be tentatively viewed with optimism, 
because after 20 years of internal conflict in the national elite 
and the weakening of its internal ties and those with the base of 
the social pyramid, the need to re-establish the social pact and 
strengthen internal cohesion becomes increasing more evident. In 
this context, the rearticulation of the signers of and the concerta- 
tion of the clauses in the new pact acquire relevance.
In order-to define the previous process, it is important to 
understand the process of renovation among the three sectors of the 
national leadership --that is, political, economic and intellectual 
leaders—  as well as the ties that bind them. While the ideological 
leadership has a relatively rapid renovation process, by the more or 
less open character of the integration of its components, the eco­
nomic leadership, on the other hand, has a relatively slow process 
of renovation, because of the traditionally closed character of the 
process of the transmission of economic power through the passing on 
of private business through inheritance. The speed of the renovation 
of the political elite is moderate, because the process is not to­
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tally open or hereditary: family name and prestige are helpful along 
the political ladder, but are not definitive.
On the other hand, while the business pyramid has economic in­
terest asf its cement and the political pyramid has upward mobility, 
the cement in the intellectual pyramid is the affinity for ideas.
The differences among the three different kinds of cement are impor­
tant, because that of business and politics is more concrete and 
tangible than that of ideology, but on the other side ideological 
bonds have a greater reach and penetration than the others. And so, 
cohesion and speed of renovation, combined with the impact of 1968, 
the strengthening of the middle class and of civil society and the 
speed of communication today, are producing the formation of a new 
invisible pyramid which is the ideological army.
This army is made up of three groups: first, a small upper 
stratum of a couple of dozen lucid Mexican intellectuals, the major­
ity of whom come from the generations preceding the 1968 student 
movement; second, the middle ranks made up of academic researchers, 
university professors, technical advisers in official agencies, 
units of economic analysis in private companies —  these can number 
as many as 100,000; and, third, the ideological rank and file mainly 
made up of youth — students, analysts, assistants-- who interact 
with the second group and who could number as many as 1 million.
This pyramid has as well a differentiation in the structure of 
ages that ties the older with the younger and, as a result, the ide­
ological pyramid is able to penetrate the political and economic 
pyramids from the top to bottom, invading them through the intellec­
tual formation of the future economic and political leaders of 
Mexico. The strength of the upper ideological stratum is based in 
its ability to read the social reality, formulate it in clear, 
easily communicated terms and then to be reinforced with credibil­
ity, prestige and moral authority, that both the economic and polit­
ical leadership are losing in favor of the intellectual leadership.
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In addition and in benefit to the intellectual pyramid, it 
seems that in Mexico at this time the great connector between the 
events of the social, economic and political spheres is precisely 
this superstructural element, the cultural element, which is to say 
the raising of awareness and the perception of reality that individ­
uals possess, filtered through their values in whichever of these 
three spheres. This brings us once again to the analysis of the im­
portance of culture for understanding reality and perception. The 
cultural context in which people perceive the economic, political 
and social realities is going to powerfully influence behavior at 
the individual and aggregate levels across these three spheres.
A tendency that certainly will attract academic attention will 
be the reconstruction of the consensus that after 50 years started 
to unravel in 1968 — the consensus that came together among the dif­
ferent groups in Mexican society at the turn of the century. It does 
not seem that the work will be done by just one person, nor by one 
group of people, nor perhaps by only one political party. It seems 
rather the work of an entire generation that will be done in what 
remains of this century by the students of 1968 who now, 20 years 
after, are beginning to acquire economic, political and social power 
in Mexico.
There are favorable signs to this generational possibility, 
such as the political opening during the last three presidencies; 
the growing participation of civil society that is being expressed 
in several forms; the renovation of the CTM leadership in the next 
decade; the electoral mobilizations at the local and some state 
levels, among others.
In undertaking this work it will be necessary to review, in 
the framework of culture, how new concepts of neighbor, work and 
criticism can be constructed and defined; how these new concepts can 
take root in the law, religion, education, mass media, public dis­
course, morality and ethics; if it is necessary to re-establish re­
lations with the church, to found a new religion or to nationalize
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the current one; whether to revolutionize or expropriate the educa­
tion system and the mass media or give them to Televisa or to the 
church; whether to break or strengthen the political discourse; 
whether to revise the foundations of the law or maintain them in 
their current traditions and customs.
In the economy it will be necessary to study whether to grant 
the states and municipalities new functions and their own sources of 
fiscal revenue or to strengthen even more their financial dependence 
on the federal government; whether to continue with a profound fis­
cal reform, patrimonial taxes or any other possible or convenient, 
or if this should be avoided at all costs; whether income ranges 
should be fixed relative to age, qualifications and years of experi­
ence — maximum salaries—  from one to 25 minimum salaries, or 
whether the current path of growing social inequality should be 
maintained; whether the productive plant should be oriented first to 
winning foreign markets through international competition, or, on 
the contrary, to satisfying the internal demand and taking advantage 
of the country's renewable natural resources.
In the polity it will be necessary to study whether to reduce 
to four or increase to 30 the number of cabinet posts; whether to 
reduce to two or raise to 15 the number of political parties; 
whether to change the electoral calenders of the states to produce 
stronger governors and weaker secretaries or viceversa; to see if 
and when the government will accept opposition victories; if the 
sectorial positions in the party should be strengthened or broken; 
if the demand to respect the vote will become effective. These revi­
sions and many others constitute work to be done. What is clear is 
that the created interests and correlations of forces do not change 
easily with words, ideas, arguments, or public pronouncement, irre­
spectively of how sound and convincing they may appear.
Appendix
The April 1983 poll included 7,051 anonymous interviews with 
uniform quotas for 15 occupational groups in 31 states and the 
federal district according to population. The questionnaire included 
46 closed questions. The profile of the sample is as follows: 66 
percent men and 34 percent women; 40 percent from age 18 to 30, 30 
percent from 31 to 40, 19 percent from 41 to 50 and 11 percent older 
than 50; 5 percent without education, 28 percent with some 
elementary school, 17 percent with some junior high school, 18 
percent with high school, 29 percent with professional training and 
3 percent with graduate studies; 18 percent with no declared income, 
17 percent below minimum wage, 2 6 percent between 1 and 2 minimum 
salaries, 24 percent between 2 and 4 minimum salaries, 11 percent 
from 4 to 8 minimum salaries and 4 percent with more than 8 minimum 
salaries. The July 1987 poll included 9,032 anonymous interviews 
with uniform quotas for 14 occupational groups in 70 localities in 
31 states and the federal district according to census population 
figures for those 18 and older. The questionnaire included 46 closed 
questions. The breakdown by sex was 66 percent men and 34 percent 
women; by age, 40 percent from 18 to 30, 33 percent from 31 to 40,
19 percent from 41 to 50, and 8 percent older than 50; by income, 47 
percent less than minimum wage, 38 percent between 1 and 4 minimum 
salaries, 10 percent between 4 and 8 minimum salaries and 5 percent 
with more than*8 minimum salaries.
The following table contains the margin of error at a 
confidence level of 99.9 percent (C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, Survey 
Methods in Social Investigation, London: Heinemann, 1977, P. 74), 
for each of the figures presented in Chapter 8, from which the 
figures in Chapters 9 and 10 were disaggregated. The significance 
tests made by the Macintosh StatView package yield a level of 0.001. 
The size of the sample permits valid use of the theory that equates 
binomial to normal distribution. The formula used to calculate the 
margin of error is the following: 3.3 x the square root of (p/100 
((1-p)/100)/n) x 100, where 3.3 is the z value, or the area beneath
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the curve of the normal standard distribution corresponding to a 
confidence interval at the significance level of 0.001; p is the 
percentage to estimate; n is the sample size. For example, 55.3 
percent of sympathy for the PRI in the 1983 poll with 7.051 
interviews yields a margin of error of 1.95, calculated as follows: 
3.3 x the square root of (55.3/100 (1-55.3/100)/7051) x 100, = 3.3 x 
the square root of (0.553 (0.447)/7051 x 100 - 3.3 x the square root 
of (0.247191/7051) x 100 = 3.3 (0.005916) x 100 = 1.95228 (Cfr 
Ronald Walpole, Introduction to Statistics, New York: MacMillan, 
1968, P. 195).
The limitations of sampling by quotas as well as the problem of 
estimating error are without a doubt inconvenient (see Moser and 
Kalt, op cit P. 127). However, the non-existence of reliable 
sampling frameworks and the costs associated with resolving these 
problems impede random sampling. Nonetheless, the results obtained 
in the two polls are internally consistent and consistent as well 
with the results obtained by Enrique Alduncin (Banamex, Los Valores 
de los Mexicanos, 1986) taken from two polls in 1982 and 1987. As 
can be observed, the margin of error, were the surveys random, in 
all cases is less than 2 percent.
M a r g i n O f e r r o r a t  a s i g n i  f i c a n c e 1e v e 1 o f O.OOl
1 2 3 4 5
83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87 83 87
A . <%> 55.3 2 9.6 10.5 10.2 3 . 8 4 . O 4 . 3 9 . 6 2 6.1 4 6.7
e r  ro r 1 . 95 1.59 1.20 1.05 0.75 0.68 0.80 1 . 02 1.73 1.73
B . <%> ” 4 1.6 2 9.3 35.3 34.6 14.0 2 9.2 9 . 1 6 . 9
e r  ro r 1 . 94 1.58 1.88 1 . 65 1.36 1.58 1.13 0.88
C . <%) 52 . O 32 . O 19.2 22.7 11.3 27.4 17 . 5 18.0
o r  ro r 1.96 1 . 62 1.55 1.45 1.24 1.55 1.49 1 . 33
D . <%> 56.6 58.9 17.2 17.9 12 . 4 13.4 13 . 8 9 . 8
e r ro r 1 . 95 1.71 1.48 1.33 1.30 1.18 1.36 1 . 03
E . <%> 3 . 7 13.1 20.8 10.0 65 . 8 67 . 3 9 . 7 9 . 7
e r ro r 0.74 1.17 1.60 1.04 1.86 1 . 63 1.16 1 . 03
F . <%) 22 . 7 19.1 20.5 13.9 44.2 53 . 2 4 . 2 7 . 4 8 . 5 6 . 5
e r  ro r 1 . 65 1.36 1.59 1.20 1 . 95 1.73 0.79 O . 91 1.10 0.86
a . <%> 30.4 23.7 57.3 60 . 1 12.3 16.2
e r  ro r 1.81 1.48 1 . 94 1.70 1.29 1.28
H . <%> 18.0 10.7 12.5 5 . O 39.3 4 3.3 21.2 28.5 9 . O 12 . 5
e r  ro r 1.51 1 . 07 1.30 0.76 1 . 92 1.72 1 . 61 1 . 57 1 . 12 1.15
A Party sympathy: 1 —PRI, 2—PAN, 3 -P S U M , 4 — Others, 5»None / E3 
Government Approval: 1 —good, 2—regular, 3 —bad y 4—don’t know / C Bank 
Nationalization: 1— good, 2 —regular, 3 —bad. 4—don't know / D Right to Strike:
1 —good, 2—regular, 3 — bad, 4 —don't know / EE Church In Politics : 1 —good,
2 —some times, 3 —bad. 4 —don’t know / F Military in Politics : 1 — good,
2 —regular, 3 —bad, 4—don’t know y 5 —no answer / G Attitude Towards 
Change: 1—radical, 2—moderate y 3 —conservative t  H Newspaper preference: 
1 —Excelsior, 2 —Novedades, 3 —other national, 4 —local y 5—no answer
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